


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Towson Journal of Historical Studies, 2023 Edition

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Table of Contents

Note From the Editors

iv

Feature Articles

James N. Johnson	<i>All We are Saying is Give Peace a Chance: Student Protest of the Vietnam War at Towson State College</i>	1
Joseph Castillo	<i>“Not One Step Back”: Soviet Ideology, Stalin, and the Massive Losses at the Battle of Stalingrad (August 1942-February 1943)</i>	11
Madison Gillin	<i>Pride and Indignation: Attitudes of Soviet Nationalism During the Khrushchev Era (1953-1964)</i>	18
Charles Hess	<i>Soviet Environmental Transformation and the Ramifications (1953-2020)</i>	27
Caleb Ruby	<i>The Military Implications of the Sino-Soviet Split: Devolution of Sino-Soviet Military Cooperation in the Khrushchev Era (1953-1964)</i>	39
Rachel Martinez	<i>Differences between the Oneida Community and mainstream Society in the 19th Century</i>	48
Sarah Minihane	<i>Women’s Liberation: Propaganda and Practice</i>	60
Sabrina Sutter	<i>An Attack on Campus: How an Incident of Discrimination Demonstrates the Power and Bias of Heterosexual Involvement in Queer Advocacy</i>	71

Note from the Editors

For the 20th edition of the *Towson Journal of Historical Studies*, we begin by thanking the readers. The editorial board, authors, faculty reviewers, and faculty advisors worked tirelessly together to complete this year's edition and we would like to thank all of you for your kindness and support. The Russian war on Ukraine generated much interest among students about the historical background to the crisis. This edition aims at providing some insight from Russian history for readers interested in the historical background to the Russia-Ukraine war. We dedicate this edition to those suffering from the effects of the war, as well as to those who face oppression and discrimination in the United States and around the world.

In this 20th edition, eight authors contributed articles exploring topics including anti-war protests, the history of the Soviet Union, and women and gender studies. To start us off, James N. Johnson helps us to remember the Vietnam War and its far-reaching impacts on youth and protest movements. Stepping into the troubled history of the Soviet Union, Joseph Castillo details the pain and sacrifice at the Battle of Stalingrad. Madison Gillin takes us on a journey through the troubling times of the Khrushchev administration and how the citizens of the USSR wrestled with what their national identity really meant. Meanwhile, Charles Hess illuminates the consequences of unchecked environmental engineering, and Caleb Ruby investigates the effects of the breakdown in relations between the USSR and the People's Republic of China. Then we turn towards the history of the struggle for equality, as Rachel Martinez takes us on a deep dive into the perils of the utopian Oneida Community project, while Sarah Miniham explores literary works in Chinese women's history. Finally, Sabrina Sutter reflects on the lessons of the Hollie Rice attack in the wake of the AIDS epidemic and the effects on the LGBTQ community here at Towson University.

All of these articles reference the level of academic research undertaken by undergraduates here at Towson University. Most submissions were submitted to lower and upper-level research and seminar classes. Authors were required to update their manuscripts to conform to the journal's guidelines and standard. We commend the hard work authors put in to improving their articles and their patience during the editing process.

We would like to extend our appreciation to our faculty advisors, Dr. Oluwatoyin Oduntan and Dr. Ronn Pineo. We thank you both for lending your expertise throughout each step of the publishing process. Finally, we thank all of the faculty reviewers who volunteered their time to review each of the submissions and provide substantial feedback. Your contributions and enthusiasm in supporting the journal are greatly appreciated.

Towson Journal of Historical Studies Editorial Board

Phillip Spain, Sabrina Sutter, Nathaniel Johnston, Rachel Martinez, Samantha Forsht, Charles Hess, Marjorie Perry, Emily Grasso.

Feature Articles

All We Are Saying Is Give Peace a Chance: Student Protest of The Vietnam War At Towson State College

James Nathaniel Johnston

Late on the night of May 10th, 1972, as seven hundred candlelit people marched through the streets of Towson to show their opposition to the Vietnam War, several students of Towson State College (TSC) slipped into Linthicum Hall and began to prepare for what would be called at the time “the most radical anti-war action” to ever take place on their campus.¹ By the end of the next day almost two dozen would be in custody or on bail for trespassing and hindering a police officer. What happened over the course of that night marked the high point of the anti-war movement at TSC as twelve individuals, mostly students of TSC, took over the building as an act of protest. Many of the students in the building during the takeover were members of an organization known as the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), and this was not their first act of protest of that year or their last. In fact, it was nowhere near the first anti-war protest staged on campus.

What was the relationship of TSC to the larger anti-war student protest movement? How involved was the student body with anti-war demonstrations at TSC? What was the response of TSC’s administration to student anti-war demonstrations? The protest movements of the 1960’s and 1970’s was a formative experience for many in that generation of students, and each campus was engaged in the movements in their own way while maintaining fundamental similarities. A study of anti-war protest at TSC provides both a look into the specific nature of the anti-war movement at TSC but also an understanding of the general nature of student activism on a college campus. Similarly, an examination of the way in which the faculty and administration of TSC responded to student activism offers insight into the decisions they faced when confronted with an unprecedented level of student activism.

Like many college campuses across the United States in the 1960’s and 1970’s, the campus of Towson State College (TSC) was the site of several demonstrations in opposition to the Vietnam war. Students connected to nationwide movements through membership in several organizations, on a local and national level. By participating in the moratoriums of 1969, the students of TSC brought the larger anti-war movement to campus. When students were killed during a protest at Kent State in Ohio, students at TSC attempted to add their voices to the events of protest and mourning. In 1972, some of the most confrontational forms of protests took place which caused the administration of TSC to reconsider their positions on student demonstrations and the policy surrounding them. Every

¹ Dillworth, Mike, and Ward Smith. “Nineteen Students Arrested in Linthicum Hall Takeover.” *Towerlight*, May 12, 1972.

person on campus experienced demonstrations in some way, students, faculty, and the president all lived through the events and were forced to react to them.

The Vietnam War was the second longest conflict in the history of the United States, and with each new President came new strategies, greater public opposition, and more reasons to protest. Although the United States became involved in the war in 1957 under the Eisenhower administration, it was under the Johnson administration that the country truly became invested in the conflict. Following an incident in the Gulf of Tonkin on August, 2nd, 1964, when a US Navy vessel was attacked by Communist North Vietnamese torpedo boats, the Johnson administration increased bombing efforts, and in 1965 committed the first major troop deployments of the war.² Following the Tet Offensive and end of Johnson's administration in 1968, public opinion had largely turned against the war, and the Presidency realized that the war needed to be ended soon. In 1969, with the start of the Nixon administration American troops in Vietnam reached their peak of 543,400.³ Under the Nixon administration there were several events that prompted protest of the conflict outside the war itself. These events include information concerning the murder of over four hundred civilians at the hands of American troops at Mai Lai in 1968 being made public, the start of the draft lottery in 1969, and the expansion of the war into Cambodia in 1970.⁴ It was on May 4th, 1970 that students at Kent State University protesting the expansion of the war were shot at by members of the National Guard, resulting in the deaths of four students. As the Nixon administration continued to try and end the war on their terms, public outcry grew against the increased bombing of targets in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, in 1971.⁵ In 1972, the Nixon administration continued a bombing campaign in North Vietnam and made the announcement that the United States would blockade all North Vietnamese ports and cut off all rail transportation until all American POWs were released.⁶ Later in 1972 two students were killed during unrest at Southern University, a historically Black university in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, causing protests in several locations.⁷ By the end of the Nixon administration in 1974, the war was effectively over. As Gerald Ford succeeded Nixon as President, Northern Vietnamese forces began an offensive that would result in the fall of Saigon and the end of the War on April 30th, 1975.⁸

The age group most affected by the Vietnam War is the same age group found most often on college campuses, and as the war grew larger so did the movement led by students in opposition to it. During the war, one of the largest problems facing a college aged male was the possibility of being drafted. Between 1940 and 1972 Congress consistently renewed the laws that enabled the drafting of young men into military service. While undergraduates were usually able to receive a deferment if they performed well academically, the process was more complicated for graduate students.⁹

² Graham A. Cosmas. "Vietnam War." *Dictionary of American History*, edited by Stanley I. Kutler, 3rd ed., vol. 8, Charles Scribner's Sons, 2003, pp. 332.

³ Spencer C. Tucker. "Vietnam War." *Understanding U.S. Military Conflicts through Primary Sources*, edited by James R. Arnold and Roberta Wiener, vol. 4: Vietnam War to Iraq War, ABC-CLIO, 2016, pp. 13.

⁴ Spencer C. Tucker. "Vietnam War." pp. 13-14

⁵ Ibid. 15

⁶ Ibid. 16

⁷ Martin Waldrons. "2 Die in Clash with Police on Baton Rouge Campus: 2 Die in Clash with Police on Baton Rouge Campus." *New York Times*. Nov 17, 1972.

⁸ Ibid. 19

⁹ Eric Longley. "The Draft." *St. James Encyclopedia of Popular Culture*, edited by Thomas Riggs, 2nd ed., vol. 2, St. James Press, 2013, pp. 165-166.

Because the age of a college student is typically the same as that of a soldier many students protested the war as a means of “self-preservation.” Others protested the war because they felt that was what was right, and some protested because they felt the war was keeping the United States from addressing more domestic issues such as racism.¹⁰ The first protest began in 1964 and 1965 as the war grew, and those protesting quickly began to organize. For example, the SDS formed in 1960 began to experience an increase in membership as students became aware of its mission and opposition to the war.¹¹

It is important to recognize that while American public memory paints a picture of student activism where most students on most campuses were engaged in radical anti-war activity, this was largely not the case. A poll of students conducted at the end of the 1960s found that only twenty per cent of students who responded had participated in at least one anti-war protest.¹² In the period between 1964 and 1969 organized student protest of the war in Vietnam occurred on between ten and forty per cent accredited four-year college and universities in the United States based depending on academic year.¹³ A plurality of opinions also would have existed on college campuses across the United States, as demonstrated by the counter-protests and general apathy present at many of the anti-war protests held at TSC. For students protesting the war their voices were loud enough to influence popular culture and capture the attention of university administrations attempting to maintain order. Ultimately many student activists found it difficult to engage the active support of their classmates and turn their vocal minority into a meaningful majority.

The student demonstrations that took place at Towson came at a turning point in the history of the school. Founded in 1866 as the Maryland State Normal School, the school moved several times before arriving at its current location in Towson, Maryland, in 1915. As a normal school, its function was the training of educators who could then pursue careers in the state educational system. In 1935, a four-year Bachelor of Sciences program was introduced and the Normal School was renamed to the Maryland State Teachers College. Following a change in program in 1963, the school was renamed for a third time, becoming Towson State College. The college would hold this name until 1976 when it was renamed to Towson State University and then again to Towson University in 1997, the name it presently holds. The TSC era was one of the most active periods in the history of the campus, with a major increase in student body, course offerings, buildings, and diversity. It was also during the TSC era that the Vietnam War escalated and ended.¹⁴

The student protest movement in opposition to the Vietnam War was highly organized, and many groups were formed on national and local levels to facilitate the execution of demonstrations. At TSC, which groups exercised the most power and were the most vocal ebbed and flowed from year to year. While some groups were connected to national organizations, others were the constructions of Towson students. One such local group was the Coalition for New Politics (CNP), a group

¹⁰ Joseph A. Fry “Unpopular Messengers: Student Opposition to the Vietnam War.” In *The War That Never Ends: New Perspectives on the Vietnam War*, edited by David L. Anderson and John Ernst, pp. 124.

¹¹ Barry J. Balleck. “Students for a Democratic Society.” In *Modern American Extremism and Domestic Terrorism: An Encyclopedia of Extremists and Extremist Groups*, 350-351. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2018. Gale eBooks

¹² Joseph A. Fry “Unpopular Messengers: Student Opposition to the Vietnam War. pp. 222.

¹³ Schreiber, E. M. “Opposition to the Vietnam War among American University Students and Faculty.” *The British Journal of Sociology* 24, no. 3 (1973): 290. <https://doi.org/10.2307/588233>.

¹⁴ University History,” University History | Albert S. Cook Library, accessed December 21, 2021, <https://libraries.towson.edu/university-archives/university-history>.

formed in the spring of 1969 primarily in opposition to the war in Vietnam, and that placed itself politically on the far left somewhere between the Democratic Party and the SDS.¹⁵ The CNP was the primary organizing body behind TSC's participation in several nationally organized demonstrations from its inception through 1970, with its last mention in the *Towerlight* where it was listed as part of the SGA organizational budget.¹⁶

As a national organization founded in the 1960's the SDS is well known for its role in the student protest movement. The SDS existed on and off for some time at Towson, but remained in the background while the CNP was active. In February, 1968, the SDS applied to be an SGA sponsored organization and was approved shortly thereafter.¹⁷ In November of 1970 Rennie Davis, a member of the Chicago Seven and an SDS organizer spoke at Towson and encouraged the participation of students in a major protest event that was scheduled for the next year.¹⁸ The SDS was listed in the SGA organizational budget article in December of 1970, receiving a small amount of money to be used for the acquisition of educational films.¹⁹ It was in fall of 1972 that the SDS became a louder voice on campus, with the start of publicized meetings and publication of its own newsletter, the *Midwife*.²⁰ The goals of the *Midwife* were to develop "a series of radical/ revolutionary programs," as well as to build "a worker-students movement, the vanguard of a socialist revolution."²¹ The new awakening of the SDS prompted an editorial from the *Towerlight* that discussed the relationship of the Towson chapter of the SDS to the wider national faction. The Towson SDS refuted the article claiming that were only "nominally affiliated" with the national organization.²²

Another nationally organized student group was Young Americans for Freedom (YAF). The YAF was active on campus throughout the 1960's and 1970's and served as a right-wing group opposite of the left leaning CNP and SDS. At nearly every protest there was a YAF counter protest, and the YAF were often invited to participate in forums and debates organized by the students on the left. The YAF were incredibly vocal and wrote to both the *Towerlight* and large local papers, often starting a series of letters debating each other. One example of this is seen following Kent State protests, when the YAF wrote to *The Baltimore Sun* applauding the fact that they defended the flag on campus from the protestors.²³ Several days later another letter was published by *The Sun* from a protester who argued that the claims made by the YAF were inflated and there was no attempt by the protestors to desecrate the flag in anyway.²⁴ In November 1972, the YAF distributed a flyer attacking the *Towerlight* claiming the publication was left leaning. In response, a student wrote a letter to the *Towerlight* stating that they felt the purpose of the YAF was to criticize "the unfunctional, the unimportant, and truly insignificant."²⁵ Out of the three organizations the YAF was

¹⁵ David Baker. "Coalition Party Forms on Campus; Plans Organization of Moratorium." *Towerlight*. September 26, 1969, 22-2 edition. Link

¹⁶ "Where You Money Goes." *Towerlight*. December 4, 1970, 22-11 edition. Link

¹⁷ Gordon, n.d.

¹⁸ Fred Barbash. "Rennie Davis, at Towson Promotes Pentagon 'Jam-In'." *The Sun*. November 14, 1970, 267-156 edition. Link

¹⁹ "Where You Money Goes." *Towerlight*. December 4, 1970, 22-11 edition. Link

²⁰ Schini, Dick. "Paper, Day Care Center among SDS Objectives." *Towerlight*. October 8, 1971, 24-5 edition. Source

²¹ "SDS Published *Midwife*." *Towerlight*. October 15, 1971, 24-6 edition. Source

²² Pridgeon, David. "SDS Refutes Editorial." *Towerlight*. November 6, 1971, 24-9 edition. Source

²³ Schorr, Charles B. "Brave YAF." *The Sun*. May 23, 1970, 267 - 6 edition.

²⁴ Scott, John C. "Peaceful Campus." *The Sun*. May 28, 1970, 267-10 edition.

²⁵ Mike Handzo, "Bury the YAF," *Towerlight*, November 5, 1972.

the steadiest, with a consistent presence on campus and a stable connection to their national organization.

The Moratorium to end the war in Vietnam was a national anti-war event that took place in late 1969. Planned by the Vietnam Moratorium Committee, an organization made up of professional activists and political campaigners, the event was intended as a response to President Nixon's plans for the Vietnam war. The plan for the event was first released in June of 1969, and called for a series of protests that would bring people from multiple different backgrounds together to demonstrate their desire for peace in a cessation of business as usual. The first moratorium was scheduled for October 15th and saw the support of over 300 academic institutions nationwide.

The participation of Towson State College at the first moratorium was slightly different than that of other schools. In a public release the TSC Office of College Relations explained that, while the SGA was planning events for that day they were not part of the national event. The events planned by the SGA included the screening of films and access to "draft counseling" to help students learn how the draft applied to them. Planning and execution of the moratorium conducted outside of the SGA was performed by the CNP. The CNP wanted to execute the moratorium as it was planned, with all normal campus activity ceasing in favor of other activities, and up until the very week of the moratorium the CNP pressed the SGA and administration to cancel classes. Unable to gain the support of the SGA and college administration the CNP observed the moratorium with the screening of several films, a forum, a rally, and a prayer session.²⁶ The efforts of the SGA and administrations modified the participation of Towson and denied the suspension of classes, but professors were encouraged to bring up the war in class and discuss it with students.²⁷

The first Moratorium was well received on campus and demonstrates an attempt by TSC students to connect to the wider anti-war movement. On October 15th the moratorium began at 8:00 AM with singing, readings, and an ecumenical hour. The morning event also included talks by a member of the Black Labor Alliance, the SDS labor committee, and a conscientious objector. During the talk given by the conscientious objector several members of the YAF paraded around the area with flags but left after a short time without incident. Following the end of events at Towson, students from the school traveled to Johns Hopkins University to join in their observations of the day. YAF protests by Towson students continued at the Hopkins moratorium; events consisted of parading with US flags and signs. Counter-protesting with the YAF were students who were in favor of the war, but not affiliated with the YAF.²⁸

At the conclusion of the first moratorium at TSC, there was little to report as the event went off with few issues. However, on campus there was an issue involving the use of the jukebox in the student union. The dispute came from a disagreement over who could control the music in the space, as the CNP had requisitioned the space with permission of the administration, and other students claimed that their right to listen to their own music was being denied. Ultimately, the CNP defused the

²⁶ "For Immediate Release," n.d. Towson State College.

²⁷ Tolen, Stephen. "Nationwide Viet Boycott Called; TSC Slates Modified Participation." *Towerlight*. September 26, 1969, 22-2 edition.

²⁸ Bonge, Valerie. "And Then, Some Came To Support The Viet War." *The Evening Sun*. October 16, 1969, 119-155 edition, sec. Women's.

situation by moving to another space. Overall, reporting by the *Towerlight* was positive.²⁹ Reporting in *The Sun* focused on events at Hopkins and other larger headlines, though Towson was mentioned in a positive light and was shown for their involvement in a national protest effort.³⁰

For the Faculty and administration, the first moratorium was also a major event. Several faculty members also voiced their support of the moratorium. A major highlight of the day came when an English professor read a letter in support signed by fifty-two members of the faculty, though it was reported that only 15 faculty members were present at the event. Dr. Fisher, and Dean Shaw were present and took part in a prayer hour with the students.³¹ For President Fisher the event marked one of the first demonstrations during his tenure as president, and an open letter on the subject proved to be the first glimpses of what would become his administrative policy of neutrality.

The next month saw another moratorium in line with the general plan of the committee, which had asked they be held at an increasing number every month following the first should there be no action taken by Congress to meet their demands. At Towson, the second moratorium was conducted like the first but on a smaller scale with a forum, public readings, and leafleting. In the press coverage leading up the second moratorium it was reported that there were no large-scale events planned. Several students traveled to the major march in Washington D.C..³² The students who traveled to this major march reported on what they experienced at the D.C moratorium to the *Towerlight* calling it “Freaky, urgent, united.” In addition to this they penned a letter saying what a shame it was that relatively little was happening at Towson State College while the major event was happening in Washington.³³

In December a final moratorium was put on, but it was a much smaller effort, though still a national event. There was a reading of the names of war dead and of interviews with soldiers who were involved in the Mai Lai massacre. There were concerns about the disruptive nature of the demonstration which caused Fisher and the Deans to become involved and threatened the demonstrators with arrest. Later in the day there was a teach-in and an open forum run by the YAF and the CNP. In the *Towerlight* following the event the YAF included a letter criticizing the CNP and the administration.³⁴ The moratorium movement did not survive the winter break, and in early 1970 the National moratorium committee faded, disbanded, and repurposed itself. At TSC however, the moratoriums could be considered a success, as they were the first major protest events connecting the campus to a larger movement and first protest to pull hundreds of students on the streets in an anti-war demonstration.

Kent State was an important moment in the student protest movement, and Towson reacted to the shooting just as many other schools across the country. Following small-scale protests on May 5, 1970, the day after the Kent State shootings, a strike was called for the 6th. The event was a general

²⁹ “Towson M-Day Brings Rallies, Marches, Counter Rallies.” *Towerlight*. October 24, 1969, 22-6 edition.

³⁰ Burns, Michael K. “Colleges Joining October 15 War Protest.” *The Sun*. October 7, 1969, 265-123 edition.

³¹ “Towson M-Day Brings Rallies, Marches, Counter Rallies.” *Towerlight*. October 24, 1969.

³² Moore, Warren. “Educational War Protests Expected Today.” *Towerlight*, November 14, 1969, 22-9 edition.

³³ Moore, Warren. “DC March Described as ‘Freaky-Holiday, Moral Crusade’.” *Towerlight*. November 21, 1969, 22-10 edition.

³⁴ Whiston, Mike. “Linthicum Moratorium Marchers Threatened with Arrest.” *Towerlight*. December 19, 1969, 22- 13 edition.

strike by students and faculty on campus.³⁵ The strike was met with mixed feelings, with some believing the on-campus strike was not enough, and others stating it was a pointless display that accomplished nothing.³⁶ Ultimately the strike was considered a “flop” by its leaders, with more of the blame being put on apathy and the lack of total disruption by the protests. Apathy was a serious problem for event organizers at TSC, and on a campus of almost six-thousand students it was rare to see more than a couple hundred demonstrating at a time. In the case of the Kent State protest, there were a couple hundred students in the union, and as much as the marchers called out for them none of them joined the protest.³⁷

On May 7th, students held a procession in the form of a mock funeral through downtown Towson in protest of the Kent State shootings. It was undisruptive, but local citizens expressed disapproval for the event.³⁸ Later in the week students took part in larger protests in the area with students from other schools.³⁹ Student organizers at Towson also keep connections with organizers at other schools, such as Johns Hopkins.⁴⁰ One result of the protests was the renaming of Agnew drive to Kent State drive by students.⁴¹ This change was later made official. Requests for finals to be canceled, left up to professors.⁴² Demonstrations continued at the campus of Towson state college through May, though none entirely related to the Kent State shootings in a direct manner. Some smaller events that were not related to major protests also would end up leaving their mark on campus. On May 4th, 1972, Marine Corps recruiters had set up for interviews on campus in the administrative building, but they were soon kept from this mission as students formed a human chain in front of their offices. After three hours of holding this chain campus security arrived to bring an end to the demonstrations. Due to a Maryland law that prohibited the interference with business on state college campuses, five of the protesters were taken into custody after failing to disperse. As the students were being taken to the bus that would transport them from the site, a physical altercation between police and protesters occurred, and the event turned into a scuffle that no one seemed to be able to recall clearly.⁴³ During the course of this, several students and faculty were harmed by security, and in general the actions of campus security prompted an investigation that would be used to advise security force policy on campus. In this case, the investigation committee found that while there had been a lack of judgment on both sides following the arrests, it was ultimately members of the security force who were in the wrong, and the committee provided guidance on how to avoid similar confrontations in the future.⁴⁴ A week later, the day before the special panel was set to take testimonies, a dozen students took over Linthicum Hall as other protestors watched from outside.⁴⁵ The action began at 10:40 as the students

³⁵ The Associated Press. “Series Of Strikes Set By Md. College Students.” *The Daily Times*. May 6, 1970, 47-132 edition.

³⁶ “All We Are Saying... Is Give Peace a Chance.” *Towerlight*. May 11, 1970, 22-25 edition.

³⁷ “Students Move Protest Toward Downtown.” *The Evening Sun*. May 6, 1970

³⁸ Sanoff, Alvin P. “Area Demonstrations Continue.” *The Sun*. May 8, 1970.

³⁹ Sanoff, Alvin P. “3,000 Here Protest Wider War.” *The Sun*. May 9, 1970, 266-80 edition.

⁴⁰ Gillbert, Kelly. “Towson Protest Divided On Effect.” *The Evening Sun*. May 7, 1970, 121-17 edition, sec. Metropolitan Section.

⁴¹ “Strike Leaders Sub 'Kent State' For Agnew Drive.” *The Sun*. May 9, 1970, 266-86 edition.

⁴² “Decision On Final Exams Up To Teachers At Towson.” *The Sun*. May 13, 1970, 266-89 edition.

⁴³ George Weinburg. “5 Protesters Charged in SDS Action.” *Towerlight*, May 5, 1972.

⁴⁴ George A. Pruitt. “Report of the Special Panel to Investigate the Arrests of May 4, 1972.” Towson State College: Towson, Maryland, June 4, 1972.

