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VOLUME I, ISSUE II, FALL 1998

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STATEMENT OF PURPOSE

The *Towson University Journal of Historical Studies* is based on the conviction that students and faculty can, and in fact do, learn from each other. It represents an attempt to raise that mutual process to the more formal level of publication. Student papers, undergraduate as well as graduate, can contribute to the development of knowledge either through an analysis of hitherto unexploited original documents or through fresh insight and debate; student reviews and other short essays will also be considered. Faculty, on the other hand, can best contribute to this particular dialogue by submitting reviews, pedagogical essays, and the like, which demonstrate the more critical, as opposed to the more creative, side of the historian's craft, fulfilling their role as teachers while students try their wings.

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NOTE FROM THE EDITOR

In this issue student authors as well as members of the faculty here at Towson University address two distinct perspectives in the study of history. An article by Brandi Robinson and a review essay by William Ward focus on the ways in which "great men," or those who have occupied positions of power, have shaped the course of history through exerting their influence in the realm of politics as well as other venues. In contrast, an article by Lauren Suls and book reviews by Dr. Lynn Johnson and Dr. James Lawlor examine history through the eyes of ordinary men and women who are often far removed from such influential positions; yet the actions taken by these people as individuals or as a group contribute significantly to the development of events. While these two approaches present clearly divergent views of the relationship between power and the individual in shaping the events of the past, they nonetheless provide historians with a kind of ideological spectrum on which the great-man approach and a social approach mark two extremes. And although a single objective truth is nearly impossible to discover, considering the multifaceted nature of the discipline, it is through the balance of these two approaches that one can fully appreciate the events and characteristics of different time periods, and thereby give definition and substance to the study of history.

LAZARO CARDENAS AND THE REALIZATION OF THE MEXICAN
REVOLUTION

BRANDI ROBINSON

In modern Mexican historical studies one of the most prominent figures is Lazaro Cardenas (president 1934-1940). The nature of the state under Cardenas--and Cardenas himself --has garnered much attention, positive attention. So well regarded has Cardenas been that historian Marjorie Becker has referred to the history of the Cardenas administration as a "myth of secular redemption" in which Cardenas appears as a "latter day Jesus."¹ Though perhaps an overstatement, it is an indication of the dominant historical, and popular view of Cardenas. He has remained above historical criticism. Cardenas is seen by most as a dedicated, popular reformer and his administration as the fulfillment of the Revolutionary promise. Thus, Michael Meyer and William Sherman in *The Course of Mexican History* entitled the chapter on the president, "Cardenas Carries the Revolution to the Left."² In one sense this is true. Cardenas did enact a number of reforms that would certainly be considered leftist. However it is too simplistic to sum up Cardenas's rule entirely in this way. The problem inherent in this view is that it fails to account for the fact that such reform characterized only the first part of Cardenas's presidency not the whole of his term. Moreover, the reforms though themselves leftist in the particulars, were part of a larger conservative thrust to unify Mexico under a powerful, highly centralized state. Even when studies recognize that the end of Cardenas's administration ceased to continue reform, they do not account for this as an internal transition in the larger state building program. Rather, it is presented as moderation imposed by external forces, namely, foreign investors, the governments supporting them and the conservative interests in Mexico. The only aspect of the later part of Cardenas's term that historians trace directly to Cardenas is his choice of a successor. They absolve Cardenas from any association with conservatism or anti-reform acts, instead attributing such acts to Cardenas's successors. Focusing on the reforms, historians have all but ignored their aim or outcome. Thus it is necessary to study the

¹ Marjorie Becker, *Setting the Virgin on Fire* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995). p.1.

² Michael Meyer and William Sherman, *The Course of Mexican History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). p.596.

reforms implemented under Cardenas, labor, agrarian and political in the larger context of his overall program and its legacy. In the interest of brevity and fluidity, educational and ecclesiastical reforms will not be examined.³ By studying two features of the Cardenas administration, the goals and the legacy, a new, more adequate, if less flattering, view of Cardenas emerges.

When Cardenas became president in 1934 a veritable landslide of reform ensued. Cardenas promoted the organization of labor into one union and further supported labor, not only in their right to strike but also in arbitration and favorable settlements. Similarly, Cardenas took up the cause of the peasants, organized them into a national confederation and distributed land on an unprecedented scale. With regard to education, Cardenas expanded the program and removed the church from instruction. Politically, Cardenas freed the Mexican presidency from the controlling influence of the Jefe Maximo, Plutarco Calles, and ended the party created by Calles, the Partido Nacional Revolucionario. In its place Cardenas formed the Partido Revolucionario Mexicano, designed to represent the military, popular, labor and agrarian sectors of society. The list of reforms could be expanded and made more detailed, but for our purposes this is enough, for it enables us to see the case made in portraying Cardenas as a liberal reformer, a leader dedicated to the people. Closer observation, however, leads one to see Cardenas as a leader dedicated to the state.

Immediately upon coming to power Cardenas took up the cause of labor. At this time the situation for workers was less than satisfactory, yet the labor movement was hopelessly divided, barring any effective action. Cardenas undertook to remedy the situation, as mentioned before, by promoting the causes and activities of organized labor.

In February of 1936 Cardenas made a speech in Monterrey, that has been thought to embody his policy on labor in brief.⁴ This speech is known as the "Fourteen Points." The text of several points follows:

1. The government will cooperate with capital and labor in the solution of their problems.
2. A united labor front should be organized, since strife between rival labor organizations themselves is detrimental to the government as well as to the workers and employers.
3. The government is arbiter and regulator of social problems.
4. The demands of labor will be taken into consideration only as

they come with in the limits of the ability of the various industries to pay.

5. When labor's united front is organized, the government will deal with it to the exclusion of minority groups which might choose to continue.
9. Current labor agitation is not due to the existence of Communistic groups, since they are so small they have no real influence in the affairs of the nation. The real cause of labor agitation is the fact that the just needs of the laboring masses have not been met, and the labor laws have not been carried out faithfully.⁵

Several themes become evident on analysis of these points. Though Cardenas recognized the existence of classes --"labor" and "capital"-- and the conflict between them, he clearly is not promoting a merger or extinction of one in favor of the other. Points four, seven and eight attest to the retention of capital. Thus, Cardenas's plan is not radical, a view further demonstrated in point nine. Point nine outlines Cardenas's intention to implement already established laws, clearly here referring to Article 123 in the Constitution of 1917 and the Federal Labor Law of 1931.⁶ Most important is the theme expressed in points one through five which outline the establishment of one union under the state. It resembles a "company union" structure.⁷ The state was to be active in the organization and maintenance of one recognized union, whose fate it would also determine. Point three deserves further, individual emphasis as it plainly established government hegemony in industrial relations, indeed in society as a whole.

In speaking on the specific unionization of teachers, John A. Britton makes a keen observation applicable to all labor organization under Lazaro Cardenas. "The potential antagonists in union employer conflict were linked in a way that seemed to favor the large bureaucratic state over the less powerful union."⁸ And so it was. Labor was organized to serve the state, not vice versa. Strikes contrary to the interests of the nation were simply not recognized. The strike of 1936 was such a case. In August,

⁵ Text of Lazaro Cardenas's speech, 2/11/1936, as it appears in Ashby. *Ibid.*, pp.182-183.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p.184.

⁷ Enrique Krauze, *Mexico: Biography of Power* (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, Inc., 1997). p.470.

⁸ John Britton, "Teacher Unionization and the Corporate State in Mexico, 1931-1945," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 59 (November 1979):690.

³ These reforms were discussed in the early drafts of this paper, but they seemed to interrupt the flow and were not necessary in proving the thesis.

⁴ Joe Ashby, "Labor and the Theory of the Mexican Revolution Under Lazaro Cardenas," *Americas* 20 (October 1963):182.

1937 strikes were no longer readily promoted. "We ask the labor organizations...consistent cooperation in seeking agreements before going out on new strikes."⁹ At around this time Cardenas began to actively denounce certain strikes and discourage strikes in general by appealing to workers' nationalism. It is important to realize that this was not a break or turnabout in labor policy, as the policy always emphasized labor's subservience to the Mexican state.

Having established the nature of Cardenas's labor policy, it follows that we should look at the two developments most frequently cited by historians to demonstrate the Cardenas administrations attempts to empower workers. The first was the nationalization of the railroads in 1937. This process began with a labor strike, so nationalization has generally been regarded to have been undertaken in the workers' interests. Several factors, however, cast doubt upon such an assessment. First the nationalization was far from radical, entailing only an administrative, not an economic change.¹⁰ Second, though the administration was turned over to the union of the railroad workers, it is clear that only a minority of workers benefitted. Strikes continued, evidencing the inadequacy of the reform for the majority of workers. Third, the state maintained absolute control of the railroads, a power later exercised for reprivatization.

Those who see Cardenas as a populist reformer point to his policy of oil expropriation. Ironically, this policy also provides one of the best cases against such a view. As in the cases of the railroads, the oil controversy began with a strike of the workers. From this beginning, however, the issues took on a new form. The oil interests in question were foreign operations. Thus, when they refused to accept the decisions in favor of labor reached by the various Mexican courts, including the Supreme Court, Cardenas saw them as a direct threat to Mexican sovereignty. Even a cursory glance at the radio address given by Lazaro Cardenas on the night of March 8, 1938 declaring the expropriation attests to the question being one of national autonomy, not exploitation of the oil workers. As Cardenas stated in the speech, "the Government, in defense of its own dignity, had to resort to the Expropriation Act."¹¹ When it was a labor issue, arbitration was called for, but an injury to the state demanded expropriation.