⁴⁵ Dillworth, Mike, and Ward Smith. “Nineteen Students Arrested in Linthicum Hall Takeover.” *Towerlight*, May 12,

barricaded themselves in, and an hour later they had access to the roof and the police were on the scene. Until the arrival of the police, access to the building was somewhat porous, with some individuals entering the building late or being let in upon their arrival with members of the school's press. Once police arrived students on the outside of the building stood in front of the entrances blocking access to the doors. Around 1:00 AM, the administration offered amnesty to the students should they decide to leave the building peacefully and of their own volition. However, the students refused, and at approximately 3:00 AM the police forced their way through the crowd and began to breach the building. In a last-ditch effort, the students retreated to the roof of the building. By 3:45 in the morning all protestors who were inside the building had been arrested and escorted out.⁴⁶

The event appears to have been coordinated by the SDS in conjunction with the candlelight march they had organized for that night. Individuals who were named in the city newspaper as having been arrested served as SDS spokespeople in an article written just prior to the takeover. In it one of the men, John Young, referred to Towson's anti-war movement as "'the most cohesive in the Baltimore-Washington area,'" and explained how he felt that the other schools in the region were looking to TSC for unity.⁴⁷

The Linthicum takeover was not the last takeover orchestrated by the SDS that year. On November 27th, 1972, four members of the SDS barricaded themselves in the switchboard room of TSC, located in Stevens Hall. They were assisted by fifty others who barricaded the doors from the outside. The act was performed to bring awareness to the deaths of two students at Southern University in Louisiana. This protest demonstrates the beginning of a shift away from anti-war protest in pursuit of other causes.

The reaction of TSC's student body to anti-war protests varied greatly. One example of the variety of student opinions is found on the cover of the edition of *Towerlight* published following the strike conducted in protest of the Kent State shootings. Where one student believes that the strike signals the start of something bigger another questioned why it is being conducted solely on campus. Several students agree that the strike will accomplish nothing, but for different reasons, with two being on the side of the government and feeling that that protest is too radical, and two others agreeing that the protest was not doing enough to get more people involved.⁴⁸ The variety of different student groups demonstrates a variety of views. Ultimately those who were actively involved in the protests represented a minority of students. The average attendance for a march paled in comparison to the student body, and in many cases student activists would make a point of attending demonstrations at other campuses.

It is reasonable to assume that the faculty was mixed in support of the protest movement as much as students were. During strikes and moratoriums, they were given the right to choose not to participate in protests and could cancel classes or tests if they chose to. There is also evidence of faculty openly supporting protests in spirit and body as seen above, and other writing to newspapers defending

1972, 25-13 edition.

⁴⁶ Jud Almond. "From the inside out." *Towerlight*, May 12, 1972.

⁴⁷ Ward Smith. "Student rally protests Nixon war escalation." *Towerlight*, May 12, 1972.

⁴⁸ "Question: What Significance Does the Strike Have for You, and What Do You Plan to Do for It?," *Towerlight*, May 11, 1970.

protesters from the claims of other students.⁴⁹ The views of faculty were also expressed in the *Towerlight* article from May of 1970. In this instance the retiring Dean of Students is quoted saying: "I am enthusiastic that students are showing concern. I believe my role is to help students express individual rights. They must follow their conscience."⁵⁰ Examples of faculty supporting students appear frequently in the *Towerlight* as well as in the local papers where they defend the efforts and image of anti-war protesters on campus.

During his administration President Fisher practiced a policy of institutional neutrality. He believed that "Institutional neutrality . . . is essential to the life and survival of the 'university.'" He was able to maintain this neutrality during his tenure as president and was able to focus on expanding the Towson campus and programs to much of what we see today. Fisher's neutrality was tested in 1972 when students called for him to take an anti-war stance. Students confronted him saying that they understood his position and the need for funding at the school, but they would not be able to respect him because of his inability to take an anti-war stance.⁵¹ Fisher remained president till 1979, and during his time in office the campus grew exponentially. His policy of neutrality may not have been popular, but it enabled students to voice their opinions freely.

The 1960's and 1970's were a period of growth at TSC, the student population grew, and new buildings were put up and the campus changed with each new class. As the war in Vietnam began to come to an end the focus of student activists at campuses across the United States shifted their focus to other social issues, and as new students appeared on campus the interest and energy of the prior classes began to vanish. The TSC based CNP demonstrates this shift that was occurring nationally, as it vanished following the graduation of its leadership. While anti-war protests were a part of life on most campuses across the country, they were conducted by a small but passionate percentage of students. As the events at TSC demonstrate protest events on many campuses were only of importance to those who made them important, and many protests were considered failures because of the apathy of other students on campus who lacked interest or had other things to worry about. In the end the students arrested at TSC in May of 1972 received parole, and their small number demonstrates how such a small group can have such a big voice.

⁴⁹ Andrews, Herbert D. "Historical 'Truth'." *The Evening Sun*. October 1, 1970, 121-142 edition.

⁵⁰ "Question: What Significance Does the Strike Have for You, and What Do You Plan to Do for It? ," *Towerlight* , May 11, 1970.

⁵¹ Barbieri, Anthony. "Towson President Refuses to Take Anti-War Stand." *The Sun*. April 22, 1972, 270-134 edition.

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“Not One Step Back”: Soviet Ideology, Stalin, and the Massive Losses at the Battle of Stalingrad (August 1942-February 1943)

Joe Castillo

Of the countries that participated in the Second World War, none had more casualties than the Soviet Union. With a death toll estimated to be over 20 million, the Soviet Union lost more than Germany, Japan, Italy, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, combined. Nowhere was this mass death and destruction more evident than at the Battle of Stalingrad, which lasted over five months and became the bloodiest of World War II. Over a million Russian soldiers died, and the civilian death toll is still disputed. The main question of this paper is what made this battle one of the deadliest in human history? What will be demonstrated here is that while almost all Soviet deaths during the battle may be attributed to the German Army, it was Stalin and the Soviet ideology of victory at any cost that made the battle so catastrophic.

One reason the Russian army suffered so much during the Battle of Stalingrad was that it was poorly led. Since the “great Terror” or “Great Purge” of the 1930s, which targeted rich peasants (kulaks), foreigners, members of the old nobility, and anyone deemed traitor of the Communist Party, the Red Army was one of the hardest hit institutions of the Purge, especially among the officers and overall command staff. By the Summer of 1937, the Soviet Army Officer Corps had been crippled. According to James Harris, “thirteen of fifteen army commanders and fifty-seven of eight-five corps commanders were shot, as were 110 of 195 divisional commanders.”⁵² Overall, “somewhere around one-third of the Red Army officer corps were removed”⁵³ just a few years before the outbreak of war and the 1941 German invasion of the Soviet Union. By purging most of the officer corps, the Red Army lacked experienced military leaders, and the overall effectiveness of the Red Army dropped as a result.

The first German invasion (codenamed Operation Barbarossa) stalled in 1941 despite inflicting mass atrocities on the Soviet people and occupying vast conquered territory. In response to Operation Barbarossa's shortcomings, the German High Command drew up plans for another invasion of the Soviet Union, codenamed Case Blue. The operation would begin in June of 1942, and the Germans gained ground rapidly. In response to the rapid gains of the Germans, Stalin issued the now infamous Order 227 which completely banned the use of retreat as a military tactic. Order 227 instructed that “the conclusion is that it is time to stop the retreat. Not a single step back!”⁵⁴ This phrase “not one step back” became the Red Army’s military doctrine from that point on. Order 227 was issued in July of 1942, about one month before the start of the Battle of Stalingrad. Stalingrad was strategically attractive to Germans because of its proximity to Volga

⁵² James Harris, *The Great Fear: Stalin’s Terror of the 1930s* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 168.

⁵³ Harris, *Great Fear*, 168.

⁵⁴ Joseph Stalin, “Order NO. 227, July 28, 1942,” *Seventeen Moments in Soviet History: An Online Archive of Primary Sources* (accessed April 24, 2022), <http://soviethistory.msu.edu/1943-2/the-nazi-tide-stops/no-one-steps-back/>.

River and its potentials for industrial production. On August 23rd, 1942, the German attack on the city was swift. Soviet writer Vasily Grossman, who was with the Red Army at the time, wrote of his arrival to Stalingrad shortly after the attack started. that “Stalingrad is burned down. Stalingrad is in ashes. It is dead.”⁵⁵ The city was destroyed in a matter of days, but the defenders would not, and could not fallback. The Soviet command insisted that the city was too important to lose, and despite the destruction, it was the Red Army's job to hold the city. As the battle raged soldiers were not allowed to retreat, and if they fled, the Order provided for special units set up behind the frontlines of battle to shoot any who tried to flee. Order 227 mandated those deployed at the rear of “unstable divisions” “execute panic-mongers and cowards at site in case of panic and chaotic retreat, to give faithful soldiers a chance to do their duty before the Motherland.”⁵⁶ The order also provided for the creation of penal battalions where deserters were sent. These penal battalions were then deployed to the worst parts of the front.

The effect Order 227 had on the Battle of Stalingrad was immense. As the fighting raged on in the city, the military act of retreating could get officers arrested and soldiers executed. Soviet soldiers were forced to hold their ground against the German war machine, and to fight and die for every inch of land. By eliminating the option of retreat, Stalin ensured that the Battle of Stalingrad became a bloodbath. The choice for Soviet soldiers was either death by German bullets or death by Soviet bullets, with Stalin betting that most soldiers would rather die by enemy hands than by other Soviet soldiers. That choice however did not matter as no matter what the Red Army paid a massive cost to hold and not retreat, a direct order of Stalin.

While Order 227 was draconian, it was also incredibly effective. By banning retreat and threatening cowardice with execution, Soviet soldiers fought harder in defending Stalingrad. According to Divisional Commissar Kuzma Gurov, Order 227 made his soldiers realize their roles as “people of that state,” and in doing so they would “[hold] their positions even though the Germans overran them.”⁵⁷ Another account tells of a soldier named Kurvanyev who when he saw his commander surrendering to the Germans, killed him, took over command of his division, and led a successful counterattack.⁵⁸ Accounts like this show while Order 227 led to massive casualties, it was also successful in inspiring the soldiers to fight. Whether it be from fear or loyalty to the party, or patriotism, Order 227 was effective because of the sheer amount of blood spilled by the Red Army.

The Red Army suffered massive casualties, not just at Stalingrad but on all fronts. Yet, many Soviet citizens readily joined the fight. It is difficult to establish whether new recruits were aware of the fatalities, but much has been written about the effectiveness of Soviet war propaganda. Roger R. Reese explains that among many reasons why Soviet citizens continued to join the fight was Soviet propaganda and the Cult of Stalin. “Without a doubt many volunteers associated Stalin with the nation in a favorable way” and that “in the prewar years the growing cult of personality surrounding Stalin likely had an influence on many young people when the war came.”⁵⁹ Reese

⁵⁵ Vasily Grossman, *A Writer at War: Vasily Grossman with the Red Army, 1941-1945* (New York: Pantheon Books, 2005), 125.

⁵⁶ Stalin, “Order 227.”

⁵⁷ Jochen Hellbeck, *Stalingrad: The City That Defeated the Third Reich* (New York: Public Affairs, 2015), 52.

⁵⁸ Hellbeck, *Stalingrad*, 53.

⁵⁹ Rogers R. Reese, “Motivations to Serve: The Soviet Soldier in the Second World War,” *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 20, no. 2 (April 2007): 263–82, doi:10.1080/13518040701378287.

recounts how a young Soviet pilot trainee named Raisa Surnachevskaya remembered praying to Stalin “like a god.”⁶⁰ While not every Soviet soldier fought for Stalin, in fact there were a good number of volunteers who despised him, Stalin was still widely beloved in the Soviet Union. Stalin as seen as a great hero and leader, and many in the USSR were willing to die for him.

Soviet losses at both Stalingrad and the many other battles of World War II can also be attributed to how the Soviet Government viewed their troops. Bradon M. Schechter describes the Soviet soldier as “little cogs” and that the “government laid claim the bodies of men and women, handing them over to commanders who were deputized to use human resources to wage war.”⁶¹ Painting soldiers in this light, it turns them from human beings into disposable, and easily replaceable war parts. The effect this can have on losses is catastrophic as if soldiers are seen as easily replaced then what is the harm of losing them. Sergeant VA Shishkin was one of those many “little cogs” who was sent to fight in the ruins of Stalingrad. His unit, a part of the 84th Tank Brigade, was ordered across the river Volga into Stalingrad in early October 1942. Shishkin was born and raised in Stalingrad and his homecoming was anything but welcome. He describes his first experience of the Battle of Stalingrad as such:

It was dusk, and Stalingrad was in flames...General Novikov arrived, and delivered a short speech. He turned round towards the burning city and with a noticeable gleam in his eye he said: “Comrades! In a few hours’ time you’ll be on the right bank of the Volga. Remember, there’s no way back. Before us lies either death or victory, and we will be victorious.” That night, under heavy enemy fire, our brigade started crossing over to the city... It’s difficult to describe for me to describe everything that happened that night...All I can say is that, if we had not had any weapons, we would still have killed the people who had come to take our Volga from us with our bare hands - which at one point is exactly what we had to do.⁶²

The Soviet soldiers who were fighting in Stalingrad were fighting for many reasons. Some out of patriotic duty, some because they were scared of what the Soviet government would do to them if they did not fight, and others fought just for survival. Sergeant Shishkin may have willingly given his own life to liberate his home city, for many others, Stalingrad was just a destroyed city, it was not their home, it was just where the Soviet Government had sent them to fight and die. Stalin and the Soviet Government were determined to control the city at any cost. For the Soviet soldiers of Stalingrad, the “little cogs,” this meant only blood and death.

Other Orders from either Stalin or the military high command focused on victory rather than the lives of combatants. One order, issued on the 13th of September 1942 from Stalin to General (and future Marshal) Georgy Zhukov stated that “[he was] to demand of the commanders of forces situated to the north and south of Stalingrad to make haste in striking the enemy and to come to the aid of Stalingraders. Any sort of delay is forbidden. Delay is now tantamount to a crime.”⁶³

⁶⁰ Reese, “Motivations,” 274.

⁶¹ Brandon M. Schechter, *The Stuff of Soldiers: A History of the Red Army in World War II Through Objects* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2019), 45.

⁶² Interview with VA Shishkin, in *Voices From Stalingrad: First-Hand Accounts From World War II’s Cruellest Battle*, ed. Jonathan Bastable (Barnsley, S. Yorkshire: Greenhill Books, 2019), 124-125.

⁶³ Joseph Stalin, “Telegram of the Supreme High Command to the representative of the Supreme High Command on the rendering of assistance to Stalingrad, 3 September 1942. 22:30,” in *The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, 1941-1945*, ed. Alexander Hill (London: Routledge, 2010), 104.

Another order from Soviet high command was given to General (and another future Marshal) Andrei Eremenko. His orders were to fortify Soviet positions within Stalingrad:

All towns and major population centers regardless of their distance from the defence lines are to be readied for defence. The principal focus is to be on those parts of Stalingrad still in our hands, with every house, every street and every district becoming a fortress. In addition, the most decisive measures are to be taken to clear the enemy from those areas of the city which he occupies and in addition to securely fortify that recapture behind you.⁶⁴

These orders given by both Stalin and the Red Army high command show just how much they are willing to sacrifice for the sake of victory. By ordering Zhukov not to delay in his attack and reminding him that delaying is a crime Stalin was instructing him that no matter how many wounded men he had, how much ammunition he had, no matter how much time he needed time to organize a proper assault, he just had to follow instruction. The only thing that mattered was victory and by not allowing any delay; victory would come with massive losses. The cost was not just in human life, vast amounts of ammunition and other military supplies were used at alarming rates. David R. Stone states that the “demand for ammunition forced the Soviets to superhuman efforts to force supplies across the Volga to beleaguered Soviet defenders on the west bank.”⁶⁵ The superhuman efforts Stone is referencing involved the needless sacrificing of Soviet soldiers as Stalin demand victory no matter how many Soviets had to die to achieve it.

It was not just the soldiers of the Red Army who suffered in Stalingrad because of the actions of Joseph Stalin, but ordinary Soviet citizens were as well. When the attacks around Stalingrad first started, Stalin forbade a full evacuation stating that the Red Army would “fight harder for a living town.”⁶⁶ This led to the deaths of many civilians as on the 23rd of August the German Luftwaffe destroy the city. 40,000 civilians died in two days because of both the German air raids and Stalin’s decision to not evacuate the city.. Larisa Ladnaya was a teenager in Stalingrad when the air raids started, and her account of those days speaks volumes to the horror the Soviet citizens of the city went through:

Shells were bursting all around us, but we had to try and get something to feed the wounded and the little children, who were crying and asking for food. Since I was older, they all turned to me for help. We could only prepare food or water at night. It was impossible to leave the hiding-place in daylight. A friend of mine was killed with her entire family when her apartment block took a direct hit. Many of the girls in my class were killed too. The city had many wooden buildings which burned easily. The oil tanks made a terrifying fire. Everything was bathed in the glow of fire.⁶⁷

Stalin’s failure to call for an immediate evacuation of the city led to countless stories like Larisa Ladnaya’s. It was his actions, or rather lack thereof, that directly led to the deaths of 40,000 Soviet

⁶⁴ “Extracts from the Directives of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No. 170,655 of 14 October 1942 on measures for the defence of Stalingrad. To the Commander of the Stalingrad Front, Comrade Eremenko,” in in *The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, 1941-1945*, ed. Alexander Hill (London: Routledge, 2010), 104.

⁶⁵ David R Stone, “Stalingrad and the Evolution of Soviet Urban Warfare,” *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 22, no. 2 (April 2009): 199.

⁶⁶ Jonathan Bastable, *Voices From Stalingrad: First-Hand Accounts From World War II’s Cruellest Battle* (Barnsley, S. Yorkshire: Greenhill Books, 2019), 44.

⁶⁷ Interview with Larisa Ladnaya, in *Voices From Stalingrad: First-Hand Accounts From World War II’s Cruellest Battle*, ed. Jonathan Bastable (Barnsley, S. Yorkshire: Greenhill Books, 2019), 44-45.

citizens in two days. A general evacuation of women and children was eventually ordered after the Luftwaffe bombing campaign, but the damage had already been done. 40,000 Soviet citizens had just been killed in Stalingrad because Stalin thought the Red Army would not fight as hard for a city that was empty. The Germans may have been the ones bombing the city, but Stalin was the one responsible for the massive loss of life.

Boris Kryzhanovsky was another Soviet citizen who lived through the Battle of Stalingrad. Kryzhanovsky was 12 when the battle started and his account of the battle cuts through what he believes to be flat out lies from the Soviet government. First, he challenges the notion that only around 40,000 Soviet civilians died during Stalingrad. To that he says it is “a damned lie. Because Stalin had forbidden evacuation. They evacuated factories and some specialists with them...but the majority stayed in Stalingrad.”⁶⁸ As for the actual number of Soviet civilian deaths, Kryzhanovsky believes that an estimate of around 200,000 provided by *Pravda* is more accurate.⁶⁹

The citizens of Stalingrad suffered heavily throughout the battle. By the time Stalin ordered the evacuation of the city, the damage had already been done. At the very least 40,000 had died because of Stalin’s outright refusal to get his own citizens out of harm’s way. Those citizens still in the city were forced to bear the full face of the German war machine. As the battle raged around them, daily life for those citizens involved hunting for supplies and running for shelter during German air raids. Much like the Soviet soldiers who fought at Stalingrad, the Soviet citizens were to be prepared to sacrifice their lives for victory.

For their part the German army had their own attitude toward war, one that when combined with the Soviet attitude of victory at any cost would lead to massive losses on both sides. In an article written by the historians Mark Edele and Michael Geyer they examine the two nations’ systems of warfare and how they contributed to the massive violence on the Eastern front. They wrote that the “Soviet Union and the German Reich fought a war that denied virtue and honor to enemy soldiers and set entire people against each other in a life-and-death struggle.”⁷⁰ Edele and Geyer suggest that the war had been fought with “utter unrestraint from the start” and that “their (the Germans and the Soviets) mutual hatred sufficed to unleash extreme violence.”⁷¹ All this mutual hatred and shared vision of war which took no prisoners would have a huge impact on the Battle of Stalingrad. The Germans would throw themselves at the city to try and conquer it and the Soviets were willing to die for every inch of it. These two ideologies would combine to make Stalingrad one of the bloodiest battles in history.

The Battle of Stalingrad ended in early February of 1943 following over five months of heavy fighting. Soviet forces in Stalingrad began to slowly overpower the Germans as Soviet’s began to outproduce the Germans. With their victory, however, came a heavy cost. More than one million Soviet soldiers would die in the defense of Stalingrad, with estimates of the number of civilian deaths ranging from 40,000 to 200,000. Stalin demanded victory at any cost, and his actions such as banning retreat as a military tactic and initially refusing to evacuate the city’s civilians directly

⁶⁸ Boris Serafimovich Kryzhanovsky, 2009 Interview by Jochen Hellbeck, *Facing Stalingrad: Portraits of German and Soviet Survivors*, <https://facingstalingrad.com/interviews/grigory-afanasevich-zverev/> (accessed April 4, 2023).

⁶⁹ Kryzhanovsky, interviewed by Hellbeck.

⁷⁰ Mark Edele and Michael Geyer, “The Nazi-Soviet War as a System of Violence, 1939-1945” in *Beyond Totalitarianism*, ed. Sheila Fitzpatrick and Michael Geyer (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 345.

⁷¹ Mark Edele and Michal Geyer, “The Nazi-Soviet War,” 348-349.

led to deaths of countless Soviet citizens. Today, Stalingrad is remembered as a great turning point of WWII, as well as being one of the bloodiest battles in history. With death at such an unprecedented scale, it is not just the Germans who should be blamed for the massive Soviet losses; Stalin and the Soviet ideology of victory at any cost must share the blame as well.

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Pride and Indignation: Attitudes of Soviet Nationalism During the Khrushchev Era

Madison Gillin

During Khrushchev's time as the leader of the Soviet Union (1953–1964), the nation was engaged in an ideological Cold War with Western society. While the West clearly offered its citizens a better standard of living, Soviets held conflicting attitudes where they enjoyed Western culture without fully immersing themselves in it, holding on to a fierce sense of pride in their socialist system. This begs the question: why did the Soviet population's awareness of their lacking quality of life on a world scale coexist with sentiments of profound pride in their own country? Soviet nationalism during the Khrushchev era was defined by individualized attitudes based on complex interactions between government influence and propaganda, distinct cultural identities, and private personal ideologies. This essay will analyze how national identities in the Soviet Union formed throughout the Khrushchev era including how Soviet citizens viewed their own quality of life, how they felt it compared against other nations, and why attitudes of heartfelt pride often accompanied resentment toward the state. Quality of life for Soviets will be assessed based on their perceived ability to succeed in life with regard to meeting their own personal and culturally valued "goals, expectations, standards, and concerns," as defined by the World Health Organization.⁷² A recurring theme is that the Soviet government's pining for international recognition of splendor did not reflect the reality of its population's actual quality of life. Historical censorship of critical outlooks makes it difficult to assess the public's unadulterated stances toward the Soviet state, and their true feelings were often suppressed by fear of government persecution. In some cases, their orientations are made transparent through subtleties in their expression of popular opinion seen in newspapers, interviews, and public events.

The immediate aftermath of Stalin's death epitomizes force-driven displays of enthusiasm for the Soviet state. One Soviet poet's description of his experience attending Stalin's funeral highlights a superficial devotion to the leader out of fear accompanied by authentic feelings of respect for him before many of his committed atrocities were publicly revealed. In his words, the populus was "trained to believe that Stalin was taking care of everyone" through government propaganda, leading most people to genuinely mourn his loss as they believed Stalin to be a protective and stabilizing figure.⁷³ Stalin's funeral was a violent spectacle, with an unspoken rule that only over-dramatic displays of grief were acceptable and with no crowd control interventions from on guard police. Attendees were unabashedly smothered, trampled, and even killed during the gathering. The writer stated it was the first time in his life he felt hatred toward Stalin for knowingly bringing harm to his people, inciting a riot even while deceased under the guise of patriotism. While it was dangerous to follow the drastic emotional outbursts in the crowd, it was equally dangerous to stand idly by as the

⁷² "WHOQOL: Measuring Quality of Life," 2012, *World Health Organization*.

⁷³ Evgenii Evtushenko, *Precocious Autobiography*, (New York: Dutton, 1963), 88.

nation's greatest leader was buried, as it would be criminally disloyal, and could earn a sentence to the Gulag prison labor camps.⁷⁴

In order to understand the stakes of compliance with authorities, one must realize the consequences of defiance. While legal protections did not technically constitute self-contained opinions or writings to be a chargeable crime, countless individuals were prosecuted for “anti-Soviet content” in personal journal writings under Stalin’s and then Khrushchev’s rule, no matter if there was never intent to distribute the opinions.⁷⁵ Many of these writings remained true to Communist ideals, but identified societal plights and sought ways to eliminate them in order to create a better socialist nation. For instance, in 1958, a man was sentenced to six years in prison when he left a folder of short stories drawn from personal experiences at a restaurant, which were deemed anti-Soviet.⁷⁶ Also in 1958, an author who wrote a book on how to move forward in Communism and eliminate current threats to idealism was sentenced to five years in prison for anti-Soviet propaganda.⁷⁷ In 1963, a Marxist scholar was sentenced to seven years in prison for possessing photos of Soviet societal shortcomings such as drunks, impoverished, and lines for goods; these are just a few examples of acts that were considered serious, traitorous crimes.⁷⁸ Criminal proceedings were reformed under Khrushchev, but were still harsh and unfair with a mantra of “guilty until proven innocent” and purposeful excessive obstacles to be proven innocent, leading to a pronounced avoidance of any slander in public.⁷⁹

Soviet nationalism in the Khrushchev era was heavily influenced by regional cultural identities. The 1960s article “On Traditions and Nationalism” argues that Soviet patriotism was based on a “universal theory of national self-determination” rather than a “single nationality.”⁸⁰ While Khrushchev ideally hoped for the “fusion” of different ethnic groups under a collective Soviet identity (which spotlighted the culture of ethnic Russians), he recognized the importance of allocating some independence and rights to self-govern in non-Russian republics to prevent civil unrest.⁸¹ His 1953 policies on these regions sought to appease demands for more self-control by restoring members of “titular nationality” to high ranking government positions in the Eastern bloc. However, by 1956, the republics had become overzealous in their aspirations for social reform and strayed too far from the goals of Khrushchev’s socialism. A series of protests emerged in Georgia, a Soviet socialist republic, against Khrushchev’s administrative decisions. This combined with mass pro-democracy demonstrations in Hungary and Poland, which were under the Soviet sphere of influence, caused Khrushchev to double down on central control of the territories. He allowed only limited reforms, attempting to balance an obvious need for an improved quality of life with a Communist monopoly on power, which eventually diminished non-Russian cultural expression.⁸²

⁷⁴ Evgenii Evtushenko, *Precocious Autobiography*, 102.

⁷⁵ Vladimir A. Kozlov, Sheila FitzPatrick, and Sergei V. Mironenk, eds., *Sedition: Everyday Resistance in the Soviet Union Under Khrushchev and Brezhnev*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011), 251.

⁷⁶ Kozlov, FitzPatrick, and Mironenk, eds., 56.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 260–261.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 264.

⁷⁹ Miriam Dobson, *Khrushchev’s Cold Summer: Gulag Returnees, Crime, and the Fate of Reform After Stalin*, (ACLS Humanities, 2009), Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 50.

⁸⁰ Bingyue Tu, *Paradoxical Russian Nationalism in the Soviet Context: A Contentious Literary Debate in 1969–1970*, (Studies in East European Thought, 2022), July, 5.

⁸¹ Stephen Lovell, *The Shadow of War: The Soviet Union and Russia, 1941 to the Present*, (Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 265.

⁸² *Ibid.*

Indeed, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, each individual republic experienced their own surge in nationalism where tangible steps were taken to return focus to their original historical culture. National narratives were rewritten when given the opportunity, replacing socialist monuments, architecture, and location names with traditional cultural varieties.⁸³ These measures indicate that non-Russian cultural identities persisted even through attempted suppression, much like criticisms of Soviet society carried on behind closed doors.

Amidst rising Cold War tensions with the West, Soviet patriotism increased among both Russian nationalist and non-Russian ethnic groups, united by a common threat. Even while younger generations became fascinated with American and Western culture and older generations voiced their disapproval, most Soviet people still believed in their own state's superiority. Soviet philosophy did not place stress on its historical cultural makeup, but instead "a love for the present and future of the homeland" as a collective culture.⁸⁴ When confronted by competition with the West, popular opinion seemed defensive of the Soviet way of life. Western media took a "sympathetic" stance toward young Soviet liberals, but the Soviets seemed to want to indulge in Western culture without participating in its hedonistic ideologies.⁸⁵ Both Khrushchev and many of his constituents felt disrespected by the rest of the world and sought global approval by flaunting the Soviet Union's strengths. The launch of the Sputnik satellite in 1957 brought great prestige to Soviet technological development, and citizens accepted the accomplishment as evidence of the success of the Soviet system. Soviet newspapers said that the feat "demonstrated to all mankind the creative genius of the free Soviet people."⁸⁶ They aggrandized fields in which they were globally advanced as proof of Soviet excellence, while minimizing their flaws in front of foreign onlookers.

While most Soviets who grew up in the late 1950s' and early 1960s' strong post-war economy remember a secure and enjoyable childhood, many recognize that this period catalyzed cynical attitudes that would be reflected in 1970s adulthood. After Stalin's death, Soviet culture under Khrushchev returned emphasis to the arts and innovation. Though many were able to truly enjoy such activities, there was an element of competition that pressured young people to overachieve not for their own advancement, but to gain prestige for their family unit, which stemmed from a goal to uplift the Soviet Union as a whole in the eyes of other countries. Donald Raleigh's book studying the Soviet Union's baby boomer generation remarks that "according to state propaganda, a Soviet youngster *had* to have a happy childhood."⁸⁷ This compilation of stories from the post-World War II generation mentions multiple accounts of parents demanding brilliance despite the best interests of the child. These anecdotes include boys made to play sports in wake of the Olympics (an international competition where Soviets could showcase their talented population), girls enlisted in singing and dance lessons, and both genders pushed to learn musical instruments through threats of punishment. All of these speakers note that they later formed a resentment toward these activities due to being forced into them, calling them a "burden" that took away from lighter childhood

⁸³ Jaroslav Ira and Jiří Janáč, *Materializing Identities in Socialist and Post-Socialist Cities*, (Charles University in Prague, 2017), Karolinum Press, Vol. First English edition, 12–13.

⁸⁴ Tu, *Paradoxical Russian Nationalism in the Soviet Context*, 6.

⁸⁵ Tu, *Paradoxical Russian Nationalism in the Soviet Context*, 8.

⁸⁶ The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, *Reports and Comments on Moon Rocket Launching*, (The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, January 3, 1959), Vol. 11, no. 1.

⁸⁷ Donald J. Raleigh, *Soviet Baby Boomers: An Oral History of Russia's Cold War Generation*, (The Oxford Oral History Series, 2012), New York: Oxford University Press, 120.

experiences.⁸⁸ On the other hand, school systems emphasized the importance of academic achievement, university aspirations, and studying literature.⁸⁹ The Soviet government's attempt at presenting itself as superior to other nations ended up detracting from its own citizens' childhoods and fostering indignation in their views toward the government.

Beginning in 1953 and lasting into the mid-1960s, the Soviet Union experienced a major cultural shift known as the Thaw, in which previously off-limits political discourse found its way into commonplace literature. Childhood accounts make evident a public desire for institutional change that was kept hushed due to fear of repercussions. Raleigh describes an "intuitive sense of caution" prevalent in 1960s homes where children were instructed that "any criticism of the government" was not to leave the confines of the home. School administrations also made it clear that political discussion would not be tolerated. As much as the government tried to prevent disapproval of Soviet operations, they were unable to "completely stifle the expression of one's own opinion" in private spheres. One woman recalls unauthorized books being circulated and discussed amongst her parents' friends, and the normalcy of being told never to repeat what she heard.⁹⁰ Another man tells how even though speech was restricted in public, there were "vivid discussions" about these political taboos around the "family table." From these accounts, it becomes clear that much of the population craved progressive freedoms that they had been denied, yet were unable to publicly express these views due to a threat of accusations of national betrayal and subsequent arrest. The Soviet government was unable to meet its populations' increasing standards of living and instead forced their silence on the matter.

In the early 1960s, the newspaper *Komsomolskaya Pravda* began conducting public opinion polls that were not completely representative of popular beliefs due to fear induced self-censorship, but still shed some light on Soviet nationalist beliefs. Initial polls in 1960 questioned the Soviet public on their thoughts about war and peace during Cold War tensions. All submissions mentioned their belief that the Soviet Union was militarily the strongest and would definitely win in the case that war was instigated, and that the Soviets represented peace while the capitalist West represented aggression. Assertions that the Soviet Union was "stronger than they in military technology", "prepared to give a crushing rebuff to enemies", and "very strong economically, technically and politically" indicate undisputed faith in their military aptness.⁹¹ Many of the responses also personally commended Nikita Khrushchev as an extraordinary leader, one proclaiming that he showed the world that the Soviet Union was morally superior to the Americans, and another thanking him "for his care for the people."⁹² These are examples of over the top expression of dedication to Khrushchev and the state. They also explicitly mentioned trust in the Communist system to maintain peace, citing strength through "virtue." However, they also gave detailed explanations as to why war should be avoided from personal experience, such as civilian family members killed in past wartimes and nuclear devastation during World War II.⁹³ The general consensus was that Soviets did not wish to engage in war with the West, but their diction was

⁸⁸ Raleigh, 124.

⁸⁹ Raleigh, 124–125.

⁹⁰ Raleigh, 132.

⁹¹ The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, *Youth Paper Opens a 'Public Opinion Institute'*, (The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, May 19, 1960), Vol. 12, no. 20.

⁹² *Youth Paper Opens a 'Public Opinion Institute'*, Vol. 12, no. 20.

⁹³ The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, *Youth Paper Opens a 'Public Opinion Institute'*, Vol. 12, no. 20; Vol. 12, no. 41.

somewhat unnerved, as if they were highly afraid of the consequences of war but did not want to seem as though they were not confident in their nation's capabilities. These polls represent a popular belief that the Soviet Union was the strongest nation in both military and philosophical strength.

Other *Komsomolskaya Pravda* polls portray Soviet citizens' attitudes toward their own quality of life. A poll assessing living standards found that seventy-three percent of respondents reported that their quality of living had risen in recent years, while about 19 percent said it stayed the same and 7 percent said it declined. Responses credited Khrushchev's labor reforms for any upgrades in lifestyle, including shorter workdays or workweeks, higher wages, and greater availability of both housing and home goods like food and clothing. The article which reported on the results of the poll implied that the people who answered that their standard of living stayed the same actually did see improvements in their life, but they were subverted by some outside factor, as if the newspaper could not accept any failure of attempted reforms. The article then criticizes those who answered that their living conditions declined, stating that many "cannot be taken seriously", and others were due to a vague "natural order of things" or related to a "social nature", citing a response which complained of less than expected wages.⁹⁴ The author's overarching argument was that quality of life had improved for the "overwhelming majority of the population" in all regions of the country. The article attempts to discredit any minor grievances with the Soviet system, refuting thoughts of inadequate housing, insufficient salaries, impractical labor projects, difficult housing allocation processes, and a growing need for childcare institutions.⁹⁵ It is apparent that the published results included only statements that fit the government's agenda and showed public satisfaction with current policy while undermining any concerns. This again demonstrates a suppression of the true attitudes toward the Soviet state.

More *Komsomolskaya Pravda* polls conducted provide insight into what the rising youth supposedly thought of the current state of the Soviet nation and the direction its society was headed in. The responses were overwhelmingly positive about their generation's potential and the future of the nation. They wrote about longing to realize the Communist dream, one claiming that "believing [in the ideology] is half the battle." Another wrote that the strongest characteristic of their generation was "faith in the triumph of the Soviet reality."⁹⁶ Nearly every single entry described personal ambition to achieve academically and seek a higher education, the stated reason being a "recognition of the social value of their work", including contributing "selfless labor." One even said she "wish[ed] to improve [herself] morally" in accordance with expectations of a good Communist citizen, rather than simply pursuing high-paying jobs so as to live a more comfortable lifestyle.³⁵ They also implied that this generation would strive to eliminate the faults in the system using the skills gained from growing up with an emphasis on intellectual study. One student hoped that "more might be done, given our social system and education."⁹⁷ They still refrained from outright criticism of the current failures of Soviet society. This demonstrates a continuous faith in the end result in the Soviet project, a reason that they could possess a great deal of pride in their nation while still seeking to reform its deficiencies.

The general response to the 1959 American Exhibition in Moscow exemplified Soviet infatuation with Western culture while still maintaining a sense of cultural superiority and national pride. Public

⁹⁴ *Youth Paper Polls Public on Living Standards*, Vol. 12, no. 41.

⁹⁵ *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. 12, no. 41; Vol. 13, no. 2.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

⁹⁷ *Young People*, Vol. 13, no. 2.

opinion on foreigners was in large part determined by government propaganda. Raleigh's interviewees said that "people simply doubted everything they read" and heard over the radio, making their own judgements if outside information was available and believing the opposite of whatever was stated if it was not.⁹⁸ Recognizing the tendency of government monitored media to lie and misinform at the very least, one speaker believed that illegally tuning into Western radio stations was what allowed Soviet people to "understand that [they] lacked information" because it allowed them to receive uncensored news coverage, although the government tried its best to jam international signals.⁹⁹ However, when presented with concrete displays of American culture that were much more technologically advanced, Soviets sustained feelings of moral supremacy despite realizing the stark difference between the average American and Soviet quality of life. At the Exhibition, the United States displayed to Soviet citizens many lifestyle conveniences that drew interest and even admiration, including a model house complete with appliances, American vehicles, Western fashion, and various technologies. An investigation of the Soviet response found that "Soviet social cohesion, identification, and national pride emerged strengthened" after the exhibit, despite everything they were missing out on being thrown in their faces.¹⁰⁰ The Soviet people proved to be willingly "patient and give the socialist system the time it needed" to reach Western standards of living, placing trust in their system that "promised social security, services, housing, and free education and health care."⁴⁰ They saw the values of the American system to be shallow and consumerist, inferior to their own ideals of worldwide social and economic equality.¹⁰¹ These strengths of the Soviet system still remained a source of pride despite its imperfections.

Personal accounts representative of the average Khrushchev-era Soviet citizen suggest that there was widespread dissatisfaction with quality of life and frustration with government censorship of political and social expression. So why did the Soviets often demonstrate such intense respect and dedication for their nation? A simple answer is that individuals took pride in their personal histories, made up of generations of overcoming adversities specific to their cultural or economic backgrounds as well as more general hardships faced by the entirety of the Soviet Union, such as Cold War anxieties. While newer generations under Khrushchev were able to recognize the shortcomings of their government and did not blindly submit to its indoctrination, they were still conditioned by the idea that Communism was the political system that would rescue global humanity from its sufferings, and many honestly believed in its promise when practiced successfully. A dynamic power struggle existed between the government, who did not want the Soviet Union to be portrayed in any sort of negative light, and the public, who believed in Communist ideals but wanted to fix its current errors in practice. A history of censorship, repression, and radical nationalism meant that Soviet citizens were not able to freely express their ideas about the state, or they would risk harsh punishments. At the same time, the Soviet government was working to display an image of power and excellence to the world. Interviews with Soviets who lived through the Khrushchev era indicate that strong social and political beliefs unaligned with the state still existed amongst the public, suggesting that independent thought persisted through the government's attempt at enforcing conformity. The

⁹⁸ Raleigh, 2012, *Soviet Baby Boomers*, 132.

⁹⁹ Raleigh, 148.

¹⁰⁰ Susan E. Reid, *Who Will Beat Whom? Soviet Popular Reception of the American National Exhibition in Moscow, 1959*, (Kritika: Explorations in Russian & Eurasian History, 2008), 9 (4): 196. ⁴⁰ Susan E. Reid, *Who Will Beat Whom?*, 9 (4): 196.

¹⁰¹ Susan E. Reid, *Who Will Beat Whom?* 9 (4): 196.

Komsomolskaya Pravda's public opinion polls and the subsequent reflections published in *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press* provide valuable insight into private judgments that hinted at discontent. Reactions to the American Exhibition in Moscow contrasted these subtle digs at Soviet society, sparking a wave of renewed national pride. Through this analysis, it appears that Soviet citizens actively assessed the state of their nation with a critical eye, often harbored negative sentiments towards their government and standard of living, but ultimately believed in the mission of the Soviet project and the continuance down a progressive path that would end in an outcome beneficial for all peoples.

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Soviet Environmental Transformation and the Ramifications (1953-2020)

Charles Hess

“To put it bluntly, nature did not act in our interest when it “distributed” the country’s water resources.”¹⁰² Igor Andreevich Gerardi, Chief Technical Director of the Complex of Projects for Transferring and Distributing the Flow of the Northern and Siberian rivers made this statement in 1971 when multiple Soviet factories were facing severe water shortages.¹⁰³ Natural geography, in addition to private land ownership and serfdom barred many proletarian members of traditional Eurasian societies from accessing and utilizing the natural resources of their surroundings. The triumph of the Bolsheviks in the 1917 October Revolution promised to amend these inequities and to place all of the means of production, including the natural environment, into the hands of the proletariat. Rapid industrialization, and scientific advancement would enable the Soviets to not only give the proletariat greater access to the natural environment, and to the means of production but also endowed the modern Soviet State with the god-like ability to bend the natural environment to meet their needs. As one of the many consequences arising out of this virtuous mission to make nature more equitable, by 1990, the 103 largest Soviet cities had airborne pollution levels ten-times higher than permissible by international law.¹⁰⁴ Instead of “distributing” the natural environment as State technicians such as Igor Gerardi had envisioned, the Soviet Regime had caused a Union-wide environmental disaster of unprecedented scale and severity.¹⁰⁵ Not only did pollution occur from the environmentally transformative policies Igor Gerardi and his superiors dogmatically supported, but the environmental ramifications from these policies also caused palpable drops in agricultural and industrial efficiency. How could a regime so devoted to the use of science and technology to increase the proletariat’s access to the means of production be so disastrously shortsighted in terms of environmental conservation? This paper, by utilizing the example of naturally transformative policies in Central Asia, will assert that environmental conservation was neglected in the Soviet Union due to a lack of civic engagement which was driven by the ultimate economic goals of the Soviet Union. In order to compete with the west economically, and fulfill the promises of socialism, the Soviets consciously and scientifically chose to exploit their natural environment regardless of the contemporaneous, and long-term environmental consequences.

Early Bolshevik Themes: Utopian Potential of Marxism

Stalin and Khrushchev were not the first Soviet Marxists to envision a socialist state with the power to reshape and bend the environment to its will. In 1920, after the victory of the Bolsheviks in the Russian Civil War, enthusiasm for Marxism and the future it could create was at an all-time high. During this time, Marxist-influenced science fiction writing gained a wide audience among educated

¹⁰² Pravda, “A Plan to Move Rivers: Man over Nature?,” Seventeen Moments in Soviet History: An On-Line Archive of Primary Sources, July 1971.

¹⁰³ Pravda, 1971.

¹⁰⁴ Tatiana Zaharchenko, “The Environmental Movement and Ecological Law in the Soviet Union: The Process of Transformation,” *Ecology Law Quarterly* 17, no. 3 (January 1, 1990): 455–75.

¹⁰⁵ Zaharchenko, (1990), 456-457.

members of the newly formed Soviet Union. One author whose popularity increased in the 1920s, Alexander Bogdanov, wrote *The Red Star* in 1908 after the first Russian Revolution in 1905. In his works the author coined the literary theme of *bogostroitelstvo*, which roughly translates to “God-building.” Bogdanov, and many other Marxist authors during the early stages of the proletarian revolution envisioned how the “justice, and order” provided by a utopian Marxist state could propel, in this instance, a Marxist Martian society to a fully-secular God-like status.¹⁰⁶ The fictional Martian society envisioned by Bogdanov, was one which could level mountains, move streams, and bend the natural means of production such as flora, fauna, and waterways to their will.

The “Red” planet was an aptly named setting to situate the explicit utopian Marxist themes which romanticized the utopian potential of the then-ongoing proletarian Bolshevik Revolution. The entirety of *The Red Star* novel is imbued with a utopian theme. Martian history had gone through the same stages of history described by Marx, and Engels, but had advanced through this history and achieved the utopian goals of the proletarian revolution far faster than the peoples of Earth. The Red Planet’s daily life and political systems were strictly and scientifically well-ordered, but yet the society was flexible in terms of adherence to humane virtues. There was no war, no gender roles, the Martians had mastered science, made themselves immortal through blood transfusions, and most importantly for this research, the natural world; rivers, oceans, mountains, flora, and fauna had been sculpted by the Marxist Martian scientists to be wholly equitable and accessible. Bogdanov’s work of fiction seems unachievable to many modern readers, however for him, and many other intellectual and enthusiastic Soviet Marxists in the 1920s, this utopian Martian future was an achievable goal for earthlings. Bogdanov, even experimented with his self-described blood transfusions to achieve his own immortality up until his death in 1926.¹⁰⁷ Secular rationalism coupled with advanced science, and supposedly blood transfusions was the arch through which these Marxist Martians walked through to build their utopian and fully equitable Marxist society. These Writers, Lenin, Stalin, and a young Khrushchev, all came to see science, and its potential to subjugate the natural environment, as ideologically central to building a socialist state.¹⁰⁸ In the perfectly ordered scientifically rational Marxist Utopia, man was envisioned to be imbued with God-like abilities and were therefore able, and morally rectified to sculpt the natural environment to their proletarian will.

After the War: In the Pursuit for a Better Tomorrow

World War Two had disastrous impacts on the Soviet environment. In addition to the millions of deaths suffered by the Soviet Union, the rapid relocation of manufacturing facilities to isolated regions of the Ural Mountains caused long term water shortages in the region.¹⁰⁹ On top of water shortages caused by unquenchable heavy industry, World War Two also released numerous pollutants in the form of bombs, conflagrations, and the various destructive consequences indicative

¹⁰⁶ Veronica L. Sharova, “Revolution and Utopia: Images of the Future in Alexander Bogdanov’s Science Fiction,” *Russian Studies in Philosophy* 57, no. 6 (February 2019), 546

¹⁰⁷ Sharova, (2019), 550-551

¹⁰⁸ Christine Bichsel, “From Dry Hell to Blossoming Garden: Metaphors and Poetry in Soviet Irrigation Literature on the Hungry Steppe, 1950–1980,” *Water History* 9, no. 3 (October 2017), 338.

¹⁰⁹ Pravda, 1971.

of total-war. Prior to the War, the Soviet Union was all consumed by fear of impending invasion, preparations, and then finally waging the existential battle against the Nazi scourge.¹¹⁰ This real threat to the existence of both the Slavic ethnicity and the Soviet Union left no time for concerns dealing with the preservation or protection of the environment, or conversely the pursuit of God-building projects by Stalin. Regardless of this temporary hold on “progress,” any vocal support for the environment or criticisms directed at Stalin’s previous plans for industrialization and collectivization was considered as dissent throughout his rule.¹¹¹ The Party line maintained that environmental pollution and degradation were both consequences of capitalism, and a socialist state by nature was one where through public ownership, science, and collective investment in the natural environment there would be virtually no waste or pollution.¹¹²

From 1946 to 1948, in the wake of World War Two, famine gripped the Soviet Union as a result of the damage caused to both domestic agricultural production, and to the supply chains which transported Soviet foodstuff.¹¹³ With approximately one million fatalities stemming from this famine, Stalin, and the politburo’s desire to control the natural environment was strengthened. Stalin’s Great Plan for the Transformation of Nature launched in 1948 to address the various shortages of natural resources which contributed to the 1946-48 famine, and also to improve the devastated Soviet supply chain. The plan “tuned” nearly all major rivers in the Soviet Union by use of dams, embankments, diversions, and various other environmentally transformative construction products.¹¹⁴ Stalin’s program was a continuation of the canal, and dam building included in his first two five year plans, and the general drive for rapid modernization and industrialization pursued by the Soviet State since its formation. However, this plan and its distinct emphasis on river diversions and water resources would set the tone for similar environmental engineering projects undertaken by the Soviets. Furthermore, these early transformative plans in the wake of World War Two were similar to those launched in other countries like the United States who, like the Soviets, were ignorant of the long-term ramifications of their water management policies in the American West, and Tennessee Valley during the New Deal.¹¹⁵ The current state of Lake Mead serves as a consequence of these early American developments. The Soviets would continually pursue these projects virtually unimpeded until Perestroika in the 1980s.

Transforming the Hungry Steppe and Virgin Lands

The death of Stalin brought an end to many of the wasteful projects associated with the dictator’s turbulent administration. In the wake of their victory over the fascists and Khrushchev’s relaxations of Stalin’s repressive policies encompassed by the Thaw (mid-1950s-mid-1960s), belief in the power of the socialist state to create utopia was once again at a high in the late 1950s to mid-1960s.¹¹⁶ The Khrushchev administration offered a more targeted, but still excessively damaging

¹¹⁰ Sheila Fitzpatrick, *The Russian Revolution*, Fourth Edition (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2017), 123.

¹¹¹ Paul R. Josephson, *An Environmental History of Russia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 68.

¹¹² Anthony Cortese, “Regulatory Focus: Glasnost, Perestroika, and the Environment,” *Environmental Science & Technology* 23, no. 10 (1989), 1212.

¹¹³ Paul R. Josephson, *An Environmental History of Russia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 119.

¹¹⁴ Josephson, (2013), 120.

¹¹⁵ Josephson, (2013), 119.

¹¹⁶ Christine Bichsel, “From Dry Hell to Blossoming Garden: Metaphors and Poetry in Soviet Irrigation Literature on the Hungry Steppe, 1950–1980,” *Water History* 9, no. 3 (October 2017), 351.

environmental policy than his predecessor. The most transformative of these policies were the Virgin Lands Program (VLP) and the contemporaneous development of the Hungry Steppe Region in Central Asia launched in the early to mid-1950s. Although unrelated to the Virgin Lands Program, the development of the Hungry Steppe was nearly identical to regions encompassed by the VLP and both efforts were ploys by Khrushchev to use his knowledge of agricultural management to increase his political clout.¹¹⁷ Khrushchev hoped to dramatically increase the agricultural production of the Soviet Union with these plans, and at the same time bolster his political power in the wake of Stalin's death.