Further, the state retained ownership and administrative control of the oil industry, creating PEMEX. This was certainly not in keeping with the expectations of the oil workers' union, many of whom felt that Cardenas

⁹ Cardenas, as quoted in Krauze, *Biography*, p.470.

¹⁰ Krauze, *Biography*, p.471.

¹¹ Speech by Lazaro Cardenas, 3/18/1938, as appears in Benjamin Keen, ed., *Latin American Civilization*, 6th ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996). p.315.

had reneged on his campaign promises to labor.¹² The government conflict with the union of oil workers occasioned a split between the oil workers' union and the official union, the CTM, demonstrating the assimilation of the latter into the state.¹³

If the oil workers were unhappy with the outcome of the expropriation they were in the minority in Mexico. The expropriation called forth a wave of nationalist sentiments. Groups gathered before Cardenas's residence in support of this action, some who had previously been demonstrating in opposition to Cardenas.¹⁴ When it came time to pay reparations, individuals brought forth their private possessions from jewels to livestock to assist.¹⁵ These emotions were not a mere coincidence. The expropriation was consciously used by Cardenas as a nationalist appeal.

It is necessary that all groups of the population be involved with a full optimism and that each citizen, whether in agricultural, industrial, commercial, transportation, or other pursuits, develop a greater activity from this moment on, in order to create new resources which will reveal that the spirit of our people is capable of saving the nation's economy by the efforts of its own citizens.¹⁶

The Cardenas era also saw much in the way of agricultural reform. Land was redistributed more thoroughly than ever. The primary recipients were the ejidos, traditional communal land holdings. A national organization of peasants was formed. Again the reforms lend themselves to the idealistic views of Cardenas which are not consistent with the reality of the situation.

During Cardenas's term in office, 49 million acres of land were distributed. This was more than all the leaders before him combined, almost two times more. By the time Cardenas left office, practically all of the arable land in Mexico had been redistributed.¹⁷ What is more, the hacienda system had been laid to rest. While all of this is true, it is also true that the Cardenas period was a time when a new form of agrarian

¹² Joe Ashby, *Organized Labor and the Mexican Revolution Under Lazaro Cardenas* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1967). p.270.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ Hector Aguilar Camin and Lorenzo Meyer, *In the Shadow of the Mexican Revolution* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1993). pp.153-154.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p.154.

¹⁶ Cardenas's speech of 3/18/1938, in Keen, *Civilization*, pp.317-318.

¹⁷ Meyer and Sherman, *Course*, p.598.

exploitation, the “new latifundio,” as Arturo Warman referred to it, gained a foothold in Mexico. As Warman explains it, the new latifundio can best be described as a capitalist type system where the benefits of ownership are separate from actual legal ownership.¹⁸ The main point is that it is once again the peasants who get the short end of the stick, so to speak, ownership, after all, was only part of the problem for them, for they also lacked the capital necessary to farm productively. Realizing this, Cardenas did establish the Banco de Credito Ejidal. Unfortunately, the Banco lacked the funds necessary to fulfill the peasants’ needs. In the Yucatan, one of the largest ejido redistributions, it is estimated that only ten of the 272 ejidos created received sufficient support.¹⁹

It is easy to understand how the peasants of the ejidos who were not adequately supported fell prey to the exploitation of the new latifundio. A more interesting observation is that even those who benefited from the Banco credit were not immune. This is because the Banco de Credito Ejidal often took a paternalistic and domineering approach to the ejiditarios, for example making decisions related to production.²⁰ Thus the state, acting through the Banco, retained ownership for all intents and purposes, the ejidos merely held title--an early “latifundista.” This does not even make mention of the effects of corruption in implementation, rampant in some places, or of the peasants who received no land.

State hegemony in the agrarian sector was furthered by the organization of the peasants into the Confederacion Nacional Campesinos (CNC) in 1938.²¹ The formation of the CNC took place under the supervision and guidance of Cardenas. The CTM under Vincente Lombardo Toledano intended to organize the peasants among its ranks. Cardenas’s intent was not to build solidarity among the proletariat, but, as we have seen before, to build a centralized Mexican state. Accordingly, Cardenas forbade the CTM to organize peasants and undertook the project himself through the official party, the PNR. In his address to the first unification congress, Cardenas linked the future of agrarian reform to the “total unification” of peasants into one organization directly under the state. “We (the government) cannot completely fulfill your program if in the first place we

¹⁸ An excerpt of Arturo Warman’s work in Keen, *Civilization*, pp.318-324.

¹⁹ Krauze, *Biography*, p.464.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p.469.

²¹ Lyle C. Brown, “Cardenas: Creating a Campesino Power Base for Presidential Policy,” *Essays on the Mexican Revolution: Revolutionist Views of the Leaders*, George Wolfskill and Douglas Richmond, eds., (Austin and London: University of Texas Press, 1979). pp.101-136, provided a number of ideas for this discussion.

cannot depend on the unification of the peasant classes.”²² Further, as Cardenas later stated, this new union, should be run by Cardenistas, not peasant representatives. Warman gives an enlightened description of the resulting CNC as the “single peasant organization that became a bureaucratic and political appendage of the government...The management of the organization was placed in the hands of the officials named from above who assumed the representation of the peasants in order to control them.”²³ As in the labor sector, reform in the agrarian sector sought and effected the creation of interests in direct obedience to the state.

There remains one final area of reform to study--political. It is possible to summarize the reforms in two parts. The first occurred relatively early in Cardenas’s term and involved the overthrow of the Jefe Maximo. The second was one of the last reforms Cardenas enacted, the creation of the Partido Revolucionario Mexicano. Both related directly to his program of state building.

Ridding the presidency of the influence of the Jefe Maximo, Plutarco Calles, was necessary for Cardenas to establish his own power and enact his program. The crux of the problem was that Cardenas, himself having come to power through the Jefe Maximo, was surrounded by Calles supporters. Perhaps Cardenas intended to work within this structure, but it soon became obvious that was not possible. Cardenas’s mild reaction to an outbreak of strikes drew public criticism from Calles.²⁴ Following this, Cardenas began to actively consolidate his support in the military and governmental sectors, and among organized labor. Once organized, Cardenas secured the ‘resignations’ of Callistas occupying powerful positions. This series of removals, including the exile of Calles, is often referred to as the “purges” in historical accounts. The process was completed by the subordination of the Partido Nacional Revolucionario, the party of Calles’s creation, to Cardenas.

Enrique Krauze, in his recent study, summarizes the effects of the purges well. In his analysis the purges were characterized by a “still greater centralization of power in the hands of the executive,...the rise of mass politics (and) a taming of the other branches of power.”²⁵ The expulsion of the Jefe Maximo was the first step in the Cardenas program to erect a modern Mexican state.

The PNR had survived the Callista purges, but it would not make it through the Cardenas era. In 1938, just after the expropriation of the oil

²² Cardenas, as quoted in Brown. *Ibid.*, p.112.

²³ Warman, as appears in Keen, *Civilization*, p.320.

²⁴ Aguilar Camin and Meyer, L., *Shadow*, p.130.

²⁵ Krauze, *Biography*, p.459.

fields, Cardenas restyled the official party. The PNR of Calles was done away with. In its stead, Cardenas established the Partido Revolucionario Mexicano (PRM). The PRM was arranged to represent the four major sectors of society--military, labor, agrarian, and popular. The party garnered much support. The organizations previously arranged under Cardenas were automatically inducted with their entire membership.²⁶ Popular sector representation served to tie individuals not in one of these groups to the state.²⁷ As the official party, the PRM was not subjected to any serious opposition.²⁸

The establishment of the PRM was the culmination of the Cardenas program. As mentioned earlier this position has often been given to the oil expropriation. Such reasoning is flawed from the outset. Oil expropriation was in no way part of the president's plan. The conflict spurring the expropriation arose spontaneously during Cardenas's term. Moreover, prioritizing the oil expropriation reflects the misinterpretation of Lazaro Cardenas's presidency as a reform administration. In reality, Cardenas's administration was dedicated to the creation of a unified, centralized Mexico. The role of reform was to create supporters for this state. This is not to say that the reforms were used strictly to bribe the masses, although that happened too. (Recall the address Cardenas made to the first unification congress of the CNC.)

Reform was not merely bribery though. It sought to create a stable popular base that could afford to support the new state Cardenas was creating. It is common knowledge that people who are daily struggling to survive do not ardently support the powers that keep them in such straits. This is so not only because their discontent is manifest, but also because more immediate powers demand their loyalty. In Mexico, these powers took the form of hacendados, industrialists, or even preachers. Cardenas had enough contact with the people to understand this situation. The reforms were a success. The reforms encouraged popular support by changing the situation of the masses economically and by eliminating, or at least subjugating, the powers that competed with the state for loyalty.

Viewing Cardenas's reform as serving the larger program of state building allows for a more consistent interpretation of his entire term. It obviates the problem of explaining the last two years of his administration or his choice of successor. With regard to the former, reform ceased to exist because it had served its purpose. The consensus was demonstrated by the popular approval of the oil expropriation and cemented by the formation of the PMR. The PMR essentially gave

²⁶ Aguilar Camin and Meyer, L., *Shadow*, p.149.

²⁷ Ashby, "Labor," *Americas* 20 (October 1963):199.