During this stage of Soviet transformations of nature, Mars was off the table, but popular soviet media portrayed romanticized common Soviet Citizens as being imbued with the God-like utopian qualities once described by Bogdanov. The propaganda which featured these romanticized characters exposed the Soviet public to the potential of then on-going environmentally transformative soviet policies in Central Asia. One such propagandic Soviet hero was Ivan Brovkin, a war hero, turned farmer, and family man who was the ideal embodiment of a Soviet Marxist in the 1950s. In the 1958 film, *Ivan Brovkin in the Virgin Lands*, the beloved fictional cinematic soviet hero sets out into the arid steppes of Northern Kazakhstan in 1955.¹¹⁸ Upon arriving in the desolate windswept, backward, and dirty region, Ivan and his comrades literally stake their claim to this "Virgin Land" with a makeshift wooden stake sign. Within two harvests, the industrious Soviet men and their families managed to entirely reshape this arid badland into a fertile and productive homestead complete with modern amenities, ample grain, irrigation and a clean modern Soviet dwelling. By employing heavy machinery, irrigation, soil science, test tubes, and other stylized modern scientific based agricultural techniques, Ivan Brovkin, and his comrades created the romanticized utopian Socialist homestead promised to them by Marxism, the Soviet Union, Bogdanov's Martians, and now fulfilled by Khrushchev.¹¹⁹ However what these fictional characters could not predict is that by fulfilling the Soviet promises of transforming the land and creating an agricultural utopia, they too were capitalizing upon the means of production.

If Ivan had stayed in this region for a mere decade more, the fictional hero would have experienced the ramifications of his State's successful stint at God-building. His beloved family, and their modern home, if it was waterfront, would have witnessed the shoreline beginning to recede as early as 1965.¹²⁰ In the absence of this water, as described by Soviet journalists in *Pravda* in September of 1965, Ivan and his family would have seen vast salt flats, incapable of supporting crops. Where there had once been abundant muskrats, fish and other wildlife, Ivan would have seen a desolate arid wasteland. However, the fictional hero need not worry about his crops. The irrigation systems which Ivan Brovkin and his friends had forced on the landscape made sure that his cotton plants, and rice fields would receive ample water despite the ramifications on the surrounding natural environment even ten years after their expansion.¹²¹

¹¹⁷ Bichsel, (2017), 341-342.

¹¹⁸ Ivan Brovkin in the Virgin Lands, Seventeen Moments in Soviet History: An On-Line Archive of Primary Sources, 1958.

¹¹⁹ Ivan Brovkin, 1958. .

¹²⁰ B. Bezrukov and N. Dababayev, "The Shrinking Aral: Irrigation's Effects Protested," The Current Digest of the Russian Press, vol. 17, no. 38 (October 1965).

¹²¹ Bezrukov and Dababaye; Gupta, Archana. "Shrinking of Aral Sea: An Environmental Disaster in Central Asia." International Journal of Humanities, Arts & Social Sciences 6, no. 4 (August 2020), 162–170.

For the Soviets, knowledge of the damaging potential of the VLP's irrigation was outweighed by the need for economic development. In the words of *Pravda's* environmentally concerned journalists in 1965– “8,000,000 acres of irrigated land, new cotton, and rice plantations, are needed, and what is more, right away. It is ridiculous to oppose muskrat skins to that.”¹²² Despite the journalists' concerns that the shrinking of the Aral Sea and other major bodies of water in the Hungry Steppe Region could “untie the hands of the desert” causing wide-spread dust storms, and desertification - the need for economic growth and foodstuffs usurped concerns for the environment. The death of wildlife, such as muskrats, was a small price to pay for the powerful hands sitting in the Central Committee, when compared to industrial and agricultural output.

The Thaw: Grassroots Conservation Efforts and the State

The aforementioned 1965 *Pravda* article aptly titled *The Shrinking Aral: Irrigation's Effects Protested*, represents various grassroots environmental conservation efforts which were voiced during the Thaw. Khrushchev's relaxation of censorship allowed various ecologically minded soviet citizens to express their concern over the devastation of previously gorgeous, and healthy ecosystems such as the Aral Sea, and its tributaries.¹²³ Soviet leadership's dogmatic support for environmentally transformative policies had begun to cause extensive, and observable environmental damage throughout the Soviet Union by the 1950s. Without Stalinist censorship these concerns were voiced and received wide support among various Soviet Citizens from Russia to Kazakhstan during the Thaw.

The history of Soviet environmental conservation efforts greatly pre-date the 1950s Thaw, and started as early as 1917.¹²⁴ In the midst of the Russian Civil War, the Agricultural Ministry under Lenin's administration placed leading civilian botanists, biologists, and other civilian scientists concerned with environmental conservation in high-ranking positions. These men set about continuing a rich historical trend of creating wildlife preserves throughout Russia known as *zapovedniki*, a practice dating back as early as Peter the Great's Imperial rule. These wildlife preserves notably protected migratory waterfowl, important national species such as bears, and most importantly pristine landscapes such as Lake Baikal. Many of these preserves would also provide refuge to the same scientists, and botanists who created them in the first two decades of the Soviet State during Stalin's Great Terror in the 1930s.¹²⁵

Many of the Bolshevik scientists who helped create nature preserves were eventually forced into hiding by Stalin in the 1930s. These men believed in environmental protections and ardently published rebuttals of Stalin's envisioned transformative environmental policies. In 1951, Stalin eventually shut the various *zapovedniki* down, opening them up to his environmentally exploitive policies.¹²⁶ After the Stalin-era which dismissed nearly all concerns for the environment as dissidence, the legacy of these early Soviet scientists lived on in the form of official state-sponsored

¹²² Bezrukov and Dababayev, (1965).

¹²³ Ibid, 1965.

¹²⁴ Nikolai Nikolaevich Vorontsov. “Nature Protection and Government in the USSR.” *Journal of the History of Biology* 25, no. 3 (1992), 374-375.

¹²⁵ Vorontsov, (1992), 374-375.

¹²⁶ Douglas R. Weiner, *A Little Corner of Freedom: Russian Nature Protection from Stalin to Gorbachev* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 294-295.

environmental organizations like the All-Russian Society on Nature Protection (VOOP) which was established in 1922. VOOP was highly censored, yet active throughout the Stalin-era.¹²⁷ Even after the dictator's death however, organizations like VOOP had little influence in terms of influencing environmental policy in the Soviet Union due to the dogmatic emphasis put on industrial and agricultural development by both the Central Committee and the Red Army.¹²⁸

During the Khrushchev era Thaw, articles like the 1965 article in *Pravda* were common, but the criticism they offered were highly ritualistic, and were normally followed by a scathing rebuttal of the pro-conservation argument they encompassed. This ritual criticism is encompassed by the initially critical, authors expressing the importance of the "need" for more farmland and greater agricultural development.¹²⁹ Additionally, Khrushchev himself was an avid hunter and outdoorsman keeping with a long tradition of Russian leaders who enjoyed the ample outdoor experiences offered by the sparsely populated and vast Russian, and now Soviet Empire.¹³⁰ During the Khrushchev administration, the VOOP, now emboldened by the easing of Stalinist repression, fought to reestablish the numerous wildlife preserves done away with by Stalin in 1951.¹³¹ Khrushchev, had different plans however, and was seeking to establish a series of elite hunting preserves for himself, foreign diplomats and other privileged Soviet elites where the *zapovedniki* had formerly been. VOOP, other official conservation organizations, and widespread grassroots outcry expressed immense disdain for Khrushchev's elitist plan, which was a direct contradiction of his supposed anti-party elite position.

Thanks to arguably the first instance of successful environmental activism in the post-Stalin-era, and the fear of inflaming nationalistic sentiments over Russified elites like Khrushchev hunting in the Republics, the Primer would not get his over 15 Union-wide planned hunting preserves.¹³² Instead these hunting preserves were constrained to Russia's national borders, and only four were established with five hotels, and over 200 State paid staff members. This shed light on another dynamic concerning Khrushchev and the Soviet Union's environmental policy – they were ardent deniers of science when it stood in the way of their personal, economic, or larger political goals. In 1961 Khrushchev offered his rebuttal of the *zapovedniki* situation after many had been established in their pre-Stalinist form:

What is this thing called a zapovednik? It is the nation's wealth, which we must preserve. But in our country, it frequently happens that zapovedniki are organized in places that do not represent anything of serious value. We must impose order on this business. Zapovedniki should be located where it is essential to preserve valuable corners of nature and to conduct authentically scientific observations. Certainly our country has these kinds of zapovedniki already. But a significant

¹²⁷ Nikolai Nikolaevich Vorontsov. "Nature Protection and Government in the USSR." *Journal of the History of Biology* 25, no. 3 (1992) 374-375.

¹²⁸ Zaharchenko, (1990), 459.

¹²⁹ B. Bezrukov and N. Dababayev, "The Shrinking Aral: Irrigation's Effects Protested," *The Current Digest of the Russian Press* 17, no. 38 (October 1965).

¹³⁰ Douglas R. Weiner, *A Little Corner of Freedom: Russian Nature Protection from Stalin to Gorbachev* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 295.

¹³¹ Weiner, 1999, 294-295.

¹³² *Ibid*, 294-295.

proportion of the zapovedniki currently in existence represents...a contrived operation.¹³³

Khrushchev's quote reflects not only him turning a blind eye to poaching throughout Russia during his tenure, but also the same ecologically transformative sentiments shared by Stalin and early Marxist science fiction writers. Khrushchev saw the nature preserves as arbitrary "contrived" concepts created by humans and imposed on the natural landscape. For Khrushchev the Soviets, just like the Martians in *The Red Planet*, had a political right and ethically duty to "impose order on this business" of natural environment.¹³⁴ This imposition of order on the environment was not restricted to hunting preserves for the avid outdoorsman, but also extended to the VLP and the development of the Hungry Steppe region. For Khrushchev, and his state, the Soviet environment was a blank slate on which the state and its elites could impose their "science"-backed and often utopian will.

Brezhnev: Picking the Science that Works.

Khrushchev is believed by many historians to have challenged the "mini-Stalins" power in local regions and to have detracted from the power of Soviet elites to gain wealth and special privileges not available to the vast majority of Soviet citizens. But, when it came to his elite privileges, like hunting on still-virgin lands, Khrushchev was quick to abandon these principles. Khrushchev's arbitrariness and challenges to Soviet Boss culture led to his ousting by Brezhnev and his loyalists. Power then returned to the local party elites during the Brezhnev-era, and this would only open the door to more environmental exploitation throughout the Soviet Union. There are few criticisms as scathing as the 1965 *Pravda* article *Shrinking of the Aral*, stemming from the Brezhnev era. The plan expressed by Igor Andreevich Gerardi in 1971 to put "man over nature" nicely summarizes Soviet environmental policy under Brezhnev.¹³⁵ However, scientific research which was not available to the vast majority of Soviet citizens, continued to raise concerns over Soviet environmentally transformative policy in the arid regions of Central Asia.

In 1978 an article was Published by a Dr. A. S. Kes from the institute of Geography in Moscow, titled "Causes of Water level Changes of the Aral Sea."¹³⁶ This scientific journal made no direct criticisms of the Party. However Dr. Kes did offer strong, and nuanced criticisms in regard to other Soviet "scientists" who were regularly cited by the Party to support their transformative environmental policies throughout the Soviet Union, and specifically in the Aral Sea's watershed. The Soviet-backed scientists had hypothesized human activity in the Aral Sea region through irrigation had caused fluctuations in the Sea's water level as early as the 14th century. The extensive remnants of irrigation projects undertaken, by the Mongols, Tsars, and historical documentation of these water level fluctuations, proved to these State-endorsed scientists that the Aral region could support modern large-scale irrigation.¹³⁷ The articles referenced by Kes, stem from 1969 to 1976,

¹³³ Ibid, 295-296.

¹³⁴ Ibid, 295-296.

¹³⁵ Pravda, 1971.

¹³⁶ A. S. Kes', "The Causes of Waterlevel Changes of the Aral Sea in the Holocene," Soviet Geography 20, no. 2 (1979), 104-113.

¹³⁷ Kes (1979), 110-111.

and both hold that environmental conditions influenced the decline of the Aral far more than human activities, which were only marginal.¹³⁸ The aforementioned article from 1965 in Pravda on the Aral, also pointed to Soviet Scientists like those who downplayed the potential of human impact on the Aral and simply claimed that “nothing terrible will happen if the Aral dries up.”¹³⁹

Dr. Kes rebuts these Scientists, whose findings had fully been endorsed by the “ideological centrality of scientific rationality and technical progress in the Soviet Union.”¹⁴⁰ The historic water level changes attested to by the pro-transformation scientists had rarely exceeded more than 6-meter changes over a century long period.¹⁴¹ However in 1979, the water level in the Aral had dropped over ten meters since 1950, and had lost two meters of water level in the previous three years alone.¹⁴² The Sea was rapidly declining, but environmentally minded science was not taken into consideration by the State and their “leading” scientists. As long as there were Soviet Scientists who would cater their work, and findings to the party line, Brezhnev and his predecessors had the rational scientific proof they needed to pursue and fund these projects. Furthermore, the party-line-scientists would most certainly enjoy more access to research grants, promotions, and various other rewards from the Party for their literally groundbreaking achievements. Doctors, like Kes who were able to physically see the ten-meter drop in the Aral, and the formation of salt-flat wastelands in the surrounding areas were thoroughly marginalized by the Soviet State. For every anti-Aral development article published, there are probably 10-pro publications throughout Soviet literature up until the late 1980s. Even educated locals in the regions directly impacted by this shortsighted development like the Vice President of the Turkmenian Republic Academy of Sciences were fully supportive of transformative policies in the Aral Sea region.¹⁴³

Environmental Impacts Forced on the Central Committee - 1980s Reform

Vast irrigation projects throughout the Hungry Steppe, and Virgin Lands were not the only utopian-minded “scientifically rational” planning projects undertaken by the Soviet Union. Environmentally transformative policy’s impacts on the rapid decline of the Aral, its tributaries, and the ensuing desertification these changes caused were never enough to open the Central Committee’s mind regarding conservation. Arguably, the greatest and most infamous environmental disaster, the meltdown at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, forced the Central Committee to entirely reexamine environmental concerns.¹⁴⁴ Almost immediately after the nuclear disaster’s impacts had been unveiled to the Soviet public in 1986 grassroots, and for the first time, non-illegal NGO organizations began participating in wide-spread environmental activism throughout the Union.¹⁴⁵ These environmental movements spanned from the local level like the Save the Volga committee, and “Delta” group concerned with the Neva River in Leningrad, to the all-union level like the

¹³⁸ Kes, (1979), 110.

¹³⁹ B. Bezrukov and N. Dababayev, “The Shrinking Aral: Irrigation's Effects Protested,” The Current Digest of the Russian Press 17, no. 38 (October 1965).

¹⁴⁰ Bichsel, (2017), 338.

¹⁴¹ Kes, (1979), 111.

¹⁴² Ibid, 111.

¹⁴³ I Robochev, “The Taming of the Desert,” The Current Digest of the Russian Press 21, no. 3 (April 1969).

¹⁴⁴ Tatiana Zaharchenko, “The Environmental Movement and Ecological Law in the Soviet Union: The Process of Transformation,” Ecology Law Quarterly 17, no. 3 (1990), 460.

¹⁴⁵ Zaharchenko, (1990), 460.

Social-Ecological Union, and the All-Union Movement of the Greens. Any number of these movements, if formed a moment before the Chernobyl disaster could have easily been blacklisted, exiled, or targeted by the KGB over dissent. But with radiation falling all over eastern Europe, the Soviet Union was finally forced to diversify its understanding of environmental science.

Harking back to the nationalistic sentiments expressed by the Republics in regard to Khrushchev's hunting "camps," nationalistic sentiments throughout the Soviet Union were also tethered to the late 80s environmental movements. From organizations like the extremist Russian nationalists Pamyat, to actual explicit environmental movements like Ukrainian *Zelyony Svyet* (Green World), and Green Parties in the Baltic Nations, all had ties to extremist nationalist movements.¹⁴⁶ The degradation caused to the rivers "tuned" by Soviet water scientists, the humanitarian and ecological disaster at Ukraine, and the incredibly high levels of airborne pollutants in urban areas could no longer be ignored by the Central Committee. For the nationalists, these physical environmental attacks on their homelands by the Soviet Union were a rallying call for additional, and often violent grassroots support.

The Chernobyl disaster combined with a faltering economic and political situation prompted Gorbachev to begin radically reforming the Soviet Government and society in the late 1980s. These various reforms encompassed by Glasnost, and Perestroika touched on nearly every corner of the Soviet System, and offered arguably the first, and most certainly, the only palpable legal gains for environmental protections in the Soviet Union.¹⁴⁷ "Openness" allowed for vocal criticism and non-party political activism to finally have a platform nearly free from state censorship.¹⁴⁸

Throughout the final decade of the Soviet Union through political empowerment - grassroots, official state-sponsored, and nationalist organizations all successfully lobbied for increased environmental protections.¹⁴⁹ In 1987 the Council of Ministers passed the "Protection and Rational Utilization of the Natural Resources of the Lake Baikal Basin."¹⁵⁰ While there were previously laws on the Soviet record concerning environmental protections like these, the laws passed in the late 1980s were also, at least to some degree, enforced. In 1990 the Republic Council of Ministers successfully pressured the Central Committee to enforce the aforementioned Lake Baikal protections. Additionally private ownership of land was being phased in, and where previously industries, and individuals did not have to provide compensation for their impacts on the environment, now they were monetarily liable for their properties' emissions, and damage caused to the surrounding environment.¹⁵¹

Civil Activism and Decline

For the first time since Lenin's "early commitment to the protection of nature" reflected in his empowerment of biologists and *zapovedniki*, Soviet citizens in the late 1980s were momentarily able

¹⁴⁶ Ibid, 460-462.

¹⁴⁷ Nicholas Robinson, "Perestroika and Priroda: Environmental Protection in the USSR," *Pace Environmental Law Review* 5, no. Spring (1988), 351-352.

¹⁴⁸ Zaharchenko, (1990), 468.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid, 464.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid, 463.

¹⁵¹ Ibid, 464.

to influence environmental policy.¹⁵² More importantly, many of the economic programs which had degraded the Soviet environment so disastrously, were challenged and even put on hold by valid, and scientifically endorsed public outcry.¹⁵³ In this regard, the tumultuous economic situation facing the Soviet Union in the late 1980s was made worse by the environmental lobby.¹⁵⁴ The interconnectedness and co-dependence of manufacturing, and agricultural centers which were overutilizing water resources, and causing physical pollution meant if one was shut down, possibly hundreds of other factories could be impacted. Nikolay Ryzhkov, Gorbachev's ally, and Chairman of the Council of Ministers said in 1990 that the "closure of a simple chemical plant in Armenia brought about by environmentalist pressures, led to the shutdown of tens and even hundreds of different enterprises dependent upon the chemical plants production."¹⁵⁵ These successful environmental activist efforts, while finally able to gain a political and civil foothold, were once again at odds with the fragile Soviet economy.

Just as the Second World War had put Stalin's God-building projects on hold, Soviet environmental activism would be interrupted by another near-societal collapse. The decline of the Soviet Union and its eventual collapse in December of 1991 ushered in a new era of economic and political instability. In this environment of political fragmentation and economic desolation the environmental concerns voiced by these newly formed groups through the late 80s were usurped by the need for survival. The desperate economic situation of Russia and the former republics during the 1990s, devalued the importance of environmental activism in the public's eye.¹⁵⁶ The strife caused by the collapse of the USSR caused Vladimir Putin to disband the Russian Federation's EPA, founded under Yeltsin, in 2000.¹⁵⁷ The economy, and Putin's state could financially not continue to support environmental reform. In Russia this reduction in concern caused serious setbacks in environmental conservation, but now divorced from the monetary power of the Soviet Union, and its central planning, the Central Asian Regions impacted by transformative policies faced an even greater plight after 1991.

Post-Soviet environmental activism during the 1980s was most concentrated in well-developed countries like Russia, the Balkan States, and Ukraine. The vast sparsely populated and relatively uneducated regions surrounding the Aral received far less attention environmentally. Furthermore, the cotton, and rice plantations fictitiously established by Ivan Bovkin, were still in operation and provided much needed income to the poor nations surrounding them such as Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan. Physically the region was already environmentally devastated beyond repair. By 1989 entire formerly waterfront villages, once bustling cultural hubs of commerce, fishing, forestry, and hunting were enveloped by sand dunes.¹⁵⁸ As the journalists had warned in the 1969 article in Pravda, Soviet irrigation systems had successfully "untied the hands of the desert."¹⁵⁹ With no wild plants left to hold the soil down, the seabed of the Aral became airborne dust which caused vast desertification throughout the region.¹⁶⁰ The Soviet industry once situated on the shores of the 4th

¹⁵² Robinson, (1988), 354-355.

¹⁵³ Robinson, (1988), 374-375.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid, 352-353.

¹⁵⁵ Ryzhkov Discusses Economic and Political Situation (Soviet Television Interview, Feb, 1990), in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts.

¹⁵⁶ Paul R. Josephson, *An Environmental History of Russia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 292.

¹⁵⁷ Josephson, (2013), 292.

¹⁵⁸ Gueogui Pinkhassov, *SOVIET UNION: The Aral Sea Desert*. December, photograph (December 1989).

¹⁵⁹ Bezrukov and Dababayev, (1965).

¹⁶⁰ Archana Gupta, "Shrinking of Aral Sea: An Environmental Disaster in Central Asia," *International Journal of*

largest freshwater body on earth added carcinogenic pollutants to this dust storm. Evaporated water left salt deposits on the soil further making the region unsuitable for crops.¹⁶¹ However, the Aral's rivers still provide nearly all of their water resources to local agriculture to this day.¹⁶²

The central Asian nations most impacted by the shrinking of the Aral, continue to exploit natural, and human resources in the region. The central Asian cotton industry was one of the most prolific examples in the 21st century of the mass employment of child slave labor. Petty disputes over these water resources, economic, and political instability in these notoriously corrupt and impoverished Central Asian nations such as Uzbekistan detract from the possibility of environmental remediation. With their chief patron nation, the Russian Federation continually uninterested in environmental concerns there is little hope for any improvement of the devastated Aral Sea and surrounding regions. The Aral, what was once the 4th largest body of water in the world now sits below 20th in these rankings.¹⁶³ The Soviet transformative policy envisioned by Bogdanov, and fulfilled by Stalin and his successors ironically turned the Aral Sea into a realistic rendition of the surface of Mars.

Conclusion

Unlike the Marxist Martians in the *Red Planet*, the Soviets did not back their environmentally transformative projects on science. The Soviet State and its insurmountably powerful industrial lobby chose science which supported their programs and repressed science which offered a rebuttal. The millions of civilians, scientists, and party members who raised concerns over the environmental ramifications of transformative policies were marginalized until an environmental disaster of unprecedented scale and severity had already taken place in the Union. By the time of Gorbachev's reforms, there was no hope for the Aral Sea and many of the other environmentally compromised regions of the Soviet Union. If the proletariat was actually given a non-symbolic voice by the Soviet system, the concerns only raised after Chernobyl, could have led to real environmental change as early as the death of Stalin in the 1950s. Even during the Thaw there were environmental victories enabled by decreased repression. If the trends of the Thaw were not squashed by Brezhnev's heavy-handed policies toward dissent, the Aral may be a heavily impacted, but still vibrant ecosystem today. The legacy of the Soviet environmental transformations lives on in the petty squabbles over disappearing water resources still occurring in central Asia. While the Soviet System was at odds with the capitalist west, both systems have severely damaged the environment, and squashed public opinion in the pursuit of economic goals. Without the input of civil society, governments, who are far less personally connected and invested in the health of their own environment than individual members of society, are just as their repressed civilians, unable to protect these resources.

Humanities, Arts & Social Sciences 6, no. 4 (August 2020), 167-168.

¹⁶¹ Gupta, (2020): 169–170.

¹⁶² Gupta, (2020): 162–170.

¹⁶³ Ibid, 168-170.

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The Military Implications of the Sino-Soviet Split: Devolution of Sino-Soviet Military Cooperation in the Khrushchev Era (1953-1964)

Caleb Ruby

I: Introduction

The Sino-Soviet split is one of the most often-cited phenomena in analyses of Soviet foreign relations. Despite being the two most powerful and influential communist nations in the world, the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics (USSR) and the People's Republic of China (PRC) faced continuous challenges in their political, economic, and military exchanges. Although Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong demonstrated their ability to collaboratively coordinate military operations, Sino-Soviet troubles began even before the Chinese Communist Party seized victory in the Chinese Civil War and continued in a complex fashion until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. While this international tension's omnipresence in post-World War II Soviet history is indisputable, its practical implications varied drastically as the two nations' leaders, goals, and military engagements changed. The Khrushchev era is of particular importance in this regard as it was under his administration that Sino-Soviet relations first became truly hostile. The following question can be raised regarding this hostility: how did military cooperation develop in light of the Sino-Soviet split during Khrushchev's rule? General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev's indictment of Stalin's "cult of personality" and abuse of power in his Secret Speech of 1956, in addition to his ambition to interact peacefully with nations that Chairman Mao considered capitalist adversaries, completely altered Mao's attitude towards the Soviet Union. These developments led to a severe deterioration of foreign relations between the USSR and PRC that extended past diplomacy and meaningfully affected their military cooperation endeavors during the Khrushchev era.

II: Pre-Khrushchev Sino-Soviet Relations

Prior to Nikita Khrushchev's rise to General Secretary of the CPSU, Sino-Soviet relations were defined by Joseph Stalin's complicated but generally constructive relationship with Mao Zedong. Stalin's cold, traditional approach to international relations led him to occasionally make decisions that offended Mao. The most significant of these decisions was the agreement that Stalin came to with the United States at the February 1945 Yalta Conference. The US offered to allow the Soviets various liberties in Asia, where they sought to expand their influence as World War II came to a

close.¹⁶⁴ In exchange, the Soviet Union was obliged to join the Americans in their Pacific efforts against the Japanese and formally recognize China's nationalist party Kuomintang as its legitimate government. The latter condition undoubtedly constituted an act of betrayal towards Stalin's communist comrades, but he believed there to be no better path forward given the circumstances. It speaks volumes of Stalin-era Sino-Soviet relations that this development did not form a permanent rift between Mao and Stalin; they both understood that certain maneuvers had to be carried out by each of them in order to achieve their own independent goals and prevent another global war. In the case of the Yalta Conference pact, Mao knew that early allegiance between the CCP (Chinese Community Party) and USSR could trigger an extended proxy war between the Soviets and Americans in China.¹⁶⁵ While they may not have been pleased with one another at all times, Stalin and Mao had, by this point, developed a mutual understanding that they would seek to strive toward both of their interests whenever such dualistic action was reasonable.

As the People's Liberation Army (PLA) steadily made progress in the late 1940s, the Soviet Union shifted their support to the communist forces, exemplifying Stalin's tendency to adapt his foreign relations to the current balance of power. After the CCP took power in China, many doubted the integrity of Sino-Soviet relations moving further into the 20th century. The American consul general in Shanghai, John Cabot, speculated on the future of the two powers' dynamic in 1949, writing: "... it seems to me inherently improbable that [the] Soviets can indefinitely exert control over China through Chinese Communists who have risen to power largely through [their] own efforts and can scarcely be brought to heel by force."¹⁶⁶ Cabot, like Mao and Stalin, understood that China's mostly autonomous victory over ostensibly superior military forces demonstrated the nation's ability to stand firm without its fellow communist power's support. Nonetheless, in the following year the Soviets and Chinese entered into a comprehensive military treaty, committing to mutual military defense and consultation of one another regarding critical international issues.¹⁶⁷ Later in 1950, the two powers engaged in their first joint military endeavor: support for communist forces in Korea.

By most accounts, including that of Nikita Khrushchev, the Korean War began because of Kim Il-Sung's desire to consolidate his control over the entirety of Korea.¹⁶⁸ However, the timing of Kim's operation was contingent upon Stalin and Mao's collective willingness to support him. In 1950, Stalin gave his tentative approval of Kim's plans for aggression, increasing Soviet aid to his regime on the condition that Kim knew that his support had limits¹⁶⁹. In the national leaders' final meeting before the invasion, Stalin reminded that: "If you should get kicked in the teeth, I shall not lift a finger. You have to ask Mao for all the help"¹⁷⁰. With this statement, the Soviet premier made it clear that his endorsement of Pyongyang's military operations was informed by the PRC's reinforcement of that decision. Stalin expressed this position directly to Mao via telegram on May 14, reporting that Soviet-Korean discussions had determined that the final decision to initiate war would be made by "the Chinese and Korean comrades together, and in case of disagreement by the Chinese comrades the decision on the question should be postponed until a new discussion."¹⁷¹

¹⁶⁴ Chamberlin, *The Cold War's Killing Fields: Rethinking the Long Peace*.

¹⁶⁵ Chamberlin.

¹⁶⁶ Cabot, "The Consul General at Shanghai (Cabot) to the Secretary of State," May 31, 1949.

¹⁶⁷ "Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance."

¹⁶⁸ Chamberlin, *The Cold War's Killing Fields: Rethinking the Long Peace*. 118

¹⁶⁹ Chamberlin. 118

¹⁷⁰ Zhihua, "Sino-Soviet Relations and the Origins of the Korean War."

¹⁷¹ Stalin, "Ciphred Telegram No. 8600, Vyshinsky to Mao Zedong," May 14, 1950.

Stalin's de facto designation of North Korea's defense to China can be reasonably interpreted as a lack of willingness to deploy Soviet troops in the event of a U.S. intervention, but Mao seldom needed any Soviet pressure to accept this role. Paul Chamberlin writes that the Chinese leader was eager to use the war to demonstrate the PLA's military prowess, prevent an American threat to Chinese national security, and prompt increased support to China from the Soviet Union.¹⁷² Regardless of their independent national interests, the united, relatively transparent manner in which the two powers involved themselves in the Korean War serves as another example of Sino-Soviet military cooperation in the pre-Khrushchev era.

Although relations between Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong were hardly harmonious, Stalin's death in 1953 can be understood as the end of the Sino-Soviet alliance's prime years and the first event of many that led to the Sino-Soviet split.¹⁷³ Soviet foreign policy until 1953 was generally dictated by the whims of Stalin's agenda. Stalin had the authority to make unilateral decisions for the nation, and that led to a system wherein war efforts and relationships with other states entirely revolved around his dictation. As a result, his death plunged the Kremlin into chaos and uncertainty. His predecessors were responsible for determining how Soviet foreign relations would be carried out in the future and had the opportunity to essentially build from scratch in many ways. This paved the way for Nikita Khrushchev to come into Stalin's former role as head of the Soviet Union and set his own terms for how the nation would interact with China.

III: Sino-Soviet Ideological Divide

Nikita Khrushchev, like many political leaders, was an enigmatic and occasionally erratic figure. However, the contrast he exhibited from his predecessor was consistently discernible. Through his words, policies, and personality, Khrushchev distanced himself from Stalin and the way the USSR had functioned during his dominion. By far the most notorious exhibit of this distancing occurred on February 25, 1956, at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). On this day, Khrushchev delivered a four-hour speech that targeted Stalin's "cult of personality" (also referred to as his "cult of the individual"), exposing his most egregious abuses of power and erroneous decisions.¹⁷⁴ He gave particular attention to the fears that Vladimir Lenin had held about how Stalin would wield power over the Soviet Union, informing the CPSU delegates that Lenin "detected in Stalin in time those negative characteristics which resulted later in grave consequences".¹⁷⁵ In doing so, Khrushchev leveraged Stalin's alleged devotion to Marxism-Leninism against him and appealed to the reverence with which Lenin's words were regarded in the Soviet Union. Khrushchev also specifically directed the criticism towards Stalin's foreign policy, decrying the manner in which he escalated hostile relations with Yugoslavia¹⁷⁶.

Khrushchev had a variety of reasons to deliver his Secret Speech. Indisputably, his own self-interest was among them. Khrushchev was fully aware of his involvement with many of the horrors he denounced Stalin for committing.¹⁷⁷ All of Stalin's most trusted colleagues were implicated in his

¹⁷² Chamberlin, *The Cold War's Killing Fields: Rethinking the Long Peace*. 119

¹⁷³ Lüthi, *The Sino-Soviet Split*. 38

¹⁷⁴ Service, *A History of Modern Russia: From Tsarism to the Twenty-First Century*. 338-339

¹⁷⁵ Khrushchev, "Khrushchev's Secret Speech, 'On the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences.'"

¹⁷⁶ Khrushchev.

¹⁷⁷ Service, *A History of Modern Russia: From Tsarism to the Twenty-First Century*.

innumerable crimes, and he was no exception. With the address, Khrushchev was preemptively controlling the narrative surrounding Stalin-era terror and preventing it from damaging his political prospects in the future. Nonetheless, his time as the CPSU's General Secretary also revealed the authentic ways in which he differed from Stalin both domestically and internationally. Chairman Mao of the PRC was among those who resented this change in Soviet leadership.

Despite the speech's delivery to a closed session of Congress, which meant the exclusion of foreign officials, Mao quickly learned of Khrushchev's condemnation of Stalin's rule. Mao did not approve of what had been said at the Twentieth Congress. Principally, Mao took ideological offense to the speech. While "de-Stalinization" had been in progress since 1953 and CCP leaders had long had criticisms of Stalin, Mao considered Khrushchev's evaluation of his predecessor to be flawed. His own interpretation of Stalin's leadership was reflected in an article titled "On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat," published in *Renmin Ribao* (the CCP Central Committee's official newspaper) in April 1956. It reaffirmed the merits of the proletarian dictatorship, depicting Stalin as a heroic defender of Marxism-Leninism and, by proxy, the Soviet people. The article also included a notable measure of criticism of Stalin, corroborating Khrushchev's diagnosis of his "cult of the individual" and expressing the CCP's commitment to prevent that dynamic from developing in their own affairs.¹⁷⁸ Like Khrushchev's speech, the article extensively cited Lenin to illustrate the legitimacy of their analysis. Lorenz Lüthi argues that the publication was designed to subliminally reinforce Mao's own cult of personality, while proving to the Soviets that they were able to assess Stalin more wisely than they did.¹⁷⁹ This exchange in early 1956 is one of a plethora of similar ideological disputes during the Khrushchev era.

In addition to his qualms with Soviet de-Stalinization, Mao also virulently opposed the vision of the international system that Khrushchev had espoused both in the Secret Speech and previously in the Twentieth Congress. One of the primary features of the Congress was Khrushchev's report on domestic and foreign policy, in which he expressed his disagreement with the notion of inevitable war with global capitalism and his support for nations who wish to take alternative routes to socialism.¹⁸⁰ These ideas, as well as those included in his February 25 address, were utterly beyond Mao's conception of how communist nations should engage with both Western adversaries and potential post-colonial allies.

While this resentment did not immediately boil over into explicit verbal retaliation, Mao would make his perspective on Khrushchev's foreign relations widely known in the following years. In a speech draft written in 1959, the Chinese chairman revealed the extent to which his bitterness had grown since 1956 or perhaps before. He wrote: "Khrushchev and his group are very naïve. He does not understand Marxism- Leninism and is easily fooled by imperialism... He lacks a workable agenda and will follow gain wherever it goes".¹⁸¹ Mao criticized the pragmatism he had observed in Khrushchev, which often led him to engage relatively amicably with Western nations, while explaining the doctrinal principles that allegedly govern how great powers will inevitably come into conflict and initiate a permanent revolution. Khrushchev's chosen route of Soviet governance did not fit Mao's model, and the Chinese leader was not content with passive disagreement.

¹⁷⁸ "On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat."

¹⁷⁹ Lüthi, *The Sino-Soviet Split*.

¹⁸⁰ Taubman, *Khrushchev: The Man and His Era*.

¹⁸¹ Mao, "Outline for a Speech on the International Situation."

Finally, the Secret Speech also disavowed Stalinist policies that Mao had proposed to be repurposed and implemented in the PRC. Soviet disapproval of these programs reduced the probability that Mao would be able to retain support for them in China, and in fact several policy reversals and political limitations for Mao were adopted at the CCP's eighth congress in September 1956.¹⁸² In the years to come, Mao would reverse this dynamic, weaponizing deteriorated relations with the Soviet Union to improve his domestic position.

Particularly in the concluding years of Khrushchev's rule, the Sino-Soviet split was intentionally escalated by Mao Zedong, who believed he stood to improve his domestic prospects by intensifying the nations' rivalry. Historian Mingjiang Li has observed that when ideologically divergent states enter into competition with one another, their political differences can be interpreted by each state as a threat to their legitimacy and power.¹⁸³ This tension can both challenge national leaders' positions relative to their domestic rivals and provoke intensification of the nations' interactions. Li writes that, in the case of Mao, the Chinese leader saw the Sino-Soviet split as an opportunity to actualize his political vision for China and consolidate more unchecked power.¹⁸⁴ He framed his domestic programs as reactions to Soviet "revisionism" and asserted that China must learn from their mistakes. While this approach may have aided Mao in his efforts to mold Chinese society as he saw fit, it significantly contributed to the continued rupture of Sino-Soviet relations.

IV: Ramifications for Military Cooperation

Khrushchev and Mao's disagreements had broad effects beyond the diplomatic realm. Their ideological misalignment and corresponding disdain for one another led to the dismantling of much of the two powers' military partnership initiatives prior to Khrushchev's ousting in 1964. One explicit example of such a dissolution occurred just two years after the Soviet premier's infamous Secret Speech. In July 1958, Khrushchev was deeply involved in the aftermath of an Iraqi coup that marked the establishment of a new regime that revoked the nation's alliance with Western nations such as Great Britain.¹⁸⁵ While the success of the revolution was considered a victory for the communist world, in the same month Khrushchev found himself traveling to Beijing to resolve what he considered a critical misunderstanding between himself and Chairman Mao Zedong. Earlier in July, Khrushchev had sent Soviet ambassador Pavel Yudin to deliver an oral message to Mao regarding the possibility of the USSR utilizing the Chinese coast for submarine ports and radio stations.¹⁸⁶ In light of recent maritime war efforts by Western powers, the Red Navy had accelerated the construction of marine vessels and was shifting towards wider deployment of them across the globe.¹⁸⁷ Additionally, only a few weeks prior the PRC had requested Soviet assistance with the development of nuclear-powered submarines, seemingly indicating a willingness to work in tandem on such military projects¹⁸⁸. Khrushchev wished to be optimally prepared in the event of a war against his Western rivals, and the proposal was simply a reflection of that fact.

¹⁸² Lüthi, *The Sino-Soviet Split*. 46

¹⁸³ Li, "Ideological Dilemma."

¹⁸⁴ Li.

¹⁸⁵ Fursenko and Naftali, *Khrushchev's Cold War*.

¹⁸⁶ Fursenko and Naftali.

¹⁸⁷ Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*. 387

¹⁸⁸ Lüthi, *The Sino-Soviet Split*.

However, whether due to Yudin's communication or Mao's distrust, the CCP Chairman did not receive the message as the Soviet leader intended. Mao interpreted it as an attempt to control China and unilaterally determine the manner in which their military development would occur. Upon hearing of Mao's unsavory reception of his message, Khrushchev hastily arranged for a visit to Beijing to meet with the Chinese leader and discuss his propositions. The aforementioned developments in Iraq slightly eased the tension in the Beijing talks, as both powers considered the outcome of the coup to be a success.¹⁸⁹ Regardless, Khrushchev was still unable to convince Mao that he had misinterpreted his message. Mao accused him of "Russian nationalism," rejected his proposal to construct Soviet port facilities on the Chinese coast, and ruled out the possibility of a joint Sino-Soviet nuclear submarine fleet.¹⁹⁰ The entire ordeal constituted an embarrassment for Khrushchev and a demonstration of how little patience Mao already had left for Sino-Soviet military cooperation.

Mao did not stop at rejecting Khrushchev's outreach for naval collaboration. The Chinese leader began to intentionally undermine Khrushchev's diplomatic relationship to the West through a number of reckless military maneuvers. The Second Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1958 is the most notable example of this effort. On August 23, Chinese troops launched an assault on the islands of Jinmen and Mazu without notifying the USSR beforehand, effectively forcing Khrushchev to declare Soviet support for the PRC.¹⁹¹ In the first week of September, the United States announced their resolve to defend the islands with the threat of war, and within days China imparted their desire to resume diplomatic talks with the Americans. William Taubman explains that Mao had hoped the attack would thwart Khrushchev's attempts at establishing détente with the US, and his wishes were to some extent fulfilled; the Americans had interpreted Khrushchev's backing of the Chinese bombardment as evidence that the USSR had been involved in planning the operation.¹⁹² With this unilateral act of audacious political manipulation, Mao led China down a path towards the severance of Sino-Soviet military cooperation.

The Soviets may have been unfortunate to fall into Mao's plans during the 1958 Taiwan Crisis, but the PRC faced a major technological blow in the summer of 1959. Despite growing Sino-Soviet tension following the Secret Speech, the USSR had committed to granting the PRC a prototype nuclear bomb in 1957 as part of their ongoing military support for the young communist nation.¹⁹³ On June 20, 1959, Moscow reported that they would not fulfill their promise, to the severe vexation of Chairman Mao.¹⁹⁴ While China's recent history of brash military instigation likely played a role in this decision, Lorenz Lüthi holds that Khrushchev was primarily concerned about the United States reacting to nuclear expansion in the communist world by providing West Germany with nuclear weapons, an outcome that would undoubtedly raise Cold War tensions globally.¹⁹⁵ Irrespective of the USSR's foremost intentions, the canceled nuclear provision was perceived by Mao as further evidence of Moscow's naïve pursuit of international peace and constituted the most significant recession of Soviet military aid to China in the 1950s.

¹⁸⁹ Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchev's Cold War.

¹⁹⁰ Lüthi, *The Sino-Soviet Split*.

¹⁹¹ Taubman, *Khrushchev: The Man and His Era*.

¹⁹² Taubman.

¹⁹³ Taubman.

¹⁹⁴ Lüthi, *The Sino-Soviet Split*.

¹⁹⁵ Lüthi.

By 1960, scientific and technological cooperation between the two powers had all but collapsed. Chinese military leader Nie Rongzhen reported to Mao in July 1960 to notify him of the extent to which Soviet assistance in such affairs had become marred by negligence, poor or lacking communication, and manipulation. He expressed his conviction that such collaboration ought to be considered null, writing: “Quite clearly, before we resolve Chinese-Soviet political ideological differences, we should not suppose that we can achieve assistance in this area.”¹⁹⁶ Rongzhen also stressed that the PRC was presently reliant on the Soviet Union for scientific developments, and that autonomous research and intelligence acquisition must be pursued in order to rid China of this dependency. The theme of begrudging Chinese deference to Soviet political and technical leadership predated the PRC, and in the eyes of many it was time to shed this burden. Just four years after Khrushchev’s Secret Speech, the ideological rift that it had caused had all but dissolved Sino-Soviet technological operations and propelled China towards seeking military independence. Military-technical collaboration continued to gradually devolve, and 1963 marked the complete cessation of Soviet aid to China.¹⁹⁷ Within half a decade of Khrushchev’s resignation in 1964, the Sino-Soviet split that he and Mao had jointly caused would intensify into overt violent conflict.¹⁹⁸

V: Conclusion

Though the Sino-Soviet conflict would not peak until late in the 1960s, the Sino-Soviet split led to an extreme deterioration of military relations between the two powers during Khrushchev’s time as the CPSU’s General Secretary. Ideological discrepancies and incompatible geopolitical imperatives drove the world’s largest two communist nations away from their former alliance. While the Soviets sought to balance the spread of communism with a measured understanding of nuclear risk, Mao’s resentment of this mission and his undying resolve to establish Chinese autonomy guided his decisions to cease Sino-Soviet joint military activities and undermine Soviet diplomatic interests. The Sino-Soviet split also informed the deterioration of Soviet technical support for the PRC, including the Soviet determination to withhold a previously committed sample nuclear bomb and culminating in the total termination of aid to China in 1963. These trends and their root causes continued to develop over the course of the 20th century and shaped international affairs until the end of the Cold War.

¹⁹⁶ Rongzhen, “Report by Nie Rongzhen to Mao Zedong Regarding Science and Technology (Abridged).”

¹⁹⁷ Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*. 398

¹⁹⁸ Lüthi, *The Sino-Soviet Split*. 340

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Differences between the Oneida Community and mainstream Society in the 19th Century

Rachel Martinez

Victor Hawley was a romantic man. One who wanted nothing more from life than to marry his lover, Mary Jones, and raise a family together. Unfortunately for them, the couple was a part of a utopian society, the Oneida community, that strictly forbade monogamous relationships and the formation of familial connections. Still set on raising a family together, Victor and Mary went to the community leaders and asked if they were allowed to have a baby. In a heartbreaking series of events, the couple was deemed an unacceptable match and Mary was forced to have a child with Theodore Jones, who the leaders said was better than Victor in both physical and spiritual capacities. Victor was forced to watch his lover fall pregnant with another man's child and remained by her side, even as she experienced complications and went through a stillbirth. Fully traumatized by this experience, Victor and Mary left the community in 1877 to start a life of their own. Victor's story is like many in the Oneida community, where societal progress, perfectionism, and unity were more important than any one individual's emotions or beliefs.¹⁹⁹

Why did Victor Hawley have to give up his lover to another man and why would a couple have to check in with community leaders before having a child of their own? How did a community with such strict guidelines stay together for around thirty full years? The Oneida community is not simply a radical society that came and went in the nineteenth century. Looking into the community's values and reasons for its eventual collapse can provide practical insight on human nature that could be useful in formulating guiding principles for society today. The Oneida community's struggle with the prohibition of emotional and romantic connections validates monogamy and family as natural and not an inadequate construct of society. Oneida shows how the strive for perfection and civilization can be misconstrued. It also demonstrates why radical adaptations of society have not worked in the past in the hopes of preventing such communities from forming in the future.

In the second half of the 19th century, the Oneida Community was different from mainstream American society because it stressed the importance of unity among all members in all aspects of life. Community members gathered as one to participate in "mutual criticism," where individuals accused others of wrongdoing to bring them closer to God and their fellow members. Adult members of the Oneida Community practiced "complex marriage" which prevented exclusive coupling and promoted free sex and love between everyone. To unite the community even further, children were raised communally instead of only by those who conceived them. By instilling these values, John Humphrey Noyes, the community's founder, did everything in his power to unite his members as one large, supportive family. Noyes even attempted to alter his members' inheritable traits through eugenics to ensure they were united in every value and belief imaginable. Unfortunately, his approach to communal utopianism ultimately failed to unite his followers, as many were unconvinced of his radical ideology.

¹⁹⁹ Martha Tomhave Blauvelt, "Review of Special Love/Special Sex: An Oneida Community Diary, by R. S. Fogarty," *New York History* 76, no. 1 (1995): 109.

The Oneida community, formed by John Humphrey Noyes and lasting from 1848-1880, was a utopian society located in New York, one of many which sprung up in the United States during the nineteenth century. A utopia, as described by political scientist Lyman Tower Sargent, is a commune of “social dreaming” where individuals plan to alter their daily practices and beliefs because they “envision a radically different society than the one in which [they] live.” A utopian society is inherently nonexistent; they are formed to be “perfect” versions of society, but perfectionism is impossible to attain. Therefore, every utopia will eventually fail, just as the Oneida community did in 1880. Despite this knowledge that forming a perfect society is unattainable, many have still strived to do so throughout history, as it is human nature to want more out of one’s community. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that many individuals created utopian societies in the nineteenth century United States because they had their own ideas of how their newly formed nation should function in their favor.²⁰⁰

John Humphrey Noyes founded the Oneida community in 1848 and based the commune’s most central beliefs on revelations he himself discovered while studying Christianity. Born in 1811 and raised in Vermont, he came from what cultural anthropologist Heather Van Wormer called a “fairly educated and socially connected family,” gaining an education in law before converting to Christianity and beginning religious studies at Yale. While studying, Noyes diverged from the religion’s traditional beliefs. Heather Van Wormer said that he alleged that there was a way to be free of sin and perfect under God, and that by understanding the complete truth, he “was already perfect and free of sin” himself. After the church ousted him for what they believed was a radical, inaccurate depiction of the religion, Noyes created his own community in Oneida, New York where he could project his opinion of the “truth” and create a perfect society absent of sin.²⁰¹

The Oneida Community’s central belief was in John Humphrey Noyes’ perfectionism, and set the group apart from mainstream society. Noyes’ main message was that perfectionism would lead people to be granted what Allan Estlake called “salvation over sin.”²⁰² Therefore, Noyes strived to create a perfect environment for his community so they could all reach salvation after death. One way in which Noyes endeavored to create this perfect society was by creating absolute harmony between the sexes. The notion of complete sexual harmony led to the Oneida Community’s radical “free sex” practice, used to eliminate restrictive barriers between the two genders. Noyes attempted to sharpen his society by raising religious, social, and economic loyalties from the individual to societal level as well.²⁰³ Therefore, the fundamental belief, perfectionism, which led Noyes to create the Oneida Community, facilitated his emphasis on communal unity throughout the society’s existence.

Mutual criticism was a tool unique to the Oneida Community that kept members united under the same values by checking their actions and calling them out for what they did wrong. Mutual criticism was performed in front of an audience and was given out quite often among community

²⁰⁰ Lyman Tower Sargent, “The Three Faces of Utopianism Revisited,” *Utopian Studies* 5, no.1 (1994): 3-5.

²⁰¹ Heather Van Wormer, “The Ties That Bind: Ideology, Material Culture, and the Utopian Ideal,” *Historical Archaeology* 40, (2006): 39.

²⁰² Allan Estlake, *The Oneida Community: A Record of an Attempt to Carry out the Principles of Christian Unselfishness and Scientific Race-Improvement* (London: George Redway, 1900), 5.

²⁰³ Lawrence Foster, *Religion and Sexuality* (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1984), 80-92.

members. According to Isaac G. Reed Jr., mutual criticism was a right to be freely exercised by all members “to discuss and criticize, either favorably or unfavorably... the conduct, or disposition, or ability of every and anybody else.”²⁰⁴ The Oneida Community relied on this criticism as a type of governance, particularly because they had no traditional form of law to otherwise hold each other accountable.²⁰⁵ The mutual criticism was meant to bring the community closer, whereas in mainstream society, criticism was a way to anger others and push them away. Mutual criticism was not meant to make those in the hot seat feel bad about themselves or their actions. Instead, John Humphrey Noyes created the practice to bring his community members closer to God.²⁰⁶ Noyes believed that people would be more likely to follow the Oneida Community’s unique Christian values if they learned what they were doing wrong and had the opportunity to fix it. With more people following the rules and believing in the same concepts, the community was more inclined to behave in a united manner.