²⁸ Meyer and Sherman, *Course*, p.606.

structure to the new state. This state would be governed in a representative fashion, but representation would be only of those operating within the confines of the official organization. Further reform would have upset this balance. It is clear that Cardenas was not interested in the continuance of revolution.

Such reasoning also explains with greater accuracy Cardenas's choice of his successor, the moderate Avilo Comacho instead of the radical Francisco Mugica. The traditional school of studies on Cardenas has trouble explaining this decision in the context of their assertion that Cardenas was a liberal reformer. In their final analysis the choice of Comacho is most often portrayed as an effort by Cardenas to protect the reforms he had enacted, for there existed the threat of a conservative backlash. Thus, Mugica, in furthering reform, would have re-ignited the Revolution.

Simply put, the idea of protecting reform does not fit. Cardenas himself had begun to consolidate and dismantle his reforms. Land distribution was essentially halted, and Cardenas discouraged strikes. Nor did any new legislation counteract this trend in the late part of his presidency. In some ways, Cardenas was part of the conservative backlash. Avilo Comacho was chosen to protect these activities and, thereby, the new state.

The course pursued by Cardenas in these late years, after the PMR was formed, makes his career an interesting comparison to that of the folkhero of the Independence movement, Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla. Both Father Hidalgo and Cardenas had great sympathy for the plight of the underclass. Both had great pride in Mexico and the desire to see Mexico become a nation. Yet in their quest to build such a state, neither were prepared to give impetus to violent social upheaval or to embrace radical reform.²⁹

Finally, this brings us to examine Cardenas's sympathy for the poor. This is one popular notion of Cardenas this study does not seek to alter. Meyer and Sherman recount a tale that demonstrates this perception of Cardenas. A list was laid before Cardenas.

The list said: Bank reserves dangerously low. "Tell the treasurer," said Cardenas. Agricultural production falling. "Tell the Minister of Agriculture." ... Then he opened a telegram which read: My corn dried, my burro died, my sow was stolen, my baby is sick. Signed Jaun Pedro, village of Huitzilpitzuco. "Order the presidential train at once," said Cardenas. "I am leaving for Huitzilpitzuco."³⁰

²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp.286-290.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p.598.

There is no reason to doubt that Cardenas was a man with great concern for others. Even if this tale is not factual, other evidence exists. Cardenas regularly visited common people throughout his term.³¹ Further, he received delegations at his residence and had a direct telegraph line so that the people could access him.³² It is certain that Cardenas's sympathy was genuine. The important point is that this humanitarianism did not make him a radical. Recognizing this aspect of Cardenas's personality does make necessary the consideration of his creation of a supreme state in softer terms. Possibly Cardenas felt that a strong, central state would be best for the people. Still this would reflect a paternalistic attitude. In fact the administration did assume such a stance with regard to reform implementation. An example of such a sort would be the role assumed by Cardenas and his administration in the formation of the CNC. Other examples also exist, so the view of Cardenas as believing the unified Mexican state would benefit the people most may be a valid one.³³

In conclusion, a more thorough representation of Lazaro Cardenas than that which is currently pervasive in historical studies recognizes not only the existence of reform, but the context of this reform. As has been demonstrated, this context is best described as an effort at consensus building with the goal of creating a centralized state in Mexico. With such a purpose in mind, Cardenas utilized reform under very real limitations and frequent appeals to nationalism. The employment of nationalism led Joe Ashby to observe that Cardenism had much in common with Fascism, albeit "benevolent Fascism." Ashby's final conclusion, however, is more applicable. There is no -ism available that fully explains Cardenism.³⁴

Cardenism embodied an effort to close the Revolution while ushering in a new modern Mexican state. Historians have too little recognized the second intent when studying Cardenas. In a sense then, historians have been blinded by the reform. Hence, they have neglected to look further. It is easy to understand this phenomenon. Reform is dynamic and exciting, the stuff revolutions are fought for, a radical departure from the norm in Mexican history. Thus the construction of the state and the failings of reform to accomplish anything beyond this has largely been overshadowed. Where weaknesses are recognized in the Cardenas program, they are attributed to external forces or to his successors. Never is Cardenas the subject of harsh criticism. With regard to Lazaro Cardenas and his presidential term, historians have turned the old phrase "the end justifies

the means" on end. Historians view Cardenas in terms of the means justifying the end.

Lazaro Cardenas did, in his term, see the end of the Revolution, without the full realization of the Revolutionary ideals. Carlos Fuentes gives an eloquent description in his novel *Where the Air is Clear* of the legacy of the Mexican Revolution. Though a work of fiction, it provides some valuable insight.

There are still millions of illiterates, barefoot Indians, poor people starving to death, farmers who don't have even one miserable acre of their own, factories with no machinery, nor parts, unemployed workers who have to flee to the United States. But there are also millions who can go to schools that we of the Revolution built, millions for whom company stores and hacienda stores are gone forever, and there are some factories in the cities...For the first time in Mexican history a stable middle class exists...³⁵

Cardenas also oversaw the beginning of the post Revolutionary modern state in Mexico--a state which has similarly failed to eradicate social, political or economic ills. Today Mexico is still struggling to establish democracy and provide adequately for its citizens. Capitalists, domestic and foreign, are still extremely powerful. [36] Granted this is not to be blamed on Cardenas. His control was not absolute. But, when studying the legacy of Cardenas and his reform program, we must acknowledge that their impact was in no way the radicalization of Mexico. Rather, the legacy of Cardenas is in the relatively smooth transition in Mexico from Revolution to modern statehood. The Cardenas era accomplished the program Cardenas had set forth in the realization of a centralized, autonomous Mexican state. Lazaro Cardenas was not a radical reformer. He was a state builder, the impetus behind the formation of modern Mexico.

Brandi Robinson is currently a senior at Towson University, where she is pursuing a degree in History and Secondary Education. She is also the most recent winner of the Mary Catherine Kahl History Prize.

³¹ Krauze, *Biography*, p.468.

³² *Ibid.*, p.457.

³³ This idea was offered by Dr. Ronn Pineo of Towson University.

³⁴ Ashby, "Labor," *Americas* 20 (October 1963):199.

³⁵ Carlos Fuentes, *Where the Air is Clear* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 4th ed., p.87. It should also be noted that the idea to use this particular passage of Fuentes's novel in describing the aftermath of the Mexican Revolution was Dr. James Baker's, with whom I studied Mexican history at the University of Central Oklahoma.

JEW: FROM EUROPE TO ARGENTINA**LAUREN SULS**

Argentina, is home to Eva Perón and the tango. The Jews also have a home in Argentina. One may question the validity of this statement, because the Jewish presence is often neglected, if not forgotten. Despite the fact that the Jews represent only a small percentage of the Argentine population (2% of 34 million people), Argentina still holds more Jews than any other Latin American nation; in fact, it has the fifth largest Jewish population in the world (behind the United States, Russia, Israel, and France).¹ The journey of these Jewish immigrants is complex, and the majority of them are Eastern European Jews. Though a small group, it is important to give these Jews attention and tell the tale of their lives. Justice cannot be done to all aspects of the Jewish experience. This essay will have a stronger focus on the migration of the Eastern European Jew to Argentina, from 1880 through World War One. Economic, political, and social anti-Semitism forced Jews to leave Eastern Europe. Three interconnecting factors brought some of them to Argentina. First, the country had liberal immigration policies. Second, these policies created a climate favorable to the formation of the Jewish Colonization Association. Finally, the Jews who came as a result of these two reasons led to the greatest mass immigration of Jews to Argentina, which was accomplished through various means.

The majority of Jews who came to Argentina (from 1880 through World War One) were Ashkenazim (Eastern European). Eighty-five percent of these Jews came from Russia, which is why the Argentines call all Jews "Rusos."² It is not coincidental that this period of mass migration coincided with the beginning of Czar Alexander III's reign in 1881. Prior to Alexander III, Jews in Russia were made to live in the Pale of Settlement (a group of provinces that made up 5% of the Russian Empire), where they were denied the right of free movement and choice of

¹ Robert Weisbrot, *The Jews of Argentina* (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1979), p.3.

² Judith Lakin Elkin, *Jews of the Latin American Republics* (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1980), p.58.

residence. More than 1000 articles within Russian law regulated religious/communal life, economic activities, jobs, military service, property rights, and education. Jews were also required to pay special taxes that went beyond the taxes of all other Russians. These economic, social, and eventually violent physical repressions of Jews intensified during the reign of Alexander III (1881-1894) and Nicholas II (1894-1918). The ruling parties of Russia (Russian Orthodox Church, Nationalists, Autocracy/Bureaucracy) believed that the Jews represented the ideals and interests which the Russian ruling class opposed.