Mutual criticism was also a place for community members to mention annoyances they had with each other.²⁰⁷ In mainstream society, people let their negative feelings build up and grow into bigger issues. Instead, the Oneida Community prevented this festering of emotions by making their members share any pessimistic feelings immediately. This practice prevented small disagreements from turning into large blowouts that could have ripped the community’s cohesion apart. When people criticize others in mainstream society, it often comes off as rude and aggressive. However, mutual criticism performed by the Oneida Community was meant to be impartial, impersonal, and affectionate in nature.²⁰⁸ It has even been documented by Oneida Community members that those who received criticism took “the opportunity to express [his/her] thanks to the family for the sincere” concerns.²⁰⁹ By expressing thanks for their criticism, community members showed that they knew the practice was not malicious and was instead meant to link the community as one.

Outsiders to the Oneida Community were extremely confused about the practice of mutual criticism and often shared their condescending opinions on it. They thought the act of constantly criticizing others was extremely negative and shunned the practice, while inside the community, Oneida members appreciated the kind, behavioral corrections they received. Members of regular society assumed that community leaders tried to hide the criticism’s true, poor intentions under the guise of a mutually beneficial act. To the leaders, however, the process worked at getting members on the same page and creating harmony within their community.²¹⁰ This disagreement between groups on the benefits of such a central practice for the Oneida Community shows just how differently the two societies thought and behaved in the 19th century.

Mutual criticism further united the Oneida Community because it functioned as their system of law. All societies have some legal system to keep the society functioning appropriately. mainstream societies used a court system with different punishments such as monetary fines and jail time. The Oneida Community, on the other hand, used mutual criticism to call out members who strayed from

²⁰⁴ Isaac G. Reed Jr., “The Oneida Community of Free Lovers. Second Article,” *Frank Leslie’s Weekly*, Apr 09, 1870.

²⁰⁵ Constance Noyes Robertson, “The Oneida Community,” *New York History* 30, no.2 (1949): 134.

²⁰⁶ Robertson, “The Oneida Community,” 138.

²⁰⁷ Lawrence Foster, *Religion and Sexuality*, 99.

²⁰⁸ Robertson, “The Oneida Community,” 138.

²⁰⁹ Oneida Community, “Daily Journal of Oneida Community,” Vol. 1-3 (1866-1867). 10

²¹⁰ Robertson, “The Oneida Community,” 137-138.

their values and provided punishments like the removal of sexual privileges.²¹¹ This is seen by examining the case of Orrin, a past member of the Oneida Community who made several mistakes and was almost kicked out. By repeatedly attending mutual criticism and changing his behavior, Orrin was able to remain in the community.²¹² mainstream society would have sent him to jail or not given him support, but the Oneida Community thought rehabilitating its members through criticism would keep them undivided. Mutual criticism therefore provided unity to the Oneida Community because it guided members' behaviors and kept them in line like the court system did in mainstream society. Leaders used mutual criticism as their moral code to prevent travelers from forgetting their true home in the Oneida Community. Criticism was given to travelers both before and after trips to prevent spiritual tainting and to remind them of where they "really" belonged.²¹³ This practice prevented members from going outside of the community and being won over by the differing values of true 19th century society. Leaders allowed their members to travel and grow as people but wanted to keep them united in the "true Oneida beliefs" at the same time.

In early years of the Oneida Community's existence, mutual criticism was practiced religiously by every member with full commitment and belief in the process. However, as second and third generation community members formed their own opinions on communal values in the 1870's, criticism was practiced less and less. Because later generation Oneida members were born into the community and did not take part in the rigid application process, they often lacked the intense perfectionism and communal emphasis their parents lived out. Societal values of unity and perfectionism were further diminished as John Humphrey Noyes grew old, having less control over his community. With worsening health conditions, Noyes was unable to prevent his youths from becoming individualistic and less united. Because the community values began to decline, Noyes said that "interference of the community with individual affairs of all kinds had come to be resented and intrusive" for younger members, even the mutual criticism process. Criticism, which originally united the community under God and similar behaviors, turned into an affair that felt intrusive and unnecessary to new members of the society, making the practice virtually obsolete.²¹⁴

John Humphrey Noyes further united all adult members of the Oneida Community in one romantic relationship through complex marriage. This system prevented distinctive pairings and promoted a type of communal love that was key to uniting the population. According to historian Lawrence Foster, Noyes used complex marriage to promote the "subordination of individual self-interest to the larger and more inclusive interests of the community." Loyalties in the form of sex, children, and love were all given up through complex marriage to promote the interests of the entire group.²¹⁵ Unlike in mainstream society where two lovers married each other to grow their intimate connection, the entire Oneida Community was married to one other to promote larger societal gains and concord. The Oneida Community differed from mainstream society because it opposed monogamous relationships. The community's leader, John Humphrey Noyes, believed that contrary to widespread belief, monogamy was impure and group love was superior. To Noyes, monogamous

²¹¹ Foster, *Religion and Sexuality*, 100.

²¹² Oneida Community, "Daily Journal of Oneida Community," 18.

²¹³ Estlake, *The Oneida Community: A Record of an Attempt to Carry out the Principles of Christian Unselfishness and Scientific Race-Improvement*, 61.

²¹⁴ Monique Patenaude Roach, "The Loss of Religious Allegiance among the Youth of the Oneida Community," *Historian* 63, no. 4 (2001): 801.

²¹⁵ Foster, *Religion and Sexuality*, 107.

relationships promoted division by separating people into smaller, individualized families. These individual unions, Noyes believed, promoted disconnection and the differing of opinions between members of society. The Oneida Community practiced this belief as they chastised couples when they believed showed the slightest signs of forming a monogamous relationship.²¹⁶ The Oneida Community thus utilized an entirely new system of complex marriage, to keep society united and prevent separation.

The community also opposed monogamy because during the 19th century, men in those relationships treated their female companions as their property.²¹⁷ This form of relationship promoted inequality between the sexes in mainstream society and created a barrier between men and women, therefore preventing a complete union. Noyes let go of the traditional concept of marriage that bonded individuals in mainstream society for a form of complex marriage that promoted total communal harmony over familial bonding and inequality of the sexes. Complex marriage was utilized in the Oneida Community because it eliminated jealousy that normally divided monogamous couples in society. John Humphrey Noyes believed that “if a man cannot love a woman and be happy seeing her loved by others, he is a selfish man.”²¹⁸ This belief made Noyes place the idea of complex marriage at the top of his moral code to prevent his members from being self-centered individuals. This concept united all the community’s members into one large relationship to promote equality and make it no longer necessary to fight with other members to get better partners.²¹⁹ Community leaders prohibited coupling and did everything they could to prevent the popularization of the practice. The Oneida library even censored their books to prevent traditional concepts of love and marriage from leading to monogamous pairings.²²⁰ The Oneida Community was so different from mainstream society that they had to alter their collection of cultural materials such as books to fit their divergent values.

The perception of sex differed within the complex marriage system than in mainstream society because it was meant to be shared between the entire group, not based on serious, emotional connections. John H. Noyes wanted his followers to experience sex with many different partners throughout their lifetimes and did not intend it to signify any romantic connection between participants.²²¹ The community undoubtedly took this interpretation of sex within the complex marriage system to prevent coupling and to promote complete societal cohesion. Oneida members often had sex with two or three different partners each week to ensure maximum pleasure and to make connections with as many individuals as possible.²²² Community leaders even facilitated sex between multiple different partners. Monogamous couples were occasionally forced to have sex and procreate with other people in the hopes of destroying their bond that, according to Noyes, was divisive to communal unity.²²³ Leaders even paired teenagers with older adults for sexual

²¹⁶ David S. Reynolds, "Complex Marriage, to Say the Least the Oneida Community's Continual Rotation of Sexual Partners Became Intolerable to their Neighbors." *New York Times*, Oct 24, 1993.

²¹⁷ Anthony Wonderley, "How Women Worked in the Oneida Community during the 1870s," *Communal Societies* 30, no. 2 (October 2010): 67.

²¹⁸ Estlake, *The Oneida Community: A Record*, 35.

²¹⁹ Beth Barnard, "The Utopia of Sharing: At the Oneida Community Mansion House in Central New York, Everything--Possessions, Profits, Bodies--Belonged to Everyone." *New York Times*, Aug 03, 2007, 8.

²²⁰ Reed Jr., "The Oneida Community of Free Lovers"

²²¹ Foster, *Religion and Sexuality*, 107.

²²² Reynolds, "Complex Marriage, to Say the Least."

²²³ Foster, *Religion and Sexuality*, 107.

experiences to prevent what political scientist Susan M. Matarese called “horizontal fellowship.”²²⁴ Horizontal fellowship is the concept that people tend to stick with others that are the same age as them. The Oneida Community felt as though these friendships prevented individuals from getting to know all members of their community. So, to break these distinctive age groupings, community leaders played matchmaker and facilitated sex across conventional lines.

Because complex marriage and the nature of sex was practiced so differently in the Oneida Community, members of mainstream society openly scrutinized the group’s ways. In a mainstream society where cross-generational relationships and free love was thought of as uncivilized and abhorrent, it is easy to see how they would have disliked the core beliefs of the Oneida Community. In one 1870 publication, Isaac G. Reed described the Oneida Community as “depraving” their members due to the “promiscuous intercourse, unrestrained licentiousness” and ignorance of marriage their free love ideologies allowed.²²⁵ The ostentatious language used by Reed suggests just how passionately mainstream society was against the radical ideas of the Oneida Community.

While mutual criticism was only resented from within during the last decade of the Oneida Community’s existence, complex marriage was disliked by many members from the beginning. John Humphrey Noyes even fell into a monogamous relationship himself with a woman named Mary Cragin during the first years of the community’s existence. Mary Cragin did die shortly after their relationship began due to a drowning accident, an event that Noyes said was his punishment for straying from God and the complex marriage system. Many other community members strayed into monogamous relationships themselves, like Victor Hawley and Mary Jones who, as mentioned before, were prevented from having children due to their romantic connection. Monogamy was so common in the Oneida Community that Noyes utilized an isolated Oneida residence at Wallingford to separate members of the community who fell into these relationships.²²⁶ While complex marriage was formulated to unite society, in practice it created rifts that prevented cohesion. Because Oneida members could not spend time or procreate with their lovers, they were less likely to subscribe to communal rule and participate in community actions all together.

The temptation of monogamous relationships was present during the Oneida Community’s entire existence, but it markedly increased as second and third generation members grew up. Just as these members were more likely to revolt against the idea of mutual criticism, their individualism prompted them to make their own choices on who they fell in love with and wanted to spend their time with. Monique Patenaude Roach explained that as years passed for the community, “loyalty and devotion once bestowed upon the [entire] community was redirected to smaller family units.” In 1879, as the community was beginning to dissolve, Noyes even made a final attempt to keep his people together by getting rid of the concept of complex marriage altogether. His effort failed, and because the community did not buy into Noyes’ complex marriage, the utopian society eventually disbanded.²²⁷

²²⁴ Susan M. Matarese, and Paul G. Salmon. “Heirs to the Promised Land: The Children of Oneida.” *International Journal of Sociology of the Family* 13, no. 2 (1983): 41.

²²⁵ Isaac G. Reed Jr., “The Oneida Community of Free Lovers Doctrines of the Community Concluding Article,” *Frank Leslie’s Weekly*, Apr 23, 1870.

²²⁶ Roach, “The Loss of Religious Allegiance among the Youth of the Oneida Community,” 801-802.

²²⁷ Roach, “The Loss of Religious Allegiance among the Youth of the Oneida Community,” 803-804.

The Oneida Community was also different from mainstream society during the 19th century because their children were raised communally to prevent familial ties from forming and weakening their overall societal connection. Founders of the Oneida Community believed that having a strong community bond was more important than any other, even those as special as the ones formed from parent-child relationships. Susan M. Matarese explained that community members actively believed in this ideal from their founders and supported the separation of their children to prevent any “exclusive, child-parent bonding.”²²⁸ To inhibit this bond from forming, community leaders added an entire wing to the house so children could sleep in dormitories instead of in their parents’ bedrooms.²²⁹ Infants were placed in a community nursery at around fourteen months old to initiate the physical and mental weaning processes from their mothers.²³⁰ This separation from their parents at such a young age reinforced the idea that, unlike in mainstream society, unity among the whole community was more important than any other connection, even one with one’s own children.

Because parents did not solely raise their children in the Oneida Community, kids grew up much differently than they would have in a mainstream society. To ensure his society’s parents raised their children with the proper Oneida beliefs and values, John Humphrey Noyes appointed his most dependable followers to watch over them. Once infants moved out of their mother’s bedroom to begin the weaning process, parents could only spend time with their children during certain hours of the day, preventing parents from having much of a say in their children’s actions or morals. Children were strictly monitored from an early age and were made to follow a scripted schedule each day to encourage their militant following of community rules as they aged. According to Susan M. Matarese, children were given toys which they were “expected to share in a non-possessive fashion.”²³¹ By instilling the importance of sharing into their children at an early age, the Oneida Community ensured that their future generations would support similar values that were essential to their society, like communal unity, later in life.

Oneida Community leaders separated parents from their babies soon after birth because, unlike in mainstream society, the detachment benefitted parent and childhood development. Members criticized mothers for being overly involved in their children’s lives when they would do things such as make extra visits to the nursery hall or bring their children with them to community meetings. It was believed that this extra time spent together would impede both the parent and child’s spiritual and mental growth, so it was highly shamed.²³² This is clearly opposite of child-rearing beliefs in mainstream society, where parents were often criticized for not spending enough time with their children, for fear that it would make them deviant and uncontrollable. Compared to children in the general population, Oneida children were described as more cooperative and mutually supportive, suggesting that the separation of children from their parents assisted the community in achieving its goal of becoming as unified as possible.²³³

There was much resentment in the Oneida community regarding the communal raising of children among both the young-ones and parents involved. Children automatically felt a connection to their

²²⁸ Matarese and Salmon “Heirs to the Promised Land,” 36.

²²⁹ Barnard, “The Utopia of Sharing,” 8.

²³⁰ Matarese and Salmon “Heirs to the Promised Land,” 37.

²³¹ Matarese and Salmon “Heirs to the Promised Land,” 37-38.

²³² Oneida Community, “Daily Journal of Oneida Community,” 459.

²³³ Matarese and Salmon “Heirs to the Promised Land,” 40.

mothers, so the removal of this bond did not come naturally for many Oneida offspring. When children became too attached to their mother, as seen when they fussed for them or repeatedly asked for their presence, community leaders would temporarily suspend visitation between mother and child. Corrina Ackley Noyes, a daughter in the Oneida Community recounted an experience she had on one suspension, where she “caught a glimpse of [her mother] passing through a hallway near the Children’s House and rushed after her screaming.”²³⁴ Experiences such as this one undoubtedly traumatized second and third generation Oneida children, explaining how they began to resent the society’s communal values as a whole. It is also clear that mothers frequently appeased their children’s cries for their attention, as women were often criticized for bringing their children to meetings and frequenting the Children’s House.²³⁵

The Oneida Community attempted to unite their people even further when John Humphrey Noyes began the practice of eugenics, or stirpiculture, among his members. Attempting to create a more united society than ever before, Noyes bred his followers in the name of Perfectionism, the community’s founding principle, to create the most loyal offspring possible.²³⁶ He attempted this by partnering up members based on the strength of their beliefs and allegiance to reproduce, not based on emotional connections.²³⁷ Noyes first considered this eugenics scheme in 1848, but did not introduce it into the community until two decades later, after Lawrence Foster said about half the community’s offspring had already been conceived and “complacency and communal stagnation” began to characterize the new generation.²³⁸ In 1868, stirpiculture was unanimously supported by older members of the Oneida Community, presumably by those who were first generation participants and fully bought into Noyes’ ideals of perfect unity.²³⁹ Eugenics continued the community’s theme of unity because it was hoped to create individuals who would fully buy into the society’s ideals. Noyes assumed that by pairing the most loyal members of society together, their offspring would be just as dedicated and united under Oneida beliefs as their ancestors.

The practice of eugenics for the Oneida Community was obviously different from the way procreation occurred in mainstream society at the time. In the community, leaders prevented many loving couples from having children to hopefully quash their relationship while less attached members were encouraged to procreate for the betterment of society.²⁴⁰ Leaders even initiated one fourth of all conceptions during the stirpiculture era themselves by selecting the most committed members to have children together. They hoped their pairings would produce offspring that inherited the innate loyalty their parents had.²⁴¹ Instead of allowing couples to act on their own accord and happiness as in mainstream society, leaders denied those who were in love the right to create children and only gave the task to the most devoted members of the Oneida Community.

The stirpiculture process united the Oneida Community’s most loyal members, but it created a division between those aforementioned and less fervent members due to the exclusivity of

²³⁴ Matarese and Salmon “Heirs to the Promised Land,” 38.

²³⁵ Oneida Community, “Daily Journal of Oneida Community,” 459.

²³⁶ Philip R. Wyatt, “John Humphrey Noyes and the Stirpicultural Experiment.” *Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences* 31, no. 1 (1976): 56.

²³⁷ Matarese and Salmon, “Heirs to the Promised Land,” 36.

²³⁸ Foster, *Religion and Sexuality*, 118-119.

²³⁹ Wyatt, “John Humphrey Noyes and the Stirpicultural Experiment,” 62.

²⁴⁰ Reynolds, “Complex Marriage, to Say the Least.”

²⁴¹ Foster, *Religion and Sexuality*, 119.

childbearing. Couples had to submit requests to a carefully selected stirpiculture board to even be able to begin trying for a baby. Though only nine applications were rejected by the board during its eleven-year existence, members like Victor Hawley who were turned down were seriously impacted by their denial.²⁴² When emotionally connected couples were not allowed to have children, it undoubtedly created apprehension around the necessity of such community rules. This, in turn, led to the breakdown of communal unity as members increasingly dissented against practices like eugenics.

Stirpiculture made it clear, as Lawrence Foster put it, that only those “deemed fit would be permitted to have children,” thus stratifying community members by level of commitment before unification under the stirpicults could be realized. Because it was made so clear that members who were less united under Oneida guidelines would never be able to have children during the eugenics experiment, many knew right away who would be allowed to procreate and who would not.²⁴³ It would have been obvious, due to the public nature of mutual criticism, who community leaders would have trusted enough to have children. A clear line formed between those who upheld Oneida beliefs and those who were criticized once childbearing, a very serious and personal experience, was made into a communal decision. The Oneida Community’s eugenics experiment divided society before stirpiculture babies were old enough to display the loyalty they had supposedly inherited from their parents. Therefore, the end goal of stirpiculture was never realized and dissenting views prevailed before its offspring could make their mark on Oneida society.

John Humphrey Noyes’ eugenics experiment did not lead to the loyal and united follower base that he assumed it would. Even though stirpicults were born out of the best community members at the time, Susan M. Matarese said they did not inherit “their parents’ moral and spiritual commitment” to the Oneida Community’s perfectionist values.²⁴⁴ Many stirpicults were among those protesting community values and forming monogamous relationships at the end of the community’s journey. The experiment utterly failed to unite society’s members, as it was ultimately terminated with complex marriage in 1879 in the hopes of salvaging some part of the community.²⁴⁵ This experiment showed that the values and personalities of parents cannot be inherited at birth because it failed to produce members that would unite further under the Oneida Community.

The Oneida Community lasted for as long as it did because its original members truly bought into John Humphrey Noyes’ vision of perfect unity. By utilizing a rigorous application process, Noyes only accepted those he knew would be able to last long term in the community. Testimony from its original members show that they believed fully in the Oneida Community’s free love and its role in making them better, more perfect people. One testimony from Abby S. Burnham in 1870 explained that experiencing free love raised her “from a state of exclusiveness and idolatry to a greater enlargement of heart, and freedom of communication with God and this body.”²⁴⁶ Testimonies such as this show just how fully the community’s original members believed in its founding principles, allowing the community to last longer than other utopias in the past. No matter what dissent the

²⁴² Wyatt, “John Humphrey Noyes and the Stirpicultural Experiment,” 63.

²⁴³ Foster, *Religion and Sexuality*, 119.

²⁴⁴ Matarese and Salmon, “Heirs to the Promised Land,” 41.

²⁴⁵ Wyatt, “John Humphrey Noyes and the Stirpicultural Experiment,” 64.

²⁴⁶ Reed Jr., “The Oneida Community of Free Lovers Doctrines of the Community Concluding Article.”

community faced from outside, members wholeheartedly believed in their ability to create a perfect society.

Unfortunately, new generations of members born into the Oneida Community did not have the same intensity of beliefs their parents did, leading to the society's eventual downfall in the late 1870's. Because children born in the Oneida Community did not have to go through the same intense application process as their parents, they were not ensured to have the same beliefs. This is seen later in the community as Oneida children questioned the values of complex marriage and mutual criticism that were in the foundation of the community. With such increased skepticism, there was no way for the community to stay around after second and third generation Oneida children grew to adults. In 1879, around thirty years after the community was founded, children born in the Oneida Community were old and numerous enough to make their dissenting opinions heard. Thus, the community disbanded primarily because children in the Oneida Community resented the ideas their parents loved and, once they were old enough, destroyed the community because of it.

The Oneida Community was different from mainstream society because of the ways it attempted to unite its people under John Humphrey Noyes' ideals of perfectionism. The community used mutual criticism to encourage individuals to follow proper Christian morals in order to unite them in action and beliefs. Community members practiced complex marriage to unite all followers in one large collective relationship and to prevent divisive monogamous relationships. Children in the Oneida Community were raised communally to prevent familial bonds from overpowering communal harmony. Lastly, Noyes began a eugenics experiment to produce offspring that would be just as loyal and united under the Oneida beliefs as their parents were. The Oneida Community remained united for longer than most utopian societies, but their extreme emphasis on communal unity and loyalty ultimately led to friction between members and their eventual dissolution in 1880.

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Women's Liberation: Propaganda and Practice

Sarah Minihane

During the Maoist era, women's liberation became a symbol of China's salvation and modernization under the communist regime. In Mao Zedong's earlier writings, the subjugation of women represented "the embodiment of the whole feudal-patriarchal ideology and system...binding the Chinese people, particularly the peasants."²⁴⁷ The emancipation of women thus symbolically represented the emancipation of the Chinese people as a whole, and as such, the subject featured prominently in Chinese Communist Party (CCP) propaganda, which lauded the contributions of the newly liberated woman to the socialist project. However, despite the attention given to the issue in state media and discourse, the reality of women's liberation often fell short of the party's promises, especially in the countryside. Though the issue remained a strong theme in party propaganda throughout Mao's reign, the very nature of propaganda often undermined the full realization of the liberation it professed. Propaganda was a tool for disseminating information and messages, educating the people in party ideology, and swaying the public in favor of state policies and initiatives, and therefore, in order to be effective, it had to play into existing beliefs, sentiments, and value systems to a certain extent. Thus, despite the genuine sympathy expressed in the writings of Mao and many of his fellow May 19th intellectuals for the plight of women, the use of "women's liberation" as a tool to promote the aims of state socialism meant that gender-specific issues of oppression and discrimination were often obscured under the rhetoric of class struggle, while many deeply entrenched patriarchal norms went unchallenged, and were sometimes even reinforced, by the party's propaganda. As a result, in reality women's liberation remained a largely unfinished project.

One of the earliest examples of the clash between propaganda and the reality of women's liberation took place during the early years of agrarian revolution and land reform in China. Beginning in the late 1940s as Communist forces seized control over the Chinese countryside, the CCP launched a campaign to reform the rural economy through socialist revolution and land equalization.²⁴⁸ However, in order to mobilize support for the Communist regime and the socialist project, land reform activists found they first needed to restructure the way the rural peasantry understood the world to fit within the framework of a Marxist class consciousness. Many early reports note the "low political awareness" of the population, observing that "the peasants and the landlords do not know one another," and lamenting that the "political consciousness [of the peasants] is low."²⁴⁹ CCP officials were faced with the challenge of not only having to introduce the concepts of class statuses such as "landlord" and "peasant" into the daily vernacular of rural society, but of making

²⁴⁷ Mao Zedong, "Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan," Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung, Marxists Internet Archive, accessed December 1, 2022, https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-1/mswv1_2.htm.

²⁴⁸ Brian DeMare, *Land Wars: The Story of China's Agrarian Revolution* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2019), 14-16.

²⁴⁹ Jeffrey A. Javed, *Righteous Revolutionaries: Morality, Mobilization, and Violence in the Making of the Chinese State* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2022), 69-70.

these new labels meaningful to the peasant population.²⁵⁰ In this endeavor, women's suffering proved to be a useful tool of emotional mobilization, as tales of their victimization elicited pity and stoked public outrage against those designated as class enemies. As the historian Jeffrey Javed wrote, "Class alone was insufficient as a participation identity; it was only by imbuing it with moral meaning that the Party was able to overcome locals' apathy toward landlords. To do so, they [worked] to provoke moral-emotional responses that could reorient the symbolic boundaries that divided local communities..."²⁵¹ As a powerful emotional catalyst, female suffering was a key instrument in the discursive construction of the landlord class, transforming the notion of "landlord" from merely an economic division to a mark of moral depravity and licentiousness.