One form of economic repression was the May Law of 1882, written by Count Ignatiev. The law had two major purposes: first, it forbade the free movement of Jews, even within the Pale; and secondly, the law ended Jewish ownership of land in rural districts and employment as estate managers, thus barring Jews from using land for industrial, commercial, and agricultural purposes. Essentially, the May Law took away job opportunities, and therefore money, away from the Jews. This law had a greater effect of discrimination due to its loose legal interpretation by the Russian ruling classes.³

From a social aspect, anti-Semitic laws barred Jews from higher education and professional institutions. Alexander III opposed all education, especially pertaining to the Jews. From 1886-1887, he enacted the "Percentage Rule," which restricted the proportion of Jewish students admitted to secondary institutions and universities. In the Pale, 10% of the students admitted to schools were Jewish whereas elsewhere, Jews represented 5% of students admitted. In Moscow and St. Petersburg, however, Jews represented only 3% of students admitted to schools. Many institutions barred Jews completely from admittance. In some instances, they were barred from institutions founded by Jews. The effect was to deprive Jewish youths of the chance of receiving an education.⁴

Finally, these anti-Semitic decrees led to the violence of the pogroms. From 1881-1882, the government sanctioned many pogroms. These began in the province of Kherson, and then spread throughout Russia. The pogroms started again in April 1903, with the Kishineff massacre, which lasted three days.⁵ There were hundreds of these violent massacres, where they were created by the bureaucracy. One example of such atrocities can

³ Samuel Joseph, *Jewish Immigration to the United States: from 1881-1910* vol.59 of *Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law* (New York: AMS Press, Inc., 1967), p.60.

⁴ Joseph, p.62.

⁵ Joseph, p.65.

⁶ Joseph, p.66.

be seen in the events which occurred in Bialystok. A 1906 Duma commission report found that prior to the Bialystok pogrom, relations between the Jews and Christians had been amicable. Preparations for the pogrom were made by agents of the bureaucracy, and carried out with the aid of local authorities. Pogroms began as a movement to suppress the Jews in their economic and cultural activities, but it eventually became an anti-Jewish program designed to expel or exterminate the Jews of Russia.⁶

Anti-Semitism in Rumania was very similar to that which existed in Russia. This also contributed to Jewish immigration to Argentina as well as other countries. Under the reign of Charles Hohenzollern (1866-1914), Jews were oppressed because of their modern mentality, whereas the Rumanians were generally peasants with a traditional outlook.⁷ Within the political struggles of Rumania, this made the Jews easy targets to attack. As a result, the Jews were politically tyrannized. Article VII of the Rumanian Constitution gave the Jews the legal status of "foreigner" or "alien." Laws existed that restricted the availability of jobs for Jews as well as residence in villages. Such laws also prohibited Jewish ownership of land, houses, and vineyards. Vagabonds could be expelled by an administrative decree or forbidden to buy products of the soil and acquire real property. Nonresident Jews were debarred unless possession of property and occupation could be proven.⁸

Rumanian anti-Semitism had an economic expression. The Jews were economically devastated. An 1883 law prohibited lotteries, and in 1884, hawking and selling from door to door were also prohibited. This deprived many Jewish families of their livelihoods. They were further excluded from economic activities within the 1886-1887 laws, due to their "foreign" status. One law prohibited Jews from choosing electors or becoming members of the Chamber of Commerce and Trade, even though a majority of the merchants and manufacturers represented in these bodies were Jews. Another law stated that after a factory had been open for five years, two-thirds of the workers must be Rumanian (non-Jew). Furthermore, Jews were excluded from administrative positions in joint-stock companies and employment in state financial institutions and railway services. Also, the 1902 Artisans Bill gave control of trade to non-Jews, even though the majority of artisans were Jewish.⁹

Finally, the Jews were culturally oppressed by the Rumanian government through educational and professional institutions. In 1887, the

Circular of the Minister of Public Instruction stated that elementary schools lacking room should take non-Jews over Jews as students. This led to the expulsion of many Jewish children from schools. An 1893 law reinforced the formal treatment of Jews as aliens within the education system. This made "aliens" (Jews) pay fees to enter public schools, and they could only be permitted if space was available. Many Jews were prohibited from attending secondary institutions. Also, in 1893, aliens were restricted in professional services. They were not allowed to participate in the public sanitary service and health department as physicians, pharmacists, etc.; own or work in private pharmacies; or enter other professional fields. Rumanian policy was deliberately designed to make it impossible for Jews to live in Rumania. It was intended to, in effect, to indirectly expel the Jews.¹⁰

The governments of Russia and Rumania reached their goal. Alexander III of Russia believed as did the Rumanian government that one-third of the Jews would starve to death, one-third would develop illnesses and die, and finally, one-third would find somewhere else to live.¹¹ This was achieved, as 1880 through World War One was the period of mass migration for the Jews. Russia and Rumania in particular, as in the rest of Eastern Europe, Jews were forced out of their homelands in search of a new home, and often with only the clothes on their backs. They were looking for a haven, for religious tolerance, a place where they would not experience anti-Semitism. They wanted better social and political treatment, and a chance to gain economic prosperity. These goals seemed possible in Argentina.

The Eastern European Jews specifically came to Argentina for different reasons, which can be divided into three phases. The first phase began with Argentina's liberal immigration policies of the 1850's (although the policies grew more strict as World War One drew nearer). Under President Justo José de Urquiza (1854-1860), the Constitution of 1853, put into effect in 1860, set forth these liberal policies by two distinct clauses within the Constitution. The first clause gave complete religious freedom to all citizens and foreign residents. The second clause, in Article 25, promoted immigration through incentives.¹² Their main goals in encouraging immigration included populating the rural agricultural areas, expanding

¹⁰ Joseph, p.74.

¹¹ Danielle Adler and Cassie Dolan, "Jewish Immigrants to St.Louis in the Gilded Age." on-line. available from Microsoft Internet Explorer @ <http://www.ladue.k12.mo.us/LHWHS/Excel110/VirtualMuseum/GildedAge/people/jewish.html>. 1.

¹² Weisbrot, p.29.

⁷ Joseph, p.70.

⁸ Joseph, pp.71-75.

⁹ Joseph, p.73.

the agricultural infrastructure, and creating a class of small farmers. The Immigration and Colonization Act of 1876 had the biggest impact, and its impact continued through the early 1900's.¹³ This law created an Immigration Department and an Office for Land and Colonies. These offices acted on the need to help the immigrants from the time they left Europe to when they arrived at the farms in the Argentine frontier. Such assistance served as a means to increase the frontier population. The Immigration and Colonization Act of 1876 provided for a variety of things: agents in Europe to spread information and recruit immigrants that were hardworking and honest (with the intention of eliminating the useless and corrupt immigrants); Argentine officials to help immigrants find jobs upon arrival; families were exempt from paying customs for personal possessions; Immigrants were given five days at an immigration hostel (supervised lodging); and free transportation to any part of Argentina in which they wanted to live. Argentina's government followed through on this law, as seen in 1910. They built a new immigration hostel with more rooms and better medical attention, although Argentine immigration policy did tighten before World War One.¹⁴

Another Argentine attraction to the East European Jewry was Argentina's separation of church and state in its political structure. Argentina had no laws in place that would legally isolate the Jews. President Julio Roca (1880-1886) supported secularization, as illustrated by an 1884 law, in which schools became nonreligiously affiliated. This law fit in with other laws of the 1880's that further separated church and state by allowing a civil registry and civil marriages.¹⁵ The nations that separated church and state had more success in attracting Jewish immigrants, due to their liberal policies (similar to the United States). Jews had more freedom where the government did not have anti-Semitic policies, as illustrated by the situation in Argentina.

All of these laws had permanence in this period, but Argentina in the 1880's also experimented with more aggressive methods to attract more Jewish refugees. Beginning with President Roca, his government saw the need to cultivate new lands to increase the agricultural surplus, which would help finance industry. Roca believed that immigrants, especially Jews, could help cultivate the land, and then provide cheap labor in the

¹³ Haim Avni, *Argentina & the Jews-a History of Jewish Immigration* (Tuscaloosa, Alabama: The University of Alabama Press, 1991), pp.12-13.

¹⁴ Avni, p.47.

¹⁵ Mark Falcoff, "Argentina," in *Encyclopedia of Latin American History and Culture*, vol.1.(New York:Charles Scribner's Sons, 1996), p.151.

urban factories.¹⁶ This need for workers came at a time when the Jews of Eastern Europe suffered pogroms and the enactment of anti-Semitic laws which undermined the quality of life for all Jews. Roca wanted these Jews, and on August 6, 1881, he issued a decree that encouraged Russian Jews to establish themselves in Argentina. The preliminary steps of this plan were carried out by Carlos Calvo in 1881, in which he convinced the German and French Chief Rabbis to send letters to Russian Jewish leaders in support of the Argentine plan. In 1882, Roca appointed a chief agent (José María Bustos) to head a special mission to encourage Jews from the Russian Empire to emigrate to Argentina and become colonists for new villages and farms. In 1885, Argentina and Russia established diplomatic relations, which allowed an exchange of information and travel between these two nations.¹⁷

With the presidency of Miguel Juanéz Celman (1886-1890), an aggressive campaign was started to make a budget for information offices in different European cities. These offices would disperse information books in many languages and contain mobile displays of Argentine products. In 1887, the government made loans to the poor "favorable" candidates for settlement in order to pay their expenses. Such "favorable" candidates were skilled European farmers who could populate the agricultural regions. Another, more specific example of Argentina's aggressive recruitment involved Pedro S. Lamas, head of the Argentine Information Office in Paris. After a group from Kamantz-Podolsk, Russia, was turned down to go to Palestine, Lamas contacted this group and sent them to a commercial agent, J.P.Frank. A contract was signed, and then Siegmund Simnel, a Jewish activist and rich businessman checked out the reliability of the deal. Negotiations followed, and it was decided that the families would receive land in Nueva La Plata; farm tools, food, and supplies on credit, as well as subsidized travel expenses from Argentina's government. These major incentives led to the first mass arrival, in which 130 Jewish families (820 Jews) from Kamantz-Podolsk came to Argentina, on the *SS Weser*, which arrived on August 16, 1889. These methods enticed more families to come, but an economic crisis in 1889 put an end to the use of aggressive measures, such as free tickets for the passage of immigrants.¹⁸ Argentina's aggressiveness, along with the immigration laws, and religious toleration resulted in the Jews coming to Argentina, a

¹⁶ Weisbrot, p.175.