The power of women's suffering as a tool to cultivate class consciousness is demonstrated by its prevalence as a theme in party-sponsored forms of entertainment, such as operas, films, and literature, in which evil landlords preying upon vulnerable peasant girls became a common trope. For instance, in *Red Leaf River*, the opera witnessed by William Hinton in 1948 during his stay in Long Bow village, the landlord villain rapes the daughter-in-law of the peasant protagonist, driving her to commit suicide. Hinton describes the deep emotional impact of the scene, recalling:

It was as if the attention of the whole universe were focused on that small space. And, in the very center, a young girl, her song more a wail, more a sob than a song, spread her arms wide in despair and asked, "Why? Why? Why?" ...The girl flung herself into Red Leaf River...At that moment I became aware of a new quality in the reaction of the audience. Men were weeping, and I along with them.

While the fictional landlord's other abuses had caused the women in the audience to "weep openly and unashamedly," it was the violation and subsequent death of the daughter-in-law that moved even the most hardened men in the audience to tears.²⁵² Hinton remarked that the only complaint the peasants had regarding the show was that "no one beat the landlord," revealing how effective such operas were at generating feelings of rancor and resentment towards the landlords they depicted.²⁵³ This power to invoke vengeful hostility was also documented in audiences' responses to showings of *The White-Haired Girl*, a renowned opera and later film which told the story of a peasant girl who, after falling prey to a landlord's depraved wiles, flees to the mountains to live in hiding in a cave, where the harshness and deprivation cause her hair to turn white. The story stirred such passionate outrage amongst spectators that one drama troupe found that being pelted with rocks by enraged audience members was an "unavoidable" part of each performance.²⁵⁴ Such instances demonstrate the effectiveness of these operas at marshalling empathetic outrage on behalf of innocent female characters who suffered at the hands of the cruel fictional landlords. Moreover, through the repetition of this theme, the operas helped cement the association between female suffering and the corruption and immorality of the landlord class, so that women's liberation became increasingly equated with the liberation of the peasant woman from the exploitation of class enemies.

²⁵⁰ DeMare, *Land Wars*, 98.

²⁵¹ Javed, *Righteous Revolutionaries*, 71.

²⁵² William Hinton, *Fanshen: A Documentary of Revolution in a Chinese Village* (New York: Vintage Books, 1966), 314-315.

²⁵³ Hinton, *Fanshen*, 316.

²⁵⁴ Brian DeMare, *Mao's Cultural Army: Drama Troupes in China's Rural Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 98.

The theme of landlords preying on young women carried over into literature as well. For example, in the 1949 short story “Jinbao’s Mother,” a land reform cadre named Comrade Ma discovered the tragic plight of a village woman named Cuicui, who, despite the purity of her chaste virtue and the strength of her devotion to her husband, had been forced into a tormented life of poverty and prostitution by the devious machinations of the wicked landlord Liu Guicai who lusted after her.²⁵⁵ Cuicui’s tale of woe ended with her declaring to Comrade Ma:

“In the past I hated Lui Guicai, but I also blamed myself. I blamed my bad fate for dooming me to such terrible suffering...When you spoke at that meeting the day you arrived...I was also listening. After that, I didn’t sleep for two days and two nights. I asked myself, ‘Who hurt me this way?’ It was the landlord, Lui Guicai!”²⁵⁶

In this, “Jinbao’s Mother” not only uses its tale of female suffering to demonize the landlord class, but also to steer the rural peasantry away from the Confucian tendency to blame one’s situation on fate and accept one’s lot in life, as Hinton had witnessed during his time in Long Bow village. “...Confucianism and ancestor worship were deeply ingrained in the consciousness of the majority of the peasants,” he observed. “...‘If you are poor, that is your fate. That is determined in heaven and no man can go against heaven,’ they declared...”²⁵⁷ By stirring readers’ emotions through Cuicui’s heartrending tragedy, which is shown to be the direct result of the landlord’s conniving schemes, the CCP used women’s oppression to persuade peasants to start thinking of their own situations in terms of class exploitation rather than predestined fate.

Through the consistent repetition of themes of female victimization at the hands of villainous landlords in entertainment pieces circulated during the period of land reform, the CCP strengthened the association between the vile nature and wicked acts of the villains depicted in fiction and people’s notion of landlords in general. Moreover, the vast majority of the stories ended with the arrival of the Communists swooping in to save the day by bringing the landlords to justice, thus liberating the female characters and their villages from tyranny. “According to the party’s countless tales of lecherous landlord men, they were by nature perverse sexual deviants,” writes the historian Brian DeMare. “...Simultaneously, Communist propaganda presented the party as the sole savior of peasant women, and, by extension, the peasant family.”²⁵⁸ If landlords embodied the feudal subjugation and victimization of women, the CCP, through its destruction of the landlord class, represented the emancipation of the peasant woman.

However, despite their themes of female liberation, the stories depicted in party-sponsored entertainment strongly adhered to patriarchal beliefs and values concerning women. For example, *Red Leaf River*, *The White-Haired Girl*, and “Jinbao’s Mother” all play into traditional notions about female chastity. In *Red Leaf River*, the daughter-in-law commits suicide after being assaulted by the landlord, thus vindicating the integrity of her chaste intent, which, as the historian Janet Theiss explains, is what determined the legitimacy of a woman’s victimhood in cases of sexual assault in

²⁵⁵ Aminda M. Smith, *Thought Reform and China’s Dangerous Classes: Reeducation, Resistance, and the People* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2013), 104-105.

²⁵⁶ Smith, *Thought Reform*, 118.

²⁵⁷ Hinton, *Fanshen*, 165.

²⁵⁸ DeMare, *Land Wars*, 96.

traditional thinking.²⁵⁹ The protagonist of *The White-Haired Girl* nearly committed suicide as well, only surviving due to the intervention of an elderly maid who refused to listen as the protagonist pleaded, “Aunt Zhang, if you care about me, let me die.”²⁶⁰ Likewise, in “Jinbao’s Mother,” it is revealed that the only reason Cuicui had refrained from killing herself was her sense of duty to her son, Jinbao, whom she could not abandon, thus affirming her decency through her noble, self-sacrificing devotion to her family.²⁶¹ The story also makes a point of emphasizing how virtuous she had been before the landlord’s wiles had forced her into a life of shame, as Comrade Ma is rebuked for his initial poor treatment of Cuicui by an old woman who insists, “[Cuicui] was a good girl when she was young... There was none better for a hundred miles!”²⁶² As such instances show, in order to paint the landlords as truly evil the CCP had to play into existing beliefs about the measure of female victimhood, emphasizing the female characters’ chastity in order to generate sympathy and outrage at their sexual abuse. However, by doing so, the party propaganda served to reinforce those traditional discriminatory gender norms and patriarchal values that subjugated women and repressed their freedom.

In addition to fictionalized accounts in party propaganda, the CCP also used the oppression and abuse suffered by real women to help raise class consciousness amongst the rural population. Women’s suffering played a central role in the party’s “speaking bitterness” campaigns, which featured highly staged “struggle” sessions during which landlords and other “evil tyrants” would be forced to face victims of their abuse who would air their personal stories of woe in front of an outraged crowd of onlookers. This tactic was a key component of the CCP’s moral mobilization of public sentiment against those deemed to be class enemies. As one official proclaimed, “Speaking bitterness is the fundamental method of organizing the masses to demolish the power and influence of the landlord class... [Its] objective is to inspire the class consciousness of the masses, reveal the crimes of the landlord class, and unite and organize the masses to consciously struggle against the landlord class.”²⁶³ Like the fiction of the era, these mass struggle sessions usually involved accusations of sexual misconduct and violation of women to further promote the idea of landlords as perverse sexual predators by nature, thereby inciting moral outrage and antagonism against the class as a whole. However, women themselves were also used as the voice of the oppressed during these meetings. “...in the struggle against feudal evil tyrants and landlords,” one regional party committee declared, “women are the most powerful force in sparking the class consciousness of the masses.”²⁶⁴ Women, whose vulnerability and innocence were believed to be particularly suited to arousing the compassion and sympathy of the masses, were considered “great mobilizers” of public sentiment, maximizing the emotional impact of the struggle sessions.²⁶⁵

Through its speaking bitterness campaign, the CCP gave women a public voice they had long been denied. However, because the bitterness they spoke was intended as a tool to foster class consciousness and educate the public in socialist ideology, women’s grievances were only given

²⁵⁹ Janet M. Theiss, *Disgraceful Matters: The Politics of Chastity in Eighteenth-Century China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), 129.

²⁶⁰ “The White-Haired Girl—Film Script,” MCLC Resource Center: Modern Chinese Literature and Culture, Ohio State University, accessed December 10, 2022, <https://u.osu.edu/mclc/online-series/white/>.

²⁶¹ Smith, *Thought Reform*, 118.

²⁶² Ibid., 115.

²⁶³ Javed, *Righteous Revolutionaries*, 73.

²⁶⁴ Ibid., 84.

²⁶⁵ DeMare, *Land Wars*, 63.

consideration if they aligned with the party's rhetoric of class exploitation. As a result, when it came to gender-specific issues relating to the patriarchal oppression they suffered in their day-to-day lives, women were often silenced, and party officials displayed little patience for women who "do not see class oppression, only their in-laws and husbands."²⁶⁶ Despite previously acknowledging the unique, gender-based discrimination women experienced, by the time of land reform the party had begun to treat female oppression as merely an extension of class exploitation, and therefore to achieve women's liberation was to "consolidate the power of proletarian women of the world, to smash that arbitrary social system of the capitalist class (including both men and women)."²⁶⁷ Due to the neglect of non-class-based issues women faced, land reform campaigns failed to challenge the gender-specific forms of discrimination at the root of female subjugation. On the contrary, in some instances the campaigns even incorporated prejudices concerning gender into their activities; for example, in the village of Zengbu, landlords were shamed by "the defilement of having to kneel while menstruating women stepped over them," thereby reinforcing traditional beliefs about female pollution.²⁶⁸ Thus, despite its claims of women's liberation, by using female suffering as a propagandistic tool to promote class consciousness the land reform campaign failed to confront many of the patriarchal roots of female oppression.

The failure of land reform to adequately address the roots of gender discrimination and inequality was demonstrated by the widespread sexual violence that erupted across the countryside as a result of the campaign. Because sexual victimization was treated as a class issue, female members of landlord households found themselves in an incredibly vulnerable position, as the same people who raged against the violation of peasant women had no similar sympathies or compunctions when it came to the wives and daughters of those deemed to be class enemies. Instead, such women were viewed as yet another piece of property to be seized from the landlords and divided up amongst the people. During his time in Long Bow village, Hinton witnessed numerous instances of abuse, such as in the case of the cadre Man-hsi:

When Man-hsi found a woman of gentry origin alone he took full advantage of his good fortune. Saying, "Bastard landlords, they took our women, why shouldn't we take theirs?" he raped one landlord's daughter...Later he and another militiaman ordered the daughter of a local "money-bags" out of her neighbor's house...they took her to an empty yard and forced themselves upon her.²⁶⁹

While landlords and other "evil tyrants" were subjected to brutal violence and sometimes even death for their crimes, cadres and peasants who preyed on landlord women rarely faced any consequences whatsoever. For example, one local official named Sumei was able to get away scot-free after assaulting a local landlord woman: "While leading the land reform in Chen Village, it was said, he had taken advantage of his authority to rape a landlord's wife. This had been hushed up at the time and in no way had affected Sumei's career...most of the

²⁶⁶ Ibid., 142.kl

²⁶⁷ Smith, *Thought Reform*, 24.

²⁶⁸ Sulamith Heins Potter and Jack M. Potter, *China's Peasant's: The Anthropology of a Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 50-51.

²⁶⁹ Hinton, *Fanshen*, 226.

Chens considered him a man to respect...”²⁷⁰ By treating sexual violence as only a class issue, land reform failed to address the societal attitudes concerning gender and sexuality which fostered an environment that sustained female subjugation and victimization.

Due to their disregard of the gender-specific forms of discrimination women faced, the CCP failed to address the patriarchal ideologies at the root of women’s oppression; moreover, by reinforcing the family household as the economic foundation of the countryside, land reform actually served to strengthen the patriarchal power structure of village society, which would serve to undermine many of the party’s later reform initiatives aimed at improving gender equality.²⁷¹ One such initiative was the Marriage Law of 1950, which aimed to end the “feudal” oppression of women under the traditional marriage system. The document proudly proclaimed that, “As the agrarian reform set free hundreds of millions of landless and land-hungry peasants from oppression by the feudal landlords, so the Marriage Law marks the emancipation of the Chinese women from the feudal marriage system under which they were utterly bereft of rights.”²⁷² Under the new law, all people in China, regardless of gender, were guaranteed rights such as freedom of choice, a minimum marriage age, and the right to divorce. However, despite the newfound rights enshrined in the law, the state failed to address the deeply entrenched patriarchal norms behind the “feudal” practices it aimed to reform, as exemplified by how the propaganda used to promote the law tended to represent the archaic injustice of the old customs through the use of evil stepmother stock characters. For example, in one short story published in the *Women in China Today* pamphlet series, a young couple in love must contend with the girl’s adopted mother who wished to marry her stepdaughter off to a wealthy older gentleman in order to collect a rich bride price:

From the very beginning her foster mother had had mercenary motives in adopting her...The old woman thought that one day she might make a fortune out of her for the Wang family...But things did not turn out as she imagined. Kweilan had spread her wings since she went to work in the factory and now she was actually engaged to a man of her own choice! This was more than the old woman could stand...²⁷³

Many similar narratives were presented through visual storytelling media in order to get around the issue of low literacy rates in the countryside. In Raoyang county, locals were treated to performances of the opera *Xiao nuxu*, which depicted a teenage girl’s struggle against the scheming of her would-be mother-in-law who sought to have her betrothed to her seven-year-old son.²⁷⁴

²⁷⁰ Anita Chan, Richard Madsen, and Jonathan Unger, *Chen Village under Mao and Deng* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 224.

²⁷¹ Kimberley Ens Manning, “The Gendered Politics of Woman-Work: Rethinking Radicalism in the Great Leap Forward,” in *Eating Bitterness: New Perspectives on China’s Great Leap Forward and Famine*, ed. Kimberley Ens Manning and Felix Wemheuer (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2011), 77.

²⁷² *The Marriage Law of the People’s Republic of China* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1950), 1, <http://www.bannedthought.net/China/MaoEra/Women-Family/MarriageLawOfThePRC-1950-OCR-sm.pdf>.

²⁷³ Chen Hsu, “How Wang Kweilan Married the Man of Her Choice,” in *Women in China Today* 8 (All China Democratic Women’s Federation, 1952), 4-5, <http://www.bannedthought.net/China/MaoEra/Women-Family/WICT/WomenInChinaToday-08-2ndEd.pdf>.

²⁷⁴ Edward Friedman, Paul G. Pickowicz, Mark Selden, and Kay Ann Johnson, *Chinese Village, Socialist State* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), 121-122.

Through such stories, party propaganda fashioned older female family members of traditional households into the stereotypical villain for the marriage reform crusade to thwart, thus sidestepping the deeper patriarchal norms at the heart of the issue.

By focusing on the older generation of women as the villains in the fight for freedom of choice in marriage, party propaganda failed to confront the patriarchal roots from which the restrictive traditional marriage practices stemmed. As a result, for many women, especially those in rural areas, the promises of the Marriage Law remained more fantasy than reality. For example, one woman's description of her brother's wedding in 1974 shows how traditional practices persisted even decades after the law was passed:

The matchmaker found a family of good class background with a strong, healthy, and attractive daughter. Both parents agreed upon the bride price, dowry, and wedding arrangements...But the daughter was aloof and resisted marriage. It turned out that she fancied another young man and wanted to marry him, but he had a bad class background and her parents objected. When Little Brother found out she had a boyfriend, he didn't want to marry her, and Father agreed, saying "One shouldn't take a chance on used goods. She's like a used shoe..."²⁷⁵

Her account reveals how little power many women still had over their marital choices. The woman in the story was barred from marrying the man she loved due to her parents' disapproval, and despite her own reluctance, it was only Little Brother's change of heart that prevented her from being forced into an unwanted marriage with someone else. Moreover, the father's comments reveal how traditional values of female chastity continued to determine a woman's worth as a human being in the eyes of many.

In addition, although the Marriage Law guaranteed the right to divorce, the patriarchal reality of many women's lives impeded their ability to exercise that power. Many husbands and in-laws responded with violence to the suggestion of divorce, leading to a sharp spike in deaths between 1950 and 1953.²⁷⁶ When women did seek divorce, they were forced to obtain permission from their local, predominantly male, authorities, who often prioritized the husband's interests over the woman's. Such was the case with Lilou, a woman who was denied a divorce because her local officials were concerned for her husband's ability to remarry:

...she had petitioned the land reform workteam for a divorce, but the cadres had refused. If divorced, they feared, her husband would never be able to find another woman. Her repeated requests over the next two decades were always denied on the same grounds by the brigade's male officers. Once she ran away but was caught by a village search party.²⁷⁷

²⁷⁵ B. Michael Frolic, "Little Brother's Wedding," in *Mao's People: Sixteen Portraits of Life in Revolutionary China* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), 90-91.

²⁷⁶ Gail Hershatler, "Women and China's Socialist Construction, 1949-78," *Asia-Pacific Journal* 17, no. 12 (2019): 6.

²⁷⁷ Chan, *Chen Village*, 138.

Even though she was desperate enough to attempt to flee, the village authorities refused to grant Lilou her legal right to divorce, forcing her instead to stay with her detested husband so that he would have a wife to care for him. Furthermore, even if a woman was able to overcome the aforementioned barriers, the persistence of the patrilocal tradition often inhibited her ability to leave her husband. Women tended to marry out of their village, moving in with their husband's family far from the familiarity of their hometown. Without the presence of their family or extended kinship relations to provide a support network, many women did not have the resources or ability to leave behind an unhappy marriage.²⁷⁸ Despite the Marriage Law's best intentions, the party's failure to address the patriarchal norms that governed many women's lives ensured that, for many, the reality fell far short of the party's expectations.

Despite the disparity between the law's intentions and its execution, the CCP celebrated it as a major step towards women's liberation. As one 1950 pamphlet proclaimed, thanks to the Marriage Law "the women of all of China...have broken out of the feudal shackles that have held them for several thousand years..."²⁷⁹ The next decisive step to finalize that process would be to ensure equality in the workforce. "In order to build a great socialist society, it is of the utmost importance to arouse the broad masses of women to join in productive activity," declared Mao. "Men and women must receive equal pay for equal work in production. Genuine equality between the sexes can only be realized in the process of the socialist transformation of society as a whole."²⁸⁰ From the early 1950s, countless posters displaying images of women working in the fields or in industrial production circulated across China, while women's capacity to match men in production labor was celebrated in songs such as "At the Well-Head," which proclaimed:

Hearts as one, the boy and girl
With equal force propel the wheel.
She keeps pace as firm he pushes,
Silver water swishing gushes...²⁸¹

However, despite the emphasis on equality in party propaganda, in reality the endurance of patriarchal norms and values ensured that gender discrimination persisted. Women's work was devalued as female workers consistently earned less for their labor than their male counterparts. For example, in order to soothe the male villagers' egos, the work teams in Chen Village developed a system that ensured no woman would ever surpass a man in their daily earnings:

Indeed, [8.5] eventually became the minimal rating for male adults, even for those who were weak and lazy. A major reason for this development was, ironically, the steadfast insistence by the men of Chen Village that no man should be allowed to slip below any woman in the scale of prestige defined by workpoint rating. In most of

²⁷⁸ Hershatter, "Women and China's Socialist Construction," 7.

²⁷⁹ Dong Jianzhi, *Li Fengjin: How the New Marriage Law Helped Chinese Women Stand Up*, ed. Susan Glosser (Portland: Opal Mogus Books, 2005), 1.

²⁸⁰ Mao Zedong, "Quotations from Mao Tse Tung: 31. Women," *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung*, Marxists Internet Archive, accessed December 1, 2022, <https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/works/red-book/ch31.htm>.

²⁸¹ Richard King, "Romancing the Leap: Euphoria in the Moment before Disaster," in *Eating Bitterness: New Perspectives on China's Great Leap Forward and Famine*, ed. Kimberley Ens Manning and Felix Wemheuer (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2011), 58.

the production teams, no woman under the Dazhai program ever was granted a rating of more than 7.5 points a day.²⁸²

This sort of systematic inequality was a universal feature of the agricultural collectives across the Chinese countryside. Likewise, though it was not as overt, a similar phenomenon occurred in the cities as well. While state-owned industries guaranteed equal pay for equal work, urban women often found themselves assigned to lower-paying positions.²⁸³ Though state propaganda recognized the importance of wage equality, it tended to treat the issue like an already-realized goal, and thus insufficient effort was devoted to promoting equal pay for women or to attacking the gender biases that led to wage discrimination in the first place.

Moreover, while the state poured a great deal of energy and resources into campaigns aimed at mobilizing female labor by calling on women to step into traditionally male roles in the workforce, there were no similar efforts made to encourage men to assume a share of the responsibility for tasks that were traditionally considered to be women's domestic duties. As such, women found themselves saddled with the double burden of both industrial/agricultural production and the invisible domestic labor that went unpaid and was taken for granted by both the state and society. For example, morning broadcasts in Chen Village reflected the unequal burden that was expected of women: "The first announcement was to get the women out of bed to allow them ample time to feed the pigs and prepare breakfast before their husbands arose."²⁸⁴ These same women were forced to toil long into the night, taking care of housework while their husbands relaxed in the evenings.²⁸⁵ Moreover, in "Little Brother's Wedding," the narrator revealed how such an unbalanced division of labor was an unquestioned part of Chinese women's lives, recalling the displeasure the bride's mother expressed upon learning that her child would be the only daughter-in-law present in the husband's household: "She wasn't at all pleased that Big Brother and his wife were living in the county town, or that Middle Brother had not yet married... This meant that her daughter would bear the brunt of the household work..."²⁸⁶ Despite the fact that multiple other family members lived in the same home, it was a foregone conclusion on both the part of the bride's family and the groom's that the bulk of the responsibility for taking care of the housework would fall on the shoulders of the bride. With the double burden of state production work and domestic labor, Chinese women were forced to shoulder far more than a mere "half the sky."

In many ways, the Communist regime did liberate women from the constraints of the past, granting them newfound political rights and legal protections, and breaking down many of the barriers that had limited their ability to engage in economic, civic, and social roles that had previously been restricted to men. However, due to the focus on women's liberation as a tool to promote the socialist agenda of the state, issues specifically relating to gender discrimination were often subsumed under notions of class struggle, enabling the roots of that discrimination to continue largely unchallenged. As a result, women's liberation in practice often fell far short of the claims touted by party propaganda.

²⁸² Chan, *Chen Village*, 92-93.

²⁸³ Hershatter, "Women in China's Socialist Construction," 10.

²⁸⁴ Chan, *Chen Village*, 85.

²⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 67.

²⁸⁶ Frolic, "Little Brother's Wedding," 91.

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An Attack on Campus: How an Incident of Discrimination Demonstrates the Power and Bias of Heterosexual Involvement in Queer Advocacy

Sabrina Sutter

1.1 Introduction

The history of civil rights is one defined by a series of small battles and victories in the face of opposition. The development of the visibility and rights of the queer community in the United States is no different. Characterized by continuous yet seemingly unimpactful progress stretched over the latter half of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century, the development of the rights of those with differing sexual orientations has been a complete transformation from the preexisting social convention.

There is a clear relationship between advocacy for a marginalized group and the public acceptance of the rights of that community. This is well demonstrated in the process towards the recognition of queer student presence on Towson University's campus following an incident of discrimination against a heterosexual student who was defending a homosexual professor. This article explores this relationship, the historical context for queer identity and rights at Towson University, and the roles of supporting heterosexual students in enacting positive change. This study of queer rights at Towson is set within the broader history of queer rights in the United States. It utilizes the university student newspaper, *The Towerlight* to track the development of a queer community presence on campus. Answering these questions provide a more detailed picture of the development and acceptance of an open queer presence on Towson University's campus, as well as give insight into the progress of queer rights across the United States of America

2.1 The development of Queer rights in the United States

To understand how Towson State University's history of queer rights came to be, the wider climate of the United States surrounding homosexuality and the queer community must be examined. For the purposes of this article, the blanket term 'queer' will be used in its reclaimed capacity to refer to those who do not experience or identify with heterosexual attraction.²⁸⁷ As such, the queer community encompasses those who self-identify specifically as 'homosexual,' 'gay,' or 'lesbian,' as will be mentioned in this article. Throughout the country's history, the queer community has traditionally been looked upon as a problem to be controlled.²⁸⁸ This has led to the queer population being forced to hide in plain sight, taking precautionary measures to fit into the rest of "normal"

²⁸⁷ Kolker, Zoe M., Philip C. Taylor, and M. Paz Galupo. "'As a Sort of Blanket Term': Qualitative Analysis of Queer Sexual Identity Marking." *Sexuality & Culture: An Interdisciplinary Journal* 24, no. 5 (October 1, 2020) p. 1340 doi:10.1007/s12119-019-09686-4.