¹⁷ Gabriel Braunstein, *The Jewish Immigration to Argentina: a Genealogist's Perspective*. on-line. available from Microsoft Internet Explorer @ <http://www.memo.com/jgst/news/9/argentina.html>. 2.

¹⁸ Avni, pp.25-29.

land which they believed to be free of prejudice and anti-Semitism.

Argentina's political structure enabled the second phase to occur, which was the creation of the Jewish Colonization Association (JCA) by the Bavarian born Maurice Von Hirsch. It began with the Baron's involvement in assisting the persecuted Jews of Russia. In 1888, he offered 50 million francs (ten million dollars) to Russia for the purpose of establishing agricultural settlements, workshops, and arts and craft schools for the Jews. In 1889, he sent Dr. Wilhelm Lowenthal (a sanitary engineer) to search for possible sites. Lowenthal came upon the group from Kamentz-Podolsk, in which many had died due to starvation, illness, and exposure. Lowenthal gave money to these people and told Hirsch about them in March, 1891. Hirsch sent financial aid to this group, and made them the basis for his project. This project was the Jewish Colonization Association (JCA), a joint-stock company established in London on August 24, 1891, with a capitalization of 50 million francs. The Latin American headquarters opened in Buenos Aires in 1892.¹⁹ Hirsch explained the purpose of the JCA in an essay written in 1891. He stated that the Jews needed to find a "new existence, primarily as farmers and also as handicraftsmen, in those lands where the laws and religious tolerance permit them to carry on the struggles for existence as noble and responsible subjects of a human government."²⁰ Argentina's liberal policies and its desire to populate its agricultural regions made it a place where the Jews could have a new beginning. Also, in 1892, Russia relaxed its strict emigration policy and sanctioned Hirsch's plan of the Jewish mass migration from Russia to Argentina. The belief of the Russian government that "once a Russian always a Russian" was put aside for the Jews. For the first time in their lives, Jews "were given one right not enjoyed by other Russians, that of leaving Russia under the obligation of abandoning Russian citizenship forever."²¹ This contributed to the initial success of the JCA.

The JCA established agricultural colonies in which the Jews could work and live. The first colony was Moisesville, which was made up of the original colonists from Kamentz-Podolsk. This was the first of eighteen Jewish agricultural settlements established by the JCA. These colonies were organized around agricultural development and livestock. The Jews had great success in diversifying, making new crops, and creating new enterprises that included breeding and dairy farms along with agricultural farms. This success explained why the Argentine government was willing

¹⁹ Ronald Sanders, *Shores of Refuge: a Hundred Years of Jewish Emigration* (New York:Henry Holt and Company, 1988), p.150.

²⁰ Weisbrot, pp.44-45.

²¹ Joseph, pp.68-69.

to help the JCA in its early years, for both had similar goals. Neither wanted poor, unskilled workers. They wanted skilled farmers who could sell their property in the Old World, and then use that money to invest in the colony in Argentina. The JCA owned a substantial amount of property (they owned the land in the colony, initially acquiring one million acres in Entre Ríos), and invested money into Argentina's administration and colonization. This relationship led to a link of important contacts in the district and federal government. One such link that lasted for twenty years was Juan Alsina, the Immigration Commissioner who helped and had a cordial relationship with the JCA from 1890 to 1910.²²

At the inception of the JCA, its policies for choosing candidates for its colonization program were liberal. Although they wanted skilled workers, exceptions were often made for the poor exiles escaping the pogroms of Russia and Rumania. With the help of the Argentine government, these people had the finances to travel to Argentina. While the JCA continued to be successful in bringing Jews to Argentina in the early 1900's, it had less of an impact in bringing them to the country. The process for choosing candidates changed when the government demanded its goal of attaining skilled workers be met. First, in 1901, the new strategy for the acceptance of immigrants into the program was to only allow people who could pay their own fare, and maintain themselves until the first harvest. Then, in 1905, the JCA's new selection method included Jews who worked as hired hands for a long period of time without receiving their own farm. These workers could then become colonists after their ability, disposition, and adjustment to farm life had been assessed by the local administration. The earnings from working as a hired hand would be used to pay some of the costs of colonization.²³ The JCA continued to bring immigrants into Argentina in the early 1900's because it created a situation in which Argentina became an option for the persecuted Jews. However, the JCA came to be less liked by all people due to the strict administration of its agricultural colonies. Its failure to help Jewish immigrants in Buenos Aires (an urban center holding 30% of Jewish immigrants, as compared to the 15% of the JCA's colonies).²⁴ For this reason, new incentives and channels had to be created for Jews to come to Argentina.

In spite of the fact that the JCA started the influx of immigrants, it did not bring the bulk of Jews into Argentina. In 1904 after the JCA was losing its impact, according to the *London Jewish Chronicle*, ten thousand

²² Avni, p.48.

²³ Avni, p.59.

²⁴ Saúl Sosnowski, "Jews," in *Encyclopedia of Latin American History and Culture*, vol.3.(New York:Charles Scribner's Sons, 1996), p.320.

Jews came to Argentina. This was twenty percent more people than all of the Jews resettled by the JCA in its fifteen years of existence.²⁵ Immigration without the help of the JCA continued in the early 1900's, because Argentina had a need for all kinds of workers, agricultural and urban. These years of mass immigration occurred during Argentina's prosperous years of 1880 to 1914. The economic boom grew from the growth of production and the increasing exportation of livestock products and grains. This created jobs in agriculture, which led to the modernization and urbanization of Buenos Aires, resulting in urban work. There was a desire and need for more people, but new methods had to be used to bring them to Argentina. Thus, the third phase of Jewish emigration to Argentina began. This phase was one in which the established Jews in Argentina helped to bring more Jews from East Europe.

This was first seen in the beginning of the twentieth century, a time when the Jews came of their own volition. It was usually done through the encouragement of relatives and friends by means of correspondence. Often Argentine relatives sent money to their families in East Europe in order to pay for their passage to Argentina. One specific case involved the Jews in the agricultural colony of Moisesville, Argentina. Some of these people had emigrated from Grodno, Lithuania, and kept in touch with their Russian relatives. Moisesville enjoyed some economic prosperity as a result of cattle grazing. The town experienced a drop in residents, but with the money, they decided to bring their Russian family members to Moisesville, in order to expand the colony. They paid the leader of the settlers (Noah Katsovitch) to go to Russia, and bring the group to Argentina. Also, the settlers paid for the travel expenses of their families and a percentage of the settlement costs. The group arrived in Argentina on July 15, 1900. This successful technique in bringing the Jews to Argentina spread, and other groups (including one from the Pale of Settlement, Russia) came to Argentina by the same manner.²⁶

Jewish women, like the men, were brought over from Europe to work, but their work was one of a suspicious nature. This involved the Zevi Migdal, of Jewish "white slavers." In the late 1800's, Argentina was inviting to the white slavers. Licensed brothels were permitted by law, and the predominance of males in all immigrant groups created a market for these prostitution rings. The Zevi Migdal became a thriving and powerful syndicate, aided by connections in Europe. The Jewish slavers pooled their financial resources in a guild that centralized their business decisions

²⁵ Avni, p.67.

²⁶ Avni, p.56.

and operations. It was run like a corporation. Profits were used for bribes to keep the operation free from government interference, to acquire property, and to send agents to obtain women from Europe. Their success was so great that 51% of Argentine brothels (102 out of 199) were run by Jewish madams in 1909. The women were brought over from Europe in a variety of ways. Agents wrote to young women in Russia, Rumania, or Poland, and told them that husbands or "employment" awaited them in Argentina, and often, the agents paid for the women's passage to Buenos Aires, only to find that they would be kidnaped upon arrival and taken to the brothels. In Europe, some agents seduced the women and then persuaded the girls to join the brothels. Other agents married their intended victims to gain the woman's confidence and to provide a cover of legitimacy for their business; and some agents used rape if one refused to join. Other women lost the will to fight after a loss of virginity, and others felt ruined, so they "adjusted" to imprisonment in the brothels. These women were brought to the New World, but the Zevi Migdals did not bring much improvement to their lives.²⁷

The Zevi Migdals and the relatives were not the only reasons for new Jewish immigrants to come to Argentina during this period of mass migration. The establishment of a *kehillah* (Jewish community) in Buenos Aires created a society favorable to Jews. The community first began in 1860, when the first Jewish wedding took place in Argentina, which was the first government recognition of a Jewish observance. In 1862, the earliest Jewish congregation held its first public meeting. Rabbis were allowed to practice in Argentina in 1878. Finally, 1897 saw the first temple dedicated exclusively to Jewish religious activities. All of these milestones occurred because of the concentration of Jews in Buenos Aires, which led to a centralization of social services and cultural activities.²⁸

The centralization of Jews gave way to further developments in the 1900's, creating a favorable atmosphere for new immigrants. Buenos Aires established a Jewish community, which included two Jewish districts, Once and Villa Crespo. As a result of the concentration of Jewish immigrants and established residents, two developments occurred in 1900. One was the creation of the organization Hevra Kedusha, which was created for burial purposes, and second, was the creation of the first Jewish cemetery of Buenos Aires, in the suburb of Liniers. Local aid organizations, made up of existing Jews in Argentina, also helped new immigrants. Leon Chasanowich established the General Jewish Workers'

²⁷ Weisbrot, pp.59-61.

²⁸ Weisbrot, p.49.

Society/General Jewish Workers' Mutual Aid Society. Its goal was to spread information about Argentina's labor market. The Union of Jewish Workers helped immigrants find jobs. Both of these organizations benefitted the Jewish immigrants of Buenos Aires, considering their economic situation.²⁹

In 1910, Bikur Holim was created. It provided medical care for the sick and needy, and went on to establish the Hospital Israelita, a home for orphans and senior citizens.³⁰ All of these organizations provided great incentives for Jews to emigrate to Argentina. The economic benefits were of greatest assistance. Also economically beneficial were the factories in Argentina that were created by immigrants and their descendants. When the factory owners were not Jewish, Jews were still happy to work for them. It is sad, but true that the Jews were happy to be treated as "dumb immigrants." They thought this to be a better alternative than being treated as they were in their old country. It was seen as a form of economic freedom and religious toleration.³¹

Jews held the belief that any kind of treatment in Argentina was an improvement to the life they led in Eastern Europe. Anti-Semitism in Europe was so vast, that they were able to tolerate the forms of anti-Semitism which existed in Argentina between 1880 and World War One. Although Argentina was a haven for the Jews, it was not a society totally devoid of anti-Semitism. The degree of its existence was much less severe than in East Europe, but nevertheless, it existed within Argentine society. The difference was that anti-Semitism, at this time, was not government sanctioned, but was more of a general attitude held by the Argentines. This can be seen in different writings by important members of society. Domingo Sarmiento, the former Argentine president and immigrant supporter, came to be xenophobic, particularly with respect to Jews. His anti-Semitism was displayed on July 9, 1890, when he ridiculed the Jewish dietary rituals. On July 10, he titled an article "Jewish Tariffs." It did not refer to the Jews, but instead it referred to the excessive tariff rates charged by the Argentine Railroad Company.³² The title implied that Jews had taken too much money, just as the railroad company had. This was a less conspicuous form of anti-Semitism. Another example of Argentine anti-Semitism was expressed in literature. The novel *La Bolsa*, written by José Miró (under the pseudonym Julian Martel), was published in the 1880's.

²⁹ Avni, p.71.

³⁰ Braunstein, p.3.

³¹ Falcoff, p.2.

³² Weisbrot, pp.43-44.

Its plot focused on a conspiracy of international Jewish bankers to defraud Argentina. The "evil" Baron Mackser is the personification of this Jewish conspiracy, for he is "sello típico de la raza judía" (distinctive characteristics typical of the Jewish race).³³

The Creoles of Argentine society also displayed anti-Semitism, as seen in Argentine popular culture. The native Creoles and upper class of Argentina expressed anti-immigrant sentiments, which translated into anti-Semitism (believed by both Creoles and other immigrant groups). Jews, within popular culture, were seen as people with strange customs, dress, and food habits. The practices of the Jewish religion were barely understood by the majority of the immigrant population originally from Italy and Spain who saw Jews through the bias that originated in their homelands, and the Argentine Creoles who viewed Jews with a bias that originated from the Spanish colonial culture of that region. All of these were reflected in the *sainete* (short jocular musical play), which rose in popularity between 1880 to 1930. The *sainetes* were a mirror of society and class values within the changing class structure of Buenos Aires. Playwrights captured the spirit of that moment within the *porteño* life (port city of Buenos Aires). These writers were experiencing and observing the change that occurred, so they wrote with a clear understanding of what the audience appreciated. One example was *Donde Menos se Piensa Salta la Liebra*, written by Fausto Etchegoin and Eduardo Casetti, first seen at the theatre Boedo on January 19, 1914. The plot focuses on a Jewish father (Simón) and daughter (Rebecca) who exploit the Spanish, Italians, and Creoles. Rebecca initially wants to marry a Spaniard (Manuel), until he wants to return to Spain. She would rather stay and drive around in a car (a form of materialism), so she drops the Spaniard, and marries a Jewish doctor who can finance her dreams of materialistic success. Simón is a Jew who speaks Spanish with a heavy Jewish accent, and does not like Italians. He has an illicit relationship with a widowed Creole (Candilaria). She needs money to pay her rent because she fears her tenement superintendent (an Italian) will turn her out on the street. Simón helps Candilaria by giving her rent money in return for "unspecified favors."³⁴ This *sainete* manages to portray Jews as materialistic, selfish, hateful, and essentially immoral. It is indicative of the way most Argentines, not just the two authors, felt about the Jewish people.

³³ Donald S.Castro, "But We are a Separate Race." on-line.available from Microsoft Internet Explorer @<http://www.lanic.utexas.edu/project/lasa95/castro.html>. 4.

³⁴ Castro, pp.5-6.

This form of anti-Semitism was obvious, but other expressions of Argentine anti-Semitism became extremely blatant on May 14-15, 1910. At this time, the Creoles were experiencing anti-Semitic feelings due to their fear of left-wing activists. They proceeded to release their fury against the Jews in a full-scale pogrom, in which many Jews in the Jewish quarter of Buenos Aires were beaten and raped.³⁵ Although this form of anti-Semitism was rare, the fact remains that Argentina was a nation socially prejudiced against the Jews. There is no doubt that the life of the Jew was remarkably better in Argentina than in Eastern Europe, but there was still room for improvement. Unfortunately, anti-Semitism in Argentina did not decline, but instead, continued to increase and intensify. In the latter half of the 1900's, one-half of the world's anti-Semitic violence occurred in Argentina.³⁶ This marked a sad turn of events for a nation which held so much promise as a land of toleration.

The Ashkenazim Jewry of Argentina equaled only a small number of the population by World War One, roughly 115,000 people. The mass migration of these Jews, from 1880 through World War One, into Argentina came at a time when Eastern Europeans, particularly Russians and Rumanians, were pushing Jews out of their countries. At the same time, Argentina was going through an economic boom, facilitating its need for agricultural and urban workers. Immigration was a natural link between the two. The East European Jewry needed a new home which would allow them to escape the persecution caused by the blatant anti-Semitism which they faced, and in turn Argentina needed more immigrant laborers. The migration of these Jews from East Europe to Argentina occurred in three phases, similar to a pyramid. At its foundation, were the liberal immigration policies of Argentina. This need for immigrants led to the creation of the Jewish Colonization Association. This made Argentina a destination for the persecuted Jews. These Jews established a community, particularly in Buenos Aires, which enabled them to bring over relatives and "workers." Each step in the process of Jewish immigration to Argentina required the step preceding it. One may note the irony of the situation for the Jews. They left their homeland to escape the blatant and violent anti-Semitism that existed there. They then came to Argentina which they viewed as their "haven." They were welcomed by the government with open arms, but the Jews later found out that in their new home a less conspicuous form of anti-Semitism existed. They simply traded one form of anti-Semitism for another. That is not to say that the

Jews regretted coming to Argentina, because their lives were greatly improved, but this improvement must continue in order for this small, but thriving group to continue its existence in Argentina today and in the future.

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³⁵ Weisbrot, p.200.

³⁶ Weisbrot, p.11.

**STRATEGIES FOR A NEW CHINA:
THE POLICIES OF YUAN SHIKAI AND SUN YATSEN**

**Chang, Sidney H., and Leonard H.D. Gordon. *All Under Heaven... Sun Yat-Sen and His Revolutionary Thought*.
Stanford: Hoover University Press, 1991.**

**Young, Ernest P. *The Presidency of Yuan Shi-k'ai: Liberalism and Dictatorship in Early Republican China*.
Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1977.**

**A REVIEW ESSAY BY
WILLIAM WARD**

Centuries of political, institutional, and cultural continuity in China have instilled in the Chinese a sense of the cyclical nature of history: a predictable ebb and flow of equilibrium and imbalance. This dynastic cycle describes periods of strong centralization, power, and prosperity as giving way to chaotic times characterized by a lack of central authority and the rise of independent provincial powers. Stability is again achieved with the ascension of the strongest contender to the Imperial throne, and the new dynasty thus established will be vigorous and fruitful for a time. This oversimplification illustrates the difficulties in governing enormous China with its massive population, but it also establishes the expected mode of operation for any would-be emperor: victory is obtained only when one's personal authority is unchallenged and one's center of power is secure. Following the collapse of the Qing Dynasty in 1911-12 conditions appeared once again to reflect this age old notion of central breakdown and provincial autonomy, but new and unfamiliar elements were now injected into this struggle for Chinese renewal. The projection of Western power into China brought with it not only a challenge to Chinese sovereignty but also a profusion of European ideas. And though the Qing had accommodated foreign notions of government and nationhood, it fell to the new, revolutionary, Republic of China to rebuild the nation in the Western image. Its failure to do so, however, indicates that the Chinese were either unable or unwilling to complete their republican experiment.

Two men best exemplify the struggle to rebuild a new China capable of withstanding imperialist encroachment. Yuan Shikai, first president of the

Republic and ultimately its betrayer, is forever remembered as a villain, "The Father of the Warlords." Conversely, Sun Yatsen, revolutionary leader and theoretician, assumes the mantle "Father of the Nation" and is revered by Nationalist and Communist alike. In comparing the two one realizes their identical goal: the redemption of Chinese sovereignty. Their methods, too, had much in common, as did to some extent their personalities. Fundamental differences, both circumstantial and deliberate, also appear readily; though one must resist the tendency to allow their posthumous images free reign in distorting these differences until they appear as polar opposites; the archetypal extremes of Yuan Shikai and Sun Yatsen "as they should have been," or more precisely as we in the modern world want them to be.