²⁸⁸ Lillian Faderman, "Lawbreakers and Loonies," in *The Gay Revolution: The Story of the Struggle* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2015) p. 5

society. This includes maintaining heterosexual romantic relationships, taking care to maintain an image of stereotypical masculinity or femininity, and simply avoiding attention as much as possible. However, the attitude towards homosexuality found on TSU's campus in 1992 can ultimately trace its roots back to the 1970's and 1980's, in which recent gains in national legislation for the queer community prompted a wave of backlash from an increasingly agitated conservative Christian political faction.

The need to create new safe havens, ones that had not yet been busted by the police, led to the creation of the first queer groups. Groups such as The Mattachine Society and the Daughters of Bilitis were formed during the 1950's to provide a space for their members to socialize and discuss queer issues.²⁸⁹ While the purpose of these groups was social, the members who wished to advocate for queer rights began to make their voices heard. As the decades went on and the number of organizations increased, queer grassroots groups openly campaigning for better conditions for their community began to see results. The United States' Queer population achieved a massive victory in the American Psychiatric Association's (APA) decision in 1973 to omit homosexuality from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, effectively removing an argument and justification for discrimination.²⁹⁰ In the eyes of Christian and other Conservative fundamentalists, this decision was one of validation towards an immoral and degenerate lifestyle; they began campaigning for protecting the sanctity of American culture. Conservative icon, Anita Bryant and the Save our Children campaign in 1977 was one such in which Bryant campaigned to have local ordinances providing civil rights protections to Queer people rescinded on the basis that it discriminated against those who wished for their children to be raised in environments based on Christian values.²⁹¹ This resulted in a wave of legislative repeals, and in 1978 California State Senator John Briggs introduced Proposition 6 legislation that would bar queer teachers from working in public schools.²⁹² While Proposition 6 was successfully defeated, the narrow margins of its defeat were indicative of the popularity of anti-gay sentiment that had characterized the decade. Coinciding with these legislative battles was a rise in attacks and hate crimes against the queer population, emboldened by rhetoric casting queer people as predatory deviants, intent on targeting children. These campaigns culminated in the 1978 assassination of openly gay politician Harvey Milk by Dan White, a conservative Christian and former Republican politician.²⁹³ Just as Proposition 6 was defeated only by a narrow margin, White was convicted only for manslaughter, sending a clear message regarding how Queer life was valued.

The HIV/AIDS crisis provided anti-gay campaigners with potent tools towards the decimation of queer advocacy. First appearing in the United States in 1981, AIDS was quickly characterized as a disease whose transmission was primarily enacted through queer sexual contact.²⁹⁴ As the years went on and the situation grew into a localized epidemic, AIDS became the latest weapon of

²⁸⁹ Lillian Faderman. "The Daughters," in *The Gay Revolution: The Story of the Struggle* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2015) p. 77

²⁹⁰ Craig A Rimmerman, "The Assimilationist and Liberationist Strategies in Historical Context," in *The Lesbian and Gay Movements: Assimilation or Liberation?* Vol. 2nd ed. Dilemmas in American Politics (New York: Routledge, 2014) p. 27 <https://search-ebscohost-com.proxy-tu.researchport.umd.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=nlebk&AN=828839&site=eds-live&scope=site>.

²⁹¹ Rimmerman, "Liberationist," p. 28

²⁹² Rimmerman, "Liberationist," p. 30

²⁹³ Ibid.

²⁹⁴ Rimmerman, "Liberationist," p. 36

conservative Christian fundamentalists who were further emboldened by the wave of conservatism which swept the United States alongside the 1980 election of Ronald Reagan, and while entities such as the National Institutes of Health underutilized their budgets in regards to AIDS research, conservative politicians and groups such as Moral Majority successfully blocked legislation that would have funded counseling and education regarding AIDS past pushes for abstinence and heterosexual marriage.²⁹⁵ To fundamentalists, AIDS was the natural consequence for going against the natural laws of God. Rather than concern themselves with assisting those who had contracted the virus, focus instead went into preventing its spread into the general population. Calls for quarantining and tattooing those who had contracted the virus were openly proposed, and legislatively, the Reagan administration refused to officially address the epidemic for fear of alienating a conservative base that would interpret government support as approval of a homosexual lifestyle.²⁹⁶ Conservative castigation of the Queer community, the deliberate obstruction of education regarding AIDS outside of a rejection of homosexuality, and the purposeful ignorance of the federal government all combined to create a political climate decidedly set against the queer community emerging from the 1980's. This was the national climate in which queer students, professors and staff lived in which made the incident occurring at Towson in 1992 an important marker in the history of queer rights.

2.2 The development of an open queer presence on Towson University's campus

Towson University experienced much of the same development internally as the country did in terms of acquiring a slowly growing presence of open queer people. Much of this development can be traced through the student newspaper, *The Towerlight*. The first mention of homosexuality in *The Towerlight* comes in 1968, where a student who self-identified as a heterosexual married man gave queer people a defense in an opinion piece.²⁹⁷ While the language dates the statement, the piece is positive and condemns society for its treatment of queer people. Interestingly, this piece saw an anonymous response by a queer student, who politely corrected the original author's well-meaning misconceptions of the community.²⁹⁸ This interaction sparked related articles, and *The Towerlight* went on to run various other articles such as interviews with anonymous queer students who explained what queer life was like, and to track the larger national movement for queer rights.²⁹⁹

Similar discrimination against queer people at the national level also affected the queer population of Towson State College. In 1973, the same year that the APA declassified homosexuality as a mental illness, *The Towerlight* announced the creation of the institution's first open queer organization, the Gay Student Alliance (GSA). At the same time, editors commented in a separate article that lesbianism is both unnatural and has the goal of converting heterosexual women.³⁰⁰ These comments were swiftly and openly refuted by the GSA in the issue that followed, thus setting

²⁹⁵ Rimmerman, "Liberationist," p. 38

²⁹⁶ Rimmerman, "Liberationist," p. 40

²⁹⁷ Blaine Taylor, "Society's opinion of sexual deviancy regarded as outmoded and archaic," *Towerlight* (Towson, MD), December 6, 1968. <https://archives.towson.edu/Documents/Detail/tower-light-december-6-1968/138866?item=260891>

²⁹⁸ "Letters to the editor: On homosexuality...", *Towerlight* (Towson, MD), December 13, 1968. <https://archives.towson.edu/Documents/Detail/tower-light-december-13-1968/138858?item=260944>

²⁹⁹ "Homosexuals are not enemies of the people," *The Towerlight* (Towson, MD), March 12, 1971. <https://archives.towson.edu/Documents/Detail/the-towerlight-march-12-1971/139350?item=261388>

³⁰⁰ "Commentary: Women's Lib: Back to Basics," *The Towerlight* (Towson, MD), March 16, 1973. <https://archives.towson.edu/Documents/Detail/the-towerlight-march-16-1973/140052?item=262456>

a pattern of claims, pushback, and rebuttals.³⁰¹ Later in 1978, following the national rebuke of Proposition 6, Towson University's first Student Government Association (SGA) affiliated queer student group was accepted. It marked the visibility of queer students on campus even though advertisements and articles promoting support and social groups for queer people had been run for years.³⁰² There was considerable backlash against SGA, which decided to refuse the group's budget, thus quietly destroying it.³⁰³

By the time of the AIDS crisis, campus had become as divided on the issue as the rest of the nation had, with high profile instances of harassment against queer students in the 1980's, including one instance in 1988 in which a group of students displayed a bedsheet in a dormitory window which read "STOP AIDS, KILL A FAG."³⁰⁴ In response, the Committee on Gay and Lesbian and Bisexual issues was formed to begin combatting the rising amount of hate on campus.³⁰⁵ By the 1990's, advertisements for AIDS testing on campus, updates on the progress of cases involving queer rights, and various positive and negative opinion pieces had all appeared in *The Towerlight*. In 1990 however, a new push for queer organization occurred, and the institution's first SGA-affiliated queer group to survive was formed. The Diverse Sexual Orientation Collective, or DSOC, named to avoid attracting attention from the wider campus, was formed, and advertised in *The Towerlight*.³⁰⁶

3.0 The Hollie Rice attack

The struggle between queer visibility and threats against the queer population continued well past 1990. Yet by 1992, Towson State University (TSU) was confronted by the reality of its queer community on all levels of its institution. DSOC's public activities and its affiliation with TSU provided a forum for openly queer students to organize openly including by drawing heterosexual sympathizers. The university had a course on homosexuality in literature on its books and one professor, Dr. David Bergman, was an openly gay man.³⁰⁷ The administration itself was repeatedly confronted by the Committee of Gay and Lesbian and Bisexual issues with the reality of the vulnerability of its queer population, especially because of the noticeable rise in harassment faced by queer and other minority students.³⁰⁸ In 1992, sexual orientation was not yet classified as a protected status and the extant regime which had been reinforced by the 1986 Supreme Court case, *Bowers v. Hardwick* specifically excluded gay men and lesbians from constitutional protection, universities had to create their own instruments of protection for their queer students and staff. Some

³⁰¹ Stephanie Lerner, "Letters," *The Towerlight* (Towson, MD), March 23, 1973.

<https://archives.towson.edu/Documents/Detail/towerlight-march-23-1973/140070?item=262515>

³⁰² S. L. Verch, "Senate votes Gay Alliance recognition," *The Towerlight* (Towson, MD), May 5, 1978.

<https://archives.towson.edu/Documents/Detail/the-towerlight-may-5-1978/141683>

³⁰³ Debbie Pelton, "Senate votes down Gay Alliance budget," *The Towerlight* (Towson, MD), November 10, 1978.

<https://archives.towson.edu/Documents/Detail/the-towerlight-november-10-1978/141814><https://archives.towson.edu/Documents/Detail/the-towerlight-november-10-1978/141814>

³⁰⁴ Paula E. Languth, "Gay Awareness Takes Root at Towson State," *The Baltimore Alternative* (Baltimore, MD), November 1990.

³⁰⁵ Ibid.

³⁰⁶ Bob Johnson and Judith Burkhardt, "Information for gay, lesbian, and bisexual students," *The Towerlight*. (Towson, MD), September 6, 1990. <https://archives.towson.edu/Documents/Detail/the-towerlight-september-6-1990/146291?item=269110>

³⁰⁷ Languth, "Awareness," 1990.

³⁰⁸ Sean M. SeLegue, "Campus Anti-Slur Regulations: Speakers, Victims, and the First Amendment," *California Law Review* 79, no. 3 (1991) p. 920 <https://doi.org/10.2307/3480838>.

created³⁰⁹ For months, the Committee had petitioned the administration to review its statement of non-discrimination to include sexual orientation especially because the military's ban on queer servicemembers in ROTC conflicted with the university's broad³¹⁰ On March 4, the President's Staff received a memo from the Committee urging the adoption of a statement on sexual orientation in the official university compliance statement, but because it was not legally required, the university decided to hold off³¹¹

On March 11, 1992, exactly one week after the President's Staff received the Committee of Gay and Lesbian and Bisexual Issues' memo, there was an attack. English education major and sophomore Hollie Rice stood in the University Union chatting with a friend about one of her professors, Dr. David Bergman.³¹² After Rice's friend left, she was then approached by a man she did not know, who had overheard their conversation. He began to rant about Bergman, claiming he should not be allowed to teach because he was openly gay. After the man tried to get her to agree with him and then accused her of being a lesbian, Rice told him she found him to be ignorant, and turned to leave.³¹³ The man then assaulted her, punching her in the face so hard she fell to the ground, and he ran out of the Union.³¹⁴ According to Dr. Bergman, after getting her bearings, Rice then ran to nearby Linthicum Hall, where she found Bergman in the mail room. Bloodied, she explained what had happened, and he urged her to go to the police and report the assault.³¹⁵

News of the attack spread around campus immediately, and it sparked a wave of outrage. *The Towerlight* reported the assault on April 2, as well as the news that Rice had received a letter through a friend's mail detailing death threats towards every queer student on campus. It stated Rice herself would be killed along with them if she continued to advocate for them.³¹⁶ In the same issue, *The Towerlight* discussed the low reporting of hate crimes, with many members of DSOC coming forward to claim they often did not report the harassment they received on a regular basis.³¹⁷ Over the course of the month, a police sketch of the attacker was circulated, and there were several articles and editorials discussing the attack.³¹⁸ They questioned what it said about the Towson State University community that not only could this happen, but that the attacker was not caught because nobody was coming forward.³¹⁹ The editor of *The Towerlight* stated Hollie Rice's attacker had

³⁰⁹ SeLegue, "Anti-Slur," p. 920

³¹⁰ Barbara Slater, "Memo to Hoke Smith," Committee on Gay and Lesbian and Bisexual Issues, February 19, 2022.

³¹¹ "Materials related to sexual orientation clause (HS)," President's Confidential Staff Meeting notes, March 4, 1992.

³¹² Lisa Goldberg, "Student battered for supporting gay rights: Conversation in Union ends in violence, death threats," *The Towerlight* (Towson, MD), April 2, 1992. <https://archives.towson.edu/Documents/Detail/the-towerlight-april-2-1992/147131?item=270679>

³¹³ Ibid.

³¹⁴ Ibid.

³¹⁵ David Bergman (retired professor) in discussion with author, "Oral History," transcript of interview given on Zoom and saved on Panopto, April 8, 2022. [2a#](#)

³¹⁶ Ibid.

³¹⁷ Coreen Dee Bruce, "Campus hate crimes often go unreported," *The Towerlight* (Towson, MD), April 2, 1992. <https://archives.towson.edu/Documents/Detail/the-towerlight-april-2-1992/147131?item=270679>

³¹⁸ "Can you identify this man?" *The Towerlight* (Towson, MD), April 16, 1992. <https://archives.towson.edu/Documents/Detail/the-towerlight-april-16-1992/147186?item=270748>

³¹⁹ John M. Gissendanner, "Letters to the Editor: What is Hollie Rice's attacker learning at TSU?" *The Towerlight* (Towson, MD), April 16, 1992. <https://archives.towson.edu/Documents/Detail/the-towerlight-april-16-1992/147186?item=270807>

learned nothing at TSU, only to be countered by Professor John M. Gissendanner, a colleague of Dr. Bergman, who wrote a response in the April 16 issue as follows:

The saddest commentary is, he has learned a great deal and one of the things he has learned is that the atmosphere of the community allows what he did to be sanctioned, and even applauded, by some members of the community who share not only his beliefs but also his method of handling disagreement.³²⁰




Figure 1.³²¹

Hollie Rice had found herself at the center of the conflict. Originally a member of a conservative Christian sorority, she was thrown out by her sisters for defending Dr. Bergman's right to teach as an openly gay professor.³²² As a result of the death threats she had received, Rice felt it safer to continue the rest of the semester by commuting from her parents' home, leaving campus.³²³ DSOC, of which Hollie Rice counted herself a member and ally, was furious at what had happened to her.³²⁴ In the aftermath of the attack, members of DSOC admitted there had been a new wave of harassment against queer students, emboldened by the actions of Rice's attacker.³²⁵ In response, DSOC held an awareness rally which both Rice and Bergman attended.³²⁶ It was the biggest event the student organization had organized yet, and with signs and chants DSOC openly protested the treatment Rice, Bergman, and they themselves had received.³²⁷

The university administration found itself with a metaphorical gun to its head. Exactly one week before the attack on Hollie Rice, the President's Staff had received a memo urging the adoption of

³²⁰ Gissendanner, "Letters to the Editor: What is Hollie Rice's attacker learning at TSU?"

³²¹ "Can you identify this man?"

³²² Bergman, "Oral History."

³²³ Lillian Faderman, "America Hunts for Witches," in *The Gay Revolution: The Story of the Struggle* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2015) p. 20

³²⁴ Bergman, "Oral History."

³²⁵ Goldberg, "battered"

³²⁶ Katie Schuerholtz, "DSOC responds to hate crimes with violence awareness rally." *The Towerlight*. (Towson, MD), April 16, 1992. <https://archives.towson.edu/Documents/Detail/the-towerlight-april-16-1992/147186?item=270748>

³²⁷ Schuerholtz, "awareness."

sexual orientation as part of the compliance statement, but because it was not legally required, they decided to hold off on doing so. In the aftermath of the attack, the President's Staff received a memo from Dr. Guy Wolf II, chairman of the Committee on Gay and Lesbian and Bisexual issues discussing the recent attack:

It is our recommendation that you publicly reaffirm the statement on non-discrimination with regard to sexual orientation as noted on page 3 of the university catalog. It is the consensus of the committee that the university has not been forceful enough in providing the protection it has promised.³²⁸

Wolf ended the memo with a request on behalf of the committee to adopt the statement on sexual orientation as a protected status which had been passed by the University of Maryland College Park.³²⁹ The President's Staff agreed that any statements released by the administration regarding hate crimes in the future be announced by President Hoke Smith, and they printed a statement in *The Towerlight* regarding TSU's intolerance of violence.³³⁰

4.0 Analysis of the Attack

People asked themselves how this could happen on Towson State University's campus, and the answer lies in the historical development of both TSU and the nation's open queer community. Tensions on campus had been building for years, exacerbated by the increasing visibility and activism of queer people despite rising conservatism during the previous decade and the reputation that the gay community had gained due to the AIDS crisis. Campus had AIDS clinics and was advertising small queer student support groups; it also ran advertisements for the GALO meetings at the Newman Center.³³¹ Sexual orientation was listed in the non-discrimination statement in the course catalogs, implying a degree of tolerance towards TSU's queer community. However, such tolerance was not appreciated by many on campus, with the foundation of fear propagated by conservative groups such as Moral Majority in the 1980s and misinformation regarding AIDS which spread the idea that queer people were a detriment and danger to society. According to *The Sun*, in 1982 a student was suspended for a year after assaulting his queer roommate upon discovering his sexuality.³³² The bedsheet incident in 1988 which prompted the creation of the Committee on Gay and Lesbian and Bisexual Issues had passively called for the murder of queer students on campus. In the aftermath of the Hollie Rice attack, members of DSOC admitted they had experienced harassment that went unreported.³³³ This sentiment had festered and grown through the 1980s, and with constitutional protections being refused to queer people based on their sexual orientation, there was little universities could do to officially limit hate speech. When the students who had displayed

³²⁸ Dr. Guy Wolf II, "Memo to Hoke Smith: Assault on campus," April 15, 1992.

³²⁹ Ibid.

³³⁰ Dorothy, Siegel, "Administration responds to gay-bashing." *The Towerlight*. (Towson, MD), April 16, 1992. <https://archives.towson.edu/Documents/Detail/the-towerlight-april-16-1992/147186?item=270807>

³³¹ Corrine DiMassimantonio, "Gays, Lesbians reachout at Newman Center," *The Towerlight* (Towson, MD), October 6, 1988. <https://archives.towson.edu/Documents/Detail/the-towerlight-october-6-1988/145524?item=267777>

³³² Diane Winston, "Gays, Lesbians Learn that the Campus Life is One of Contradictions," *The Sun* (1837-), Nov 18, 1990. <https://proxy-tu.researchport.umd.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/historical-newspapers/gays-lesbians-learn-that-campus-life-is-one/docview/1734229373/se-2?accountid=14378>.

³³³ Bruce, "hate crimes"

the bedsheet calling for the killing of queer people were reported by a passerby, no punishment had been issued other than a warning.³³⁴ DSOC members received harassment, and it remained taboo to be openly queer. The development of an open queer presence on campus collided with fear and anger regarding the danger queer people purportedly posed. The attack against Hollie Rice was simply the outcome of those tensions.

There is an important aspect of the attack against Hollie Rice that was not fully explored during the initial discourse. The attack was inherently a hate crime, yet it was a hate crime committed against a person who was not a member of the community the attacker was targeting. While people acknowledged Hollie Rice was a self-identified heterosexual woman, and multiple members of the queer community expressed confusion and outrage that someone outside their community was attacked for being affiliated with them, the implications of the demographics Rice fit were not discussed. Hollie Rice was a self-identifying heterosexual woman, a devout Christian, and described as conventionally attractive.³³⁵ When Rice became the victim of a hate crime originally meant to be the expression of anger and disgust towards a gay man, it completely changed the view of the attack. To the public, the attack was no longer against a member of society's margins, whom many would argue did warrant such an attack, but against an innocent bystander simply expressing their opinion. This, combined with the fact Rice went on to mention in the interview with *The Towerlight* that she had received death threats for her involvement in the incident and would have to move off campus only increased the tragedy in the eyes of the public. Hollie Rice was painfully innocent, and while there was some disdain for the person she had chosen to defend, nobody was coming forward to say she deserved to be physically assaulted.

The centrality of Hollie Rice who was seen as a socially acceptable member of society underscore that the public response to the attack was not necessarily in favor of gay rights. Similar acts of violence on Towson State University's campus had occurred in years prior which society had turned blind eyes on. Indeed, if Dr. Bergman himself had been attacked there may have been minimal outcry. Yet the attack on the completely innocent and socially acceptable Rice changed the conversation only mildly in favor of TSU's queer community. If the outrage had been kept only on the attack on Rice's free speech, there may not have been as much attention on the plight of the queer students and faculty. Since Rice was attacked while defending her gay professor, the homophobia could not be separated from the attention the attack was receiving. The university's queer community was suddenly receiving attention as well, which it capitalized on. The awareness rally put together by DSOC was not only meant to raise awareness of homophobia but also awareness of the existence of queer people on campus in general. It also revealed how homophobia impacted daily lives in negative and dangerous ways. Dr. Bergman spoke at the rally and thanked Rice for her defense of him, noting that, while he would never ask a student to put themselves in harm's way for him, he was incredibly grateful for what she had done.³³⁶ The Committee of Gay and Lesbian and Bisexual Issues used the platform to highlight the administration's weak protection of queer people. The attack and the subsequent wave of harassment would traditionally have been a reset to the status quo, but Rice's involvement garnered enough sympathy to turn the public response in favor of the queer community.

³³⁴ Languth, "Gay Awareness"

³³⁵ Bergman, "Oral History."

³³⁶ Bergman, "Oral History."

The Hollie Rice incident was significant for the trajectory rights and protection for the queer community at Towson State University. A committed ally, Hollie Rice continued her involvement with DSOC and her outspoken advocacy for the queer community. In October of 1993 DSOC held another awareness event, the biggest DSOC event since the 1992 rally, and Rice was an attendee and participated in a skit.³³⁷ She answered questions for *The Sun* interview, discussed the event and debated vocal opponents.³³⁸ Dr. Bergman continued teaching at Towson State University until his eventual retirement, and DSOC went on to become the Queer Student Union, an organization which continues to be active on Towson University's campus in 2022.³³⁹ The attack did not completely remove hatred on campus, but when asked whether he thought the attack improved conditions on campus, Dr. Bergman said yes.³⁴⁰ According to Bergman, the outrage people felt and the questions raised on who should be allowed to exist on campus in peace favored the community going forward and set a new benchmark for behavior.³⁴¹ In 1995 when the city of Towson's pride event had to be moved to a different location, Towson State University hosted it, and drew over 7,000 attendees.³⁴² The Queer Student Union has been joined over the years by similar groups advocating for the rights of gender non-conforming individuals and queer people of color, and efforts to combat hate crime has led to the university creating multiple pathways to report incidents and educate students to stop hate from happening in the first place.³⁴³

5.0 Conclusion

The violence that occurred against Hollie Rice and the larger queer community on Towson State University's campus was both a sign and product of its time. As tension grew throughout the development of queer visibility both on campus and in the country at large due to things such as the new wave of conservatism during the 1980's as well as the AIDS crisis, the attack on TSU's campus was inevitable. What was not inevitable though was the impact the target of the attack and the involvement of the wider queer community on campus would have in moving forward. Hollie Rice's involvement as a heterosexual woman simply exercising her right to free speech in defense of her gay professor changed the narrative enough to allow focus on how violence affects the queer community without being distracted by disdain. It can be reasonably argued that Rice's involvement rather than Dr. Bergman himself was the key to forcing TSU students to reflect on what they consider acceptable behavior. However, while this ultimately resulted in progress for TSU, it is important to understand and acknowledge that it took a heterosexual woman experiencing violence regularly faced by queer people for that violence to be challenged by the wider campus community. A lack of institutional protections, both on the university and federal level, allowed a climate of

³³⁷ Thomas W. Waldron, "Gay-Rights Advocates Rally at Towson State: Noon March Aimed at Raising Awareness," *The Sun* (1837-), Nov 12, 1993. <https://proxy-tu.researchport.umd.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/historical-newspapers/gay-rights-advocates-rally-at-towson-state/docview/2121295814/se-2?accountid=14378>.

³³⁸ Ibid.

³³⁹ "Events at Towson University," Towson University. Accessed May 12, 2022. https://events.towson.edu/group/queer_student_union_qsu.

³⁴⁰ Bergman, "Oral History."

³⁴¹ Ibid.

³⁴² Tanya Jones Sun, Staff Writer. "Gay Pride Fest Moves to Towson: Venue Switched from Wyman Park." *The Sun* (1837-), Jun 12, 1995. <https://proxy-tu.researchport.umd.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/historical-newspapers/gay-pride-fest-moves-towson/docview/2463202228/se-2?accountid=14378>.

³⁴³ "Hate & Bias Prevention Support and Education," Towson University. <https://www.towson.edu/inclusionequity/hate-bias.html>

violence to grow until it affected somebody outside of the primarily affected group. Through the outrage and condemnation of those on campus of the attack, Towson State University as an institution was able to move forward. However, it is imperative to understand the bias towards heterosexual advocacy in regard to the advancement of queer rights both on campus and in the nation as a whole lest progress be delayed until issues begin to affect the heterosexual population.

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