In hindsight one realizes that the great achievement of the 1911 Revolution was the destruction of not only the existing dynasty, but of the validity and viability of a monarchical system in China. However, any constructive results of the revolution must wait for some future time, as the new regime established in the revolutionary wake proved unsustainable. The old conflict between center and periphery again surfaced but with new ingredients. Gone was the legitimacy of imperial ascension; instead some new formula to win the support of the people was needed. For the revolutionaries legitimacy was to come from a constitution, but one could hardly expect the majority of the Chinese to react to this unfamiliar concept in the same way they would to the Son of Heaven. The growing discontent of the populace with foreign encroachment added another element to the struggle, that of nationalism. This burgeoning sense of "Chineseness" was buoyed by victory over the Manchu government in 1911-12, however this convenient target of national frustration, once removed, revealed the greater threat of the West. Nationalism, which demands immediate results, would find this set of foreigners more difficult to dislodge. Proponents of nationalism, the increasingly politicized gentry, could not maintain their cohesiveness following their quick, but unsatisfying, victory. The ideas of democracy also played a crucial role in the new republic, and were central to the thinking of Sun Yatsen. But those who benefited most from democracy were not the revolutionaries nor were they the government ministers in Beijing, rather it was the provincial power brokers who best utilized the façade of democratic self-government to bolster their claims of regional independence in their quest for autonomy.

Perhaps the lip service paid to the ideals of democracy by these provincial leaders helped blur the distinction between them and the revolutionaries in the eyes Yuan Shikai. Yuan, throughout his term, regarded democratic institutions and forms as obstructions to his pursuit of

centralization. Like Sun Yatsen, Yuan subscribed to the old Chinese notion that successful rule meant centralized rule, and he pursued this goal relentlessly until his death. Even after the so called Second Revolution of 1913 when Yuan's power was felt in all corners of China, his dictatorial policies still aimed at maximum efficiency and consolidation of all authority in his hands. And though he eliminated all vestiges of genuine democratic institutions in his dismissal of first the Guomindang (GMD) and then the National Assembly in 1914, he still referred to his reformist tendencies and his record as a forward thinking administrator under the Qing. And there was some substance to these claims for Yuan was not against reform, rather he was in favor of the center as the sole source of reform. One of the great ironies of his presidency, and one revealing of his short-term planning, was that of this tactical victory against the institution of the revolution, the National Assembly. As Ernest P. Young points out in his *Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai*, Yuan sacrificed a great source of long-term legitimacy when he disbanded the Assembly, for any future claims he was to make concerning the will of the people or the furtherance of the revolution would ring hollow indeed.

The Five Power Constitution, which was to be the permanent constitution of the new republic, was replaced on Yuan's behest by a draft of his own design. It is important to note that Yuan never abandoned his desire for constitutional government, even during his monarchial attempt of 1915. Though arbitrary action by his agents was the norm, and civil liberties and the rule of law unknown under his intolerant regime, Yuan still maintained the image of a constitutional republic; even creating a cabinet and a new legislative body to serve his interests. His reliance on image to win the recognition of the populace did not stop with his homage to modern institutions. He also injected a healthy dose of the traditional in his appeals to the people; his monarchial attempt being the most extreme form of this resurrection of the old. However, despite his realization of the importance of mass, or at least elite, support, Yuan was unable to follow through with a program of genuine social mobilization to bolster his cause. Young argues that the potential existed, but Yuan's single-minded pursuit of central authority blinded him to the fact that his policies were alienating large segments of the population. Yuan, in addition to lacking any vision for a new China, was completely without a social strategy, relying instead on his bureaucratic and military power.

Yuan's quest for funding in the early days of the revolution lead him to court foreign assistance. Already reeling under the weight of reparations and concessions, Yuan attempted to secure a massive loan from a consortium of Western banks; the now infamous Reorganization Loan which precipitated the Second Revolution. Here too lies an irony; Yuan,

eager for funding to strengthen China and throw off the yoke of imperialism, was willing to grant further concessions to the West. The painful concessions of the partially adopted Twenty-One Demands represent a different situation in which Yuan essentially had no choice when faced with the aggressive and powerful Japanese. Nonetheless, in addition to further weakening China, both episodes reflected badly on Yuan's presidency. In a desperate attempt to reverse public opinion Yuan initiated his plan for a new dynasty and completely discredited his regime in the process. The short period before his death saw Yuan compromising his power in the provinces in an attempt to stave off rebellion. His loosening of central control over his regional appointments set the stage for the era of Warlordism, as Yuan's old generals and governors would compete with one another for the reins of government. Perhaps the greatest irony then is that Yuan, feverish in his attempts to break the power of the provinces, set the stage for the decentralization of the Warlord period. In this sense he can be considered the father of this new breed of men.

Yuan's failures are due in part to his dismissal of republican forms; his lack of communication with, and support from, the populace; his rigid insistence on central authority; and his lack of vision. But Yuan had the power to potentially accomplish his goals; in 1912 he seemed the best chance for a united China in the opinion of Sun Yatsen. Sun stepped down from the provisional presidency in favor of Yuan, thus avoiding conflict between the revolutionaries and the strongest man in China. But Sun also believed that Yuan would be able to obtain the centralization he thought crucial to China's survival. Following the assassination of Song Jiaoren it became clear Yuan was no friend of the revolution, and Sun opposed Yuan until the latter's death. Though Yuan obtained in large part the tight control Sun favored, he did so at the expense of democratic institutions.

If Yuan had the power without the vision, then certainly Sun had the vision but lacked the power. This generalization would neatly apply had Sun died in 1916 alongside his enemy. But Sun's career as a revolutionary carried him to Canton, where he established a nationalist regime in 1917. Thus, we may contrast the policies of Sun with those of Yuan, and not merely look at the theories of this diehard revolutionary. For, as with any system of thought, certain inconsistencies exist between theory and practice.

Sidney H. Chang and Leonard H.D. Gordon's *All Under Heaven...* details the thought and practice of Sun from his beginnings in a small village near Macao to his final manifestation as the leader of the rival government to that of Beijing. Until the Second Revolution, Sun remained optimistic about the adoption of democracy in China, assuming that once enlightened the populace would prefer a republic to the old system. This

old system, the Manchu Monarchy, was what Sun ceaselessly worked to destroy for most of his life. After the success of the revolution, Sun had a well developed theory of his own concerning the path China need take to obtain strength and self-sufficiency. These Three People's Principles of nationalism, democracy, and people's livelihood encapsulate his dominant social and political theories in an easily digested form. The turning point in his career was his entry into the world of practical politics in 1917. Until his death Sun became increasingly militaristic and autocratic, and like Yuan he has been described as a megalomaniac due to his identification with his own power as crucial to the well being of the nation. The Sun of the 1920s was not the same man as ten years before, for he increasingly bore a greater resemblance to Yuan Shikai.

In 1913 Sun actively condemned Yuan's Reorganization Loan as unconstitutional and against the best interests of the country. But Sun would later strike many deals with foreign governments in exchange for the funds he so desperately needed. Most notably Sun granted concessions to the Japanese reminiscent of the Twenty-One Demands in exchange for arms to supply his growing military. Though this behavior seems more fitting for the opportunistic Yuan, Sun reacted to the pressures of governing in much the same way. Both men were willing to sacrifice short-term goals of nationalism in exchange for a long-term potential for national reconstruction.

Sun also realized the need to disseminate his ideas to the people, and he relied heavily on his writings and his speeches to carry his message. His stature as a revolutionary was crucial to his implementation of any policy, because tolerance for the GMD government in Canton was based on Sun's usefulness to regional powers. With these warlords Sun also compromised, enjoying an uneasy truce. It must be emphasized, however, that Sun's lofty ideals were unsuitable to the circumstances of the day, and despite his compromising on some issues, he remained a man of integrity who insisted on the rule of law and would not exercise the terror tactics of Yuan such as assassination and torture.

Though Sun never made any concerted attempts to bring his message to the masses, preferring to concentrate on a party elite, he was highly concerned with the dissemination of his ideals. In packaging his personal philosophy he too made appeals to the traditional, invoking Confucius and Mencius (in much the same way as Kang Youwei) in an attempt to bridge the gap between Chinese and Western ideas. If his theories seemed an outgrowth of the European Enlightenment, Sun rather preferred to place their origins in the Zhou Dynasty. His Five Power Constitution, in addition to drawing on Western models of Executive, Legislative, and Judicial departments, also provided a continuity with the Empire in that it included

a Censorate and Examination Yamen. So, unlike the iconoclastic revolutionaries of the May Fourth Movement, Sun insisted on the validity of old institutions and social values.

The most striking example of Sun's traditional values lies in his utter insistence of party hierarchy. Though one normally associates Yuan as the exemplar of personal rule, it is really Sun who perfected it in this period. All members of his party took an oath of personal loyalty to Sun, the man, and not merely to the ideals of the revolution. Shortly before his death, Sun made a speech at Whampoa military academy in which he blamed the failure of the revolution not on the usual targets; official corruption, militarism, and political factionalism; but instead on misunderstood ideals of liberty and equality. Sun believed that these concepts applied to the nation as a whole, but that individuals were required to submit their personal liberty to the will of the party. This insistence on discipline and loyalty strengthened the cohesiveness of the GMD, but ultimately lead to its alienation from the masses.

Sun's thought lives on and has been reinterpreted to suit both the Communist and the Nationalist camps. Perhaps his sheer dedication and optimistic pursuit of the revolution warrant the title "Father of the Nation," though this distinction reflects more accurately Sun's usefulness to his successors than any extraordinary contribution on his part. Yuan, forever denigrated as a corrupt mandarin and opportunistic political schemer, probably owes this image more to a projection into the past of the realities of the Warlord era than to any true characteristics he exhibited as a factional strongman. Again, there is a certain irony when we consider the successor to both these men who would unite China by crushing regional power and centralizing authority. Chiang Kaishek would instill the cult of Sun and draw his legitimacy from Sun Yatsen Thought, all the while practicing the kind of politics which made a villain of Yuan Shikai. So too would Mao Zedong walk this path, though his ideology was only marginally concerned with Sun and his degree of autocratic control far exceeded Yuan's capabilities. The revolution, indeed, seems incomplete, for though the provinces bow to the center once again, the old source of legitimacy has not been successfully replaced. So too Western values have yet to be fully assimilated into Chinese society, their relation to Chinese tradition has yet to be satisfactorily defined, and the quest for social and political equilibrium continues to this day.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Stephen E. Ambrose. *Citizen Soldiers* (Simon and Schuster, 1997)

Stephen Ambrose, author of a score of books – many on military history, has been interviewing soldiers for more than forty years. In *Citizen Soldiers* he extends the thesis he advanced in his bestseller, *D Day: June 6, 1944*, that it was the average American soldier - often in his late teens or early twenties - be he private, non-com or junior grade officer, that won the war in the European Theater of Operations (ETO). The war was not won by generals. Indeed, Ambrose is highly critical of American generals and staff officers who rarely visited the front lines to assess conditions for themselves, who needlessly squandered the lives of thousands of American soldiers in the Hurtgen Forest and the winter offensive following the Battle of the Bulge, and who designed the terrible replacement system (the repple depple) which resulted in staggering losses in replacements within a short period of their arrival on the front line.

Citizen Soldiers follows American soldiers on the front line in the ETO from June 7, 1944 to May 7, 1945. Ambrose takes the reader from the Normandy beachhead, through the hedgerow fighting, the breakout, Hurtgen Forest, Battle of the Bulge, the winter offensive, closing to the Rhine, and on to victory in May, 1945. He weaves his own conclusions as a military historian into the tapestry of oral history interviews and personal memoirs, always maintaining a clear focus on what it was like for soldiers, both American and German, on the front line.

To give his readers a feel for what it was really like in combat on the front line (one that few readers would care to experience!) Ambrose developed separate chapters whose titles explore other facets of the combat soldier's experience, for example: *Night on the Line* which explores the physical and mental anxieties suffered by front line soldiers; *Medics, Nurses and Doctors*; *The Air War*; *Jerks, Sad Sacks, Profiteers and Jim Crow*; *Prisoners of War*; and the *Repple Depple System* which examines the outstanding flaws of the U.S. Replacement and Reinforcement System.

Citizen Soldiers soars when Ambrose describes American reaction in the Battle of the Bulge. It was the triumph of democracy the courage, determination and resourcefulness of enlisted men, non-coms and junior grade officers in line companies that blocked the German advance during

those critical first three days. Once the German offensive was blunted, Eisenhower set the broad objective to attack the Bulge on its shoulders, and, once done, the task of driving the German Army to the Rhine and beyond would fall to battalion and company commanders and their troops who came to realize the only way to go home was to continue to fight to end the war.

Again and again Ambrose recounts the right stuff American soldiers exhibited-these citizen soldiers: farm boys, college students, factory workers, and high school graduates. Throughout the misery of the cold, rain and mud; the fear, degradation and horror of unending battle; the exhaustion and lack of food and sleep; and the realization that they might not live to see the war's end; the great majority of front-line soldiers in the ETO in 1944-1945 stayed in the line, did their duty, and prevailed. This was a remarkable triumph for a democracy unprepared for war in 1941 and pitted against the world's most powerful dictatorship and best-disciplined army.

Curiously these same men were much maligned by social thinkers in the 1950's and 1960's for their conformity, similarity in dress, seldom questioning authority, materialism, and avoidance of cultural individualism. However, these were the men who built modern America. They had seen enough destruction; they wanted to build. They had seen enough killing; they wanted to save lives. They had learned in the army the virtues of solid organization and teamwork, the value of individual initiative, inventiveness, and responsibility. They developed the modern corporation, while inaugurating revolutionary advances in science and technology, education and public policy. They had seen enough war; they wanted peace. They had seen the evils of dictatorship; they wanted freedom. They had learned that the way to prevent war was to deter it through military strength and to reject isolationism for full involvement in the world. What held them together was not country or flag, but unit cohesion. Men working together toward a common end under some of the most difficult conditions in the world.

Unlike previous centuries, American soldiers arrived on the European continent in 1944 not as conquerors but as liberators - to save the world for democracy, wresting it from the most tyrannical nation on Earth. As Ambrose says

... they were the children of democracy and they did more to help spread democracy around the world than any other generation in history. At the core, the American soldiers knew the difference between right and wrong, and they didn't want to live in a world in which wrong prevailed. So they fought and won, and we all of us, living and yet to be born, must be forever profoundly grateful.

Citizen Soldiers is a stirring story about ordinary men doing their duty in a cataclysmic war under soul-testing conditions. It is a special tale about American men who become soldiers and how they adapt to the horrors of war, see it to conclusion, and return from whence they came to their homes to resume their lives as citizens in a democracy. We look at these men - our fathers, uncles and grandfathers with much pride. They did, indeed, save the world for democracy, the benefits of which we have enjoyed these past fifty years.

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David Cressy. *Birth, Marriage, and Death. Ritual, Religion, and the Life-Cycle in Tudor and Stuart England.* (Oxford University Press, 1997)

In his recent book, *Birth, Marriage, and Death. Ritual, Religion, and the Life-Cycle in Tudor and Stuart England*, David Cressy has made an important contribution to the social history of early modern England. As its title suggests, the book is concerned with the major passages in the course of a life, the rites by which these transitions were marked in the community, and the effects of religious contention on the practice and meaning of both passage and rite. These topics have been treated exhaustively before. The academic industry in studies of private life and community bonds has presented us with a wealth of detail on the practices and attitudes surrounding major life changes. The studies of religious conflicts in early modern England, as they were played out at the top ecclesiastical level and at the community level, are numerous. Cressy, however, offers new insights by offering a new perspective.

Studies of the life-cycle and its accompanying communal rituals have tended to fall into two categories. One of these is that of structural description in which the author, in straightforward fashion, presents a series of norms and most common practices and their interpretation in the community. The other frequent approach to life-cycle studies has been the polemical use of the evidence to demonstrate large shifts in human consciousness such as an increasing sense of individualism, or the discovery of affection, or an increased demand for privacy. Also in this category are the studies that make some rather large claims about gender and familial relationships in the past.

These approaches have produced valuable work and Cressy probably could not have written his book without them. His contribution to social history in this period is that he recovers the individual. He often repeats that

he is seeking the individual's experience. He treats the rituals of life's transitions as occasions in which the individual must interact with the community. His favorite terms for what individuals must do on these occasions are "negotiation" and "bargaining." Thus, we have a history not of the movement of ideas or the clash of ideas, but of ordinary people who being presented with different ideas must choose their affiliations. The results of negotiation between traditional (tradition being at times a matter of only several decades) practices, ideological religious demands, and the need to remain part of the community were often compromise and uneasy shifts and, sometimes, outright division. Those who seek support for huge ideological or socio-economic shifts will be disappointed. This study shows the often lonely individual making do, not making history. We certainly do meet some ideologues but we see them not only as proponents of a particular movement but as a member of a community who had to engage with other members of the same. Instead of a clash of ideas we see individuals who held certain ideas having to maneuver among their neighbors and relations.

Of course, ideas did divide families, communities, and eventually the nation. Just how many points of contention there could be about any practice becomes clear from Cressy's research. Take baptism, for example. Not only whether or not it should be performed at all, but the timing, the place, whether or not midwives could substitute for priests in emergencies, who should be present, and even the interpretation of the act were all issues to be debated. Cressy's attention to close personal details of the individual, situation, and context, and his wealth of examples for every point of contention, adds to our sense of both how strong and how precarious community bonds were. That still leaves us with the question of why a gap finally opened. Cressy's answer, in part, is one that has been made before. He argues that as lines hardened at the institutional, official level individuals were forced to respond in kind. Thus, at some point, individuals did make history, but only when forced to do so.

One of the main virtues of this book is the balance it restores to our view of the emotional life of early modern English people. It has been many years since Lawrence Stone declared those same people to have been largely devoid of genuine love and warm emotional attachment. Stone made his most outrageous and overdrawn claims about friendship, relationships between parents and children, and those between marriage partners. Cressy's evidence from letters, personal diaries, and even the idealized prescriptions for good families and marriages reveals in these same relationships a wealth of anxiety, concern, joy, desire, and grief over loss. Along with a mounting number of other studies, Cressy's book should finally put to rest what Cressy himself calls Stone's "reckless" claims.

